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History versus Anti-History

A Critique
of the Bourgeois Falsification
of the Postwar
History of the CPSU



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS
MOSCOW

Translated from the Russian

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ИСТОРИЯ ПРОТИВ АНТИИСТОРИИ
На английском языке

First printing 1977

© Издательство политической литературы, 1973 г.

© Translated into English from the revised Russian edition, Progress Publishers 1977

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

М $\frac{10506-599}{014 (01)-77}$ 93-77

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INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the publication of Marx and Engels's *Communist Manifesto*, its critics, the forefathers of modern anti-communism, maintained that communism was a delusion and that its ideas were untenable. As we know, such statements have not stood the test of time. Now, one hundred and thirty years later, it is immeasurably more difficult for the enemies of progress to preach the inevitability of the failure of communist ideas. They have, therefore, resorted to other methods. At an international symposium on "Marx and the Western World" held in the United States in the late 1960s, for example, the American sociologist Gerhart Niemeyer made a noteworthy remark to the effect that many bourgeois sociologists are "Marxists" but while accepting Marx's diagnosis they reject his prognosis.

This and many other examples repeatedly confirm the truth of Lenin's words: "The dialectics of history were such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to *disguise themselves as Marxists*."¹

A major testament to the victory of Marxism-Leninism is its embodiment in the socialism that has been established in the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. Consequently, it is against this socialism that the most furious attacks of contemporary anti-communism are directed. A special branch of anti-communism has taken shape—"so-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 584.

vietology'', which can without any exaggeration be called anti-Sovietism.

Carrying out ideological subversion against the Soviet Union, bourgeois theorists seek to discredit the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU in the eyes of world public opinion. In their efforts to achieve their goals, the ideologists of imperialism resort to crude falsification of the activity of the CPSU at all periods in the Party's history, but they are especially drawn to the period since the end of World War Two.

The first postwar years... Again and again they rise up in our memory. How dear victory cost the USSR is well known. The war took the lives of 20 million Soviet citizens. The material losses to the Soviet people reached the astronomical figure of 2,600 thousand million rubles. Around 30 percent of the country's national wealth was destroyed.

The country's foes prophesied an unenviable fate for the Soviet Union. The American journal *Foreign Affairs* wrote in 1945 that as a result of the colossal devastation inflicted by the war, and because of the physical and moral exhaustion of the Soviet people, the USSR might become one of the weakest and most wretched countries.

Many bourgeois oracles made such predictions at that time. But life judged otherwise. In his report "Lenin's Cause Lives On and Triumphs", delivered to a joint session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, noted: "Thwarting the enemies' treacherous plans to weaken our state for a long time, and healing the wounds of war in the shortest possible time, the Soviet people took a great stride forward. The material and spiritual gains achieved in the post-war years are staggering. Socialism has once again demonstrated its strength and viability."¹

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Lenin's Cause Lives On and Triumphs*, Moscow, 1970, p. 28.

The postwar years were a time of especially selfless labor by Soviet citizens, a time of unprecedented enthusiasm for rebuilding the war-ravaged economy. The heroic labor of those years, like the feats of labor during the first five-year-plan periods and during the Great Patriotic War, were the basis for the communist education of the subsequent generations of Soviet people. It is for this reason that the apologists for imperialist bourgeoisie seek to debunk and dehumanize the postwar history of the Soviet people, in order to create in Soviet society a mood of hopelessness and scepticism. They call for a "revaluation" of historical values, striving to estrange the generations, to instill in the consciousness of Soviet people the poison of apoliticism and distrust in the historical past of the CPSU and the Soviet state.

Anti-communists earlier ordinarily used but two colors—black and white. They argued that in the USSR everything was bad, in the bourgeois countries everything was good. The progressive American sociologist, Michael Parenty, has written of this variety of anti-communism: "...Addicted to the values and myths propagated by the propertied classes, Americans ... see communism—or their stereotyped image of communism—as the diabolic antithesis of everything they have been taught to esteem. The communists are despotic, we are democratic; they are collectivistic, we are individualistic; they have a controlled economy, we have free enterprise; they are 'extreme', we are moderate; they are godless, we are God's children; they are alien, we are Americans; they are evil, we are virtuous."¹ Thus, at one extreme is the slander of socialism, at the other—a crude apologia for capitalism.

Not surprisingly, in this black and white presentation, where everything or almost everything is made up out of whole cloth, there is no room for facts. However, the enormous development of the economic might, of the political and moral authority of the USSR in the international arena,

¹M. Parenty, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, New York, 1969, p. 72.

the increased defense capacity of the Soviet Union, have prompted major changes in the activity of bourgeois "specialists" on Soviet affairs. In the early 1960s, "sovietology" switched from crude slander of the policy of the CPSU to a more subtle method, a method hiding behind ostentatious objectivity; it was a switch from the denial of socialism's achievements to at least partial—if forced—recognition of these achievements. For example, Alec Nove, Director of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at Glasgow University, and others like him have been forced to recognize some socialist successes and achievements and some capitalist shortcomings and failures in order to appear objective. Under the guise of impartiality, they hope to show, through a tendentious selection of facts, that on balance capitalism is superior and socialism "inferior".

In recent years the changing balance of forces in the international arena to socialism's advantage, the consistent and unwavering implementation of a peaceful foreign policy by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, and the increasingly active struggle of progressive, democratic forces for peace, have led to a certain turn away from the cold war in international relations to a relaxation of tensions and the affirmation of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems.

It turned out to be more difficult than the initiators of the cold war had imagined to work against the development of socialism in the world, to thwart the national liberation movement and the struggle of the working people of capitalist countries for their social and political rights. It became increasingly difficult, too, to attribute the profound sociopolitical changes that have occurred in the world to a "communist conspiracy". In these circumstances, important bourgeois groups in the United States and other capitalist countries turned to a more realistic foreign policy. Among bourgeois scholars, détente has reinforced the trend to a certain reappraisal of anti-communist dogmas and ideas. One example was the foreign policy conference held in Washington,

D.C., in 1973, organized by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Robert Hutchins, President of the Center, admitted that the slogans that have long defined American foreign policy and called for "containing" communism were not viable. He described the consequences of such policy as disastrous. A number of other participants in the conference spoke in the same spirit.

In this connection, another fact is symptomatic. There has been a deepening split among American historians over the roots of the cold war itself. Hugh Hammett, an assistant professor at Ithaca College (New York) and a specialist in the history of US foreign policy, speaks of three groups with different views on the origin of the cold war. "Traditionalist scholars have generally upheld the popular and official view that Soviet aggressiveness and bad faith precipitated the controversy." "Realists" apportion the blame for the cold war equally between the USSR and the United States. Finally, "revisionists", or the "New Left", are inclined most often to blame the American government. Among the latter group is David Horowitz, author of *The Free World Colossus* (New York, 1965), which stirred up a major controversy in the United States. Horowitz feels that the cold war occurred primarily because of "America's persistent 'counter-revolutionary' policy aimed at stifling meaningful (radical) change throughout the world".¹

Naturally, the "revisionists'" views of this kind have been violently attacked by the "traditionalists". In the pages of the openly anti-communist journals *Survey* (Great Britain), *Problems of Communism* (the United States) and some others, there was an extensive discussion the purpose of which was to smear historians who had to one extent or another spoken the truth of the roots of the cold war. Robert Maddox, a professor at Pennsylvania University, has published *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* which accuses those who favor objective historical research

¹ *Survey*, No. 4, Autumn 1973, pp. 144, 145, 146.

of being "intellectually dishonest and professionally discreditable".¹

The military-industrial complex stands behind the attack on free-thinking students of international relations, as do reactionary military circles in the capitalist countries and numerous anti-communist ideologists who had for long waxed fat on the cold war. The champions of the cold war will not voluntarily surrender their positions. They continually seek out new "arguments" against Soviet socialist society.

Anti-Sovietism takes every opportunity to speculate with negative phenomena, mistakes and drawbacks that have occurred in the Soviet Union in the past. It is on these that sovietologists attempt to lean in delivering their verdict on the Soviet system. In this connection, what Lenin said in a letter to American workers in 1918 is still relevant today: "For every hundred mistakes we commit, and which the bourgeoisie and their lackeys... shout about to the whole world, 10,000 great and heroic deeds are performed, greater and more heroic because they are simple and inconspicuous amidst the everyday life of a factory district or a remote village, performed by people who are not accustomed... to shout to the whole world about their successes."²

Since late 1973 and early 1974, socialism's history and past have become the center of attention of anti-communist propaganda. It was alleged that socialism in the Soviet Union was unable to overcome the difficulties inherited from the past, initial stage of building a new society. However, it is not the difficulties that socialist society came up against earlier that prompted the malicious anti-Soviet attacks on the USSR, but socialism's achievements.

One does not have to be extraordinarily perceptive to understand that the profound contrast between, on the one hand, the stable economic development and constantly improving standards of living in the socialist countries, their

¹ *Survey*, No. 4, Autumn 1973, p. 148.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 72.

achievements in the international arena and, on the other hand, unstable, crisis-ridden development in the capitalist world, has never been so obvious. In these circumstances, anti-communism seeks by any means possible to block increased sympathy for socialism among the working masses of the world, to obstruct their orientation towards social progress.

There is an opinion abroad that if Communists had not made mistakes and hit some snags, there would be no anti-communism. This is a mistake. What we have here is an attempt to conceal the class roots of anti-communism, to put all the blame for anti-communism on Communists. Anti-communism, as the National Organizer of the Communist Party of Canada, Donald Currie, has rightly noted, would exist even if Communists had met with no difficulties whatsoever. After all, the purpose of anti-communism is to conceal the opposing class interests of the monopolies and the working masses.

Anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, irrespective of their specific manifestations, have two interconnected aspects. One aspect consists of the judgements that "sovietologists" make on Soviet historical reality. The other is the socio-political system that they juxtapose to socialism. There is no difference in principle whether "sovietologists" do or do not compare given aspects of socialism and capitalism. What is important is the attitude to the bourgeois order (in particular, to its central institution, private property in the means of production) from which they overtly or covertly proceed in their evaluation of Soviet historical experience, of the experience of the CPSU.

Anti-communism is the strategy of reactionary imperialist circles, a strategy directed not only against the world socialist system and the Communist parties in non-socialist countries. It is directed against the bulk of the population of the capitalist world, against those who do not belong to the communist movement but whose interests are constantly infringed upon by the major monopolies. Evidence of this is the

stand bourgeois ideologists take with respect to the democratic movements in the developing countries. In order to divert the peoples from their struggle against imperialist slavery and neocolonialism, the defenders of capitalism preach of a sham "communist threat". And this preaching cannot do without anti-communism. As the authors of *Anatomy of Anti-Communism* note: "...anti-Communism has become a political strategy that fights not only Communism, but neutralism and democratic revolution as well".¹ For that reason, the struggle against anti-communism and anti-Sovietism is of genuinely international import.

In providing a true interpretation of the facts and events of the Soviet Union's past, facts and events that "sovietologists" have falsified, it is important to show the incurable diseases and flaws of capitalism, its historically inevitable doom. In this regard, the author has felt it justified to make a number of excursions into capitalist reality, since anti-communists have recently increasingly attempted to "disclose" in socialist society the same conflicts and contradictions that corrode the capitalist system.

Along with the two basic varieties of anti-Sovietism—the crude and the "more subtle"—"sovietologists" use other methods of argument. To expose a particular theory advanced by "specialists in Soviet affairs", one must keep in mind not only the common features that unite all critics of Soviet reality, but also the specific features of their positions; it is necessary to juxtapose their views, their speculative and groundless conclusions, to each other.

Lenin showed that it is necessary to turn the enemy's own weapon against him—recall his article "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin". Pitirim Sorokin, declaring that he was leaving the Right Socialist-Revolutionary Party and renouncing his title as member of the Constituent Assembly,

¹ *Anatomy of Anti-Communism. A Report Prepared for the Peace Education Division of the American Friends Service Committee*, New York, 1969, p. XV.

admitted that his political activity and the policy of the Right SRs, who struggled against the Soviet power and the Bolshevik Party, had been mistaken. Lenin used this admission by Sorokin, one of the leading figures in the counter-revolutionary camp and later an American sociologist, as confirmation of the vitality of Bolshevik ideas, as evidence that the masses of the middle peasantry were in the autumn of 1918 beginning to turn towards the Soviet power.¹

At the same time, it should be kept in mind that not all of bourgeois ideology can be reduced to anti-communism. Anti-communists must be distinguished from those subjectively honest persons who, without abandoning bourgeois ideology, participate in the movement for peace, are adherents of democratic traditions and opponents of imperialist aggression and reaction.

Bourgeois "sovietology" insistently propagandizes the false thesis that the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society is unnecessary, outmoded, inefficient and even harmful. Works on Soviet society contain much material throwing a false light on the development of the CPSU.

In the past decade, bourgeois historical literature on the USSR and other socialist countries has shown a tendency to make the "study" of the present generation as timely as possible. "Sovietology's" abrupt turn to the problems of the present is seen in the fact that approximately half of the academic works dedicated to the USSR and Eastern Europe which were published in the United States since 1945 deal with the period after the Second World War. A similar picture is observed in Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and other capitalist countries.

Robert Conquest, the former editor of the anti-communist journal *Survey*, published in Britain but financed by the American CIA, has been a very productive "sovietologist". In the late 1960s, he took part in the publication of a series of pamphlets, under the general title of "Soviet Studies",

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, pp. 185-94.

which include "treatises" on the Soviet working class, peasantry, the nationalities question in the USSR, and so on. These works make a pretense of providing a thorough analysis of the postwar development of Soviet society. In 1967, a collection of articles by American publicists, *The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years*, was published in New York under the editorship of the well-known "specialist on Russian affairs", Harrison Salisbury. The excursions that these articles make into the past are intended primarily to discredit, by every means possible, the Soviet state's present stage of development.

Government organs have joined in the ideological struggle against the USSR on the economic front. The Subcommittee of the US Congress's Joint Economic Committee dealing with foreign economic policy has been especially active. In 1966, this subcommittee published a five-volume report *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*. In 1970, the same subcommittee published a new report, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*. In both reports, the authors outline the stages of the economic development of the USSR with maximum tendentiousness.

The "sovietologists'" output on politics and law, sociology and philosophy contains much material on the history of the CPSU, with the bluntest and crudest falsification prevailing. Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (N.Y., 1967), Bertram D. Wolfe's *Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine* (N.Y., 1965), Raymond Aron's *Démocratie et Totalitarisme* (Paris, 1965), Merle Fainsod's *How Russia Is Ruled* (N.Y., 1967) and many others, though they are not historical in the full sense of the word, contain arguments that are widely used as a primary source by bourgeois historians.

The Communist Party has repeatedly indicated the need for a stepped-up struggle against bourgeois ideology. The resolution "On Measures for the Further Development of the Social Sciences and for Increasing Their Role in Communist Construction", adopted by the August 1967 plenary

session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, states that exposing professional anti-Soviet and anti-communist ideologists who study the history of the USSR and the CPSU, the international communist, workers' and national liberation movement, is a prime obligation of Soviet scholars.

Soviet historians are doing much work in exposing bourgeois falsifications in the discipline of history. Between 1956 and 1968, hundreds of books and articles were published containing a critical analysis of bourgeois literature on various periods of the history of Soviet society, and recently subsequently the output of such works has grown. B. I. Marushkin's *History and Politics. American Bourgeois Historiography of Soviet Society* (1977, Progress Publishers, Moscow, in English), A. N. Yakovlev's *The Ideology of the American "Empire": The Problem of War, Peace and International Relations in Postwar American Bourgeois Political Literature* (1967, in Russian) and B. I. Korolev's "Anti-Sovietism" in the *Global Strategy of Imperialism* (1974, in Russian) deal with the methodology of the struggle against the bourgeois falsification of the history of Soviet society. They provide a profound and thorough analysis of the flaws and contradictions of bourgeois historiography. Of great interest, too, are *Anti-Communism—a Tool of Imperialist Reaction* (1967, in Russian), I. T. Yakushevsky's *Leninism, Revolution and "Sovietology"* (1968, in Russian) and a collection of articles *Leninism and the Struggle against Bourgeois Ideology and Anti-Communism Now* (1970, in Russian).

In recent years, a number of important works have given much attention to exposing reactionary bourgeois conceptions concerning the postwar history of the USSR. Among them we should cite the collective monograph *Against the Bourgeois Falsification of the History of Soviet Society* (1967, in Russian) and G. V. Sharapov's *A Critique of Anti-Communism on the Agrarian Question* (1966, in Russian).

Among the works of this sort on Party history, the most successful, in our view, are *Against the Bourgeois Falsification of the History of the CPSU* (1964, in Russian) and

F. Kh. Gumerov's *Fiction and Reality. Against the Bourgeois Falsification of the Organizational Principles of the CPSU* (1967, in Russian). In addition, there are other solid studies by philosophers, economists, sociologists, jurists and specialists in international affairs.¹

The questions that constitute the subject of this monograph are grouped in four sections: the economic policy of the CPSU; the Party's activity in developing the socio-political structure of Soviet society and developing socialist democracy; the ideological work of the CPSU; and the international activity of the Party.

¹ Y. D. Modrzhinskaya, *Leninism and the Contemporary Ideological Struggle*, Moscow, 1970; E. A. Bagramov, *The Nationalities Question and Bourgeois Ideology*, Moscow, 1966; M. N. Perfilov, *A Critique of Bourgeois Theories on the Soviet Political System*, Moscow, 1967; G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, *The Leading Role of the Communist Party in Socialist Society*, Moscow, 1970; L. N. Speranskaya, *The Economic Development of the USSR and Bourgeois Fictions*, Moscow, 1966; V. G. Smolyansky, *Truth Against Fiction. A Critique of Bourgeois and Reformist Theories of Socialism and Communism*, Moscow, 1965; V. F. Tsagi, *Contemporary Pseudo-Scientific Theories of Socialism*, Moscow, 1966; S. A. Khavina, *A Critique of Bourgeois Views on the Laws by which the Socialist Economy Is Governed*, Moscow, 1968; I. P. Blishchenko, *Anti-Sovietism and International Law*, Moscow, 1968; S. I. Popov, *The Crisis of Bourgeois Ideology as an Expression of the General Crisis of Capitalism*, Moscow, 1975; and others (all in Russian).

CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE CPSU BETWEEN 1945 AND 1974, AND ITS FALSIFICATION BY "SOVIETOLOGISTS"

1. THE GROWTH OF THE USSR'S ECONOMIC MIGHT IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD AND THE EVOLUTION OF "SOVIETOLOGY"

The Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany and her allies in the Great Patriotic War demonstrated socialism's superiority over capitalism in military, economic, political and ideological respects. The Soviet Union's economy, founded on public ownership of the means of production, proved incomparably stronger, more rational and more flexible than the economy of capitalism.

The growth and development of socialist production, technological progress and, on this basis, increasing the well-being of the people—these three factors, with the crucial role assigned to the latter, defined the substance of the Party's policy in the postwar years.

In 1946, the CPSU drew up a program for rapid economic development over a fifteen-year period. The program called for tripling industrial output, bringing the annual production of steel to 60 million tons, of cast iron to 50 million tons, coal output to 500 million tons and oil production to 60 million tons. When these figures were published in the Soviet press, foreign newspapers were strewn with exclamations: "Inconceivable!", "Utopian!", "Fantasy!" Even many years later, the well-known reactionary West German historian Georg von Rauch could not shake off the impression that had been made on him initially by the long-term program for economic development in the USSR. The program, he wrote, seemed at first utopian.¹ The goal of a threefold

¹ Georg von Rauch, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, Stuttgart, 1969, S. 459.

increase in industrial output was met not in 15 years, as called for, but in 10 years—by 1955.

The enormous growth of the economic capacity and the political and moral authority of the USSR in the international arena brought about important changes in the forms and methods of the activity of bourgeois "specialists in Soviet affairs".

"Sovietology's" evolution also reflected substantive changes in the economic balance between the socialist and capitalist worlds.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the USSR surpassed, in gross industrial output, the three most important countries in Western Europe—the FRG, Great Britain and France—taken together.

Comparative data on the rates of economic development of the USSR and the United States provide eloquent testimony to the relative economic potentials of the United States and the USSR in this period. While in 1941-1945 industrial production rose 60 percent in the United States and fell 8 percent in the Soviet Union as compared to the two countries' prewar levels, in the next twelve years industrial production in the USSR rose by 325 percent, as against only 43 percent in the United States. Expressed another way, the average annual rate of growth in the USSR for these years was 12.8 percent, as against 3 percent in the United States.

These and other analogous figures demonstrated that the achievement of industrial primacy by the Soviet Union had become an entirely practicable goal that the Soviet people could achieve in an historically foreseeable period.

The new stage in economic competition had a most serious impact on the position of the ruling circles in the West. The monopolistic bourgeoisie was compelled drastically to change its attitude to the course of the competition between the two systems. In connection with this the ruling élite of the capitalist powers began to show an interest in obtaining full and precise information on the development of the So-

viet economy: its rate of growth and potential for growth, the forms and principles according to which it is organized.

The rapid development of the Soviet economy forced American specialists working in this field to adopt a more realistic approach when evaluating the prospects of the economic competition of the two different social systems. In 1957, for instance, the American economist E. D. Domar wrote: "Under normal conditions the argument for and against growth could proceed leisurely, but today, the argument, as a practical matter, is obsolete: when an aggressive part of the world is strongly and quite successfully committed to rapid growth the other can disregard this objective only if it is tired of its own existence as a society."¹ Another important American economist, Robert Campbell, argued in 1960 that the old conception of the Soviet economy as a creaking failure had been battered by the evidence that it could perform striking feats of technical advancement.²

In 1960, the American economist Henry Wallich expressed himself even more forthrightly to the effect that "in comparison with the free (read: capitalist—*N.M.*) economy, the Russian system shows elements of decided strength" and that "communism is a formidable intellectual structure . . . with an inner logic and consistency that capitalism might envy".³

The United States, as the rest of the capitalist world, set the goal of catching up with the USSR in the rate of economic development. Much material began to appear in the bourgeois press, the authors providing a sober evaluation of the Soviet economy's achievements in the postwar period. For example, the well-known English publicist and historian Alexander Werth wrote: "Russia was fearfully devastated by the war, and the first immediate post-war task was

¹ E. Domar, *Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth*, New York, 1957, pp. 14-15.

² Cited in M. Wren, *The Course of Russian History*, New York, 1963, p. 724.

³ H. Wallich, *The Cost of Freedom, A New Look at Capitalism*, New York, 1960, pp. 48, 39.

to restore the country's economy. How many years would it take—ten, twenty, thirty? Miraculously, the economy was back to its pre-war level in *three or four years*; many industries had been rebuilt even while the war was still on; the villages were in the main restored within a few months, and the destroyed cities rebuilt in about six years after the end of the war."¹

Even some convinced anti-communists were forced to recognize Soviet achievements. "The achievement of the fourth Five-Year Plan," wrote the English historian R. W. Pethybridge, "was truly amazing and was the most dynamic feature of the domestic Soviet scene in the period 1945-53. Despite the wartime devastation and loss of life, by 1950 the 1940 level of industrial production had been exceeded by over 40 per cent. How was the miracle accomplished?"² And Pethybridge and his colleagues engaged in a search for an answer to this question that would demean or entirely cancel the significance of the postwar achievements of the Soviet people.

The concept of the "industrial society" was applied to the economic history of the USSR. Those who favor this theory consider the primary source of society's economic progress to be technological advances in social production, advances that occur exterior to and independent of the dominant production relations. This in effect tables the question of the socio-political structure of society, the question of the forms of property, the relations among classes and political parties, i.e., everything that in the final analysis permits us to make objective judgements of the degree to which a given social order is progressive.

It follows from this theory that under capitalism society's most acute social problems are automatically resolved as a result of technological progress, and that therefore the revolutionary movement and the class struggle lose their mean-

¹ A. Werth, *Russia: Hopes and Fears*, London, 1969, pp. 45-46.

² R. W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia*, London, 1966, p. 63.

ing. Using this theory to "explain" the achievements of the Soviet economy in the postwar years, "sovietologists" distort the reasons for these achievements, artificially isolating them from the socialist essence of the Soviet economy.

Those who defend the theory of the "single industrial society" nullify the role of all the political institutions that contribute to the development of the Soviet economy, above all the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "It is no accident that the enemies of socialism always single out precisely the Communist Party as the first target of their attacks," L. I. Brezhnev has observed. "It is no accident that they give currency to a 'theory' according to which the Party should 'separate itself' from the leadership of social development in the field of economics, state life, culture, and so on. Such a situation would naturally be very convenient for those who dream of turning back development in all these fields, back towards capitalism."¹

The idea of "separating" the Communist Party from guidance of the country's economic life follows directly from the "theory of the single industrial society". This idea has gained wide currency in bourgeois literature and the press. On January 10, 1967, *The New York Times* wrote that the unusually talented and hard-working peoples of the Eurasian plain, which is the center of Russia, have made advances both under the Tsars and under the Commissars. This was seconded by *Survey*. "Has Russia's advance as a world power been due to communism? It would be difficult to refute the thesis that in view of the country's size, resources, and the rate of industrial growth for some decades before 1914, it would have been difficult for Russia *not* to achieve the position she now holds as one of the world's two super-powers."²

Karl-Heinz Janssen, a West German publicist, expressed himself in the same spirit in the weekly *Die Zeit*. The list

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 143.

² *Survey*, July 1967, No. 64, p. 12.

of such assertions could be drawn out considerably. But none of them are original. As early as 1934, the American historian William Henry Chamberlin developed this idea in his *Russia's Iron Age*.

According to "sovietologists", the force that ensures progress in the Soviet Union is not the socialist order, but politically "neutral" industrialization, modernization and urbanization that are common to all countries and social systems. For example, the West German anti-communist Klaus Mchert asserts that industrialization and urbanization are "the ubiquitous driving forces of the modern world", forces that have supposedly exerted the dominant influence on the character formation of Russian man.¹

However, if the position taken by those who favor the theory of the "industrial society" is true, then the rate of economic development of Russia should have been identical for the period before October 1917, and for the years of the Soviet power. The figures, however, tell us otherwise. Let us compare the average annual rate of industrial growth in tsarist Russia and the Soviet state over two equal spans of time: 1861-1913 and 1918-1970, that is, two 53-year periods. While in tsarist Russia the annual rate of industrial growth was 5-6 percent, it has been 9.8 percent in the Soviet Union, i.e., 1.5 to 2 times greater in the Soviet period. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to have developed at the rate at which tsarist Russia developed between 1900 and 1913, a period which bourgeois specialists, the French academic Thierry Maulnier in particular (*Figaro*, March 7, 1967), consider most indicative, the USSR would at best—given peaceful economic development—achieve its present level of development approximately a quarter of a century later, i.e., towards the end of the 20th century.

It is also important to note that in the period in question of tsarist Russia's industrial development, not only did the

¹ *Détente. Cold War Strategies in Transition*, Ed. by Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Robert Dickson Crane, New York, 1965, p. 11.

gap between tsarist Russia and the developed capitalist countries not close, in a number of the most important sectors it increased. In 1860, Russian pig iron production was 40 percent of that of the United States and 61 percent of that of Germany; in 1913, it produced 13 and 27 percent, respectively, of those countries' totals. According to the calculations of the well-known English economist Colin Clark, Russia's total industrial output in 1895-1899 was 8.5 percent of total American production—and had fallen to 8.3 percent of the American total in 1910-1913. As we see, not only did the gap between Russian and American industry not narrow, it widened.

This was recognized even by some spokesmen for the Russian big bourgeoisie. In 1909, an article entitled "Comprehending Russia", published in the St. Petersburg paper *Ve-stnik znaniya* (*The Herald of Knowledge*), observed: "And if we look at the totality of the picture, one gets the shattering impression that this enormous country is quite surely falling apart and falling ever farther into the abyss of backwardness. . . . Among the civilized peoples we are the people of the poor! In the United States, the average annual income is 346 rubles, in Britain 273, in France 233, in Germany 184 and in our country 63; and we are not catching up, but falling ever farther behind. All around enormous forces are piling up, while we grow poorer."

"Given our slow advance," testified the great textile entrepreneur Konovalov in 1911, "our international competitors can remain quite calm; their supremacy over Russia is assured; for them, our movement forward, judged on the scale of West-European evolution, is nothing other than movement backwards. . . ."¹

These words, uttered more than 60 years ago, are quite relevant to many countries of Latin America, where intensive capitalist development began at approximately the same time as in Russia. There are no few similarities in the eco-

¹ See *Voprosy istorii* (*Problems of History*), 1966, No. 3, p. 58 (in Russian).

conomic history of Latin American countries and tsarist Russia: the predominantly agrarian nature of the economy, the preservation of the gentry big landownership, the great (though in varying forms) dependence on foreign capital, and so on. Capitalism has held back economic progress in Latin America. As before, many of its countries have remained agrarian-raw materials appendages of the United States and some other imperialist powers. Isn't this what the journal of American business circles, *Business Week*, demonstrated when it said that "the gap in wealth between Latin America and the industrialized part of the world is widening"?¹

History demonstrates that the Soviet Union's rapid economic development occurred thanks to the establishment of socialism and its socio-political institutions, and especially thanks to the activity of the Communist Party. In the light of this, the hypothesis fashionable in the West that Russia would have developed just as rapidly under capitalism as under socialism does not stand up to criticism.

From the same "theory of industrial society" stems the "sovietologists'" argument that the CPSU has had no part in the immense economic achievements of the Soviet people in the postwar period. The principal object of their ideological attacks is the CPSU's immediate leadership of the elaboration and implementation of economic plans in the USSR.

Attempts to discredit the CPSU in this area follow a number of different lines of argument. For example, "sovietologists" assert that planning is a common and inseparable property of all industrially developed countries, irrespective of their socio-economic system. On this basis, bourgeois authors are not loath to identify socialist planning with limited capitalist economic regulation.

Equating the scientifically founded, planned development of the socialist economy with the anarchic, cyclical development of the capitalist economic system, anti-communists deny

¹ *Business Week*, April 15, 1967, p. 108.

that objective economic laws that have no place in capitalism can function under socialism.

Yet we know that thanks to the new production relations, to the undivided sway of public ownership of the means of production, the fundamental economic law of socialism—the law of the planned and balanced development of the economy—functions in socialist society, that in socialist society a just principle of remuneration according to the amount and quality of work done is implemented, and so on. The Communist Party develops its economic policy in accordance with these laws. At the same time, only under socialism, where public ownership has been established, is it possible systematically and consciously to maintain a proper balance, is it possible to plan on the scale of society as a whole.

Thus, the fact that socialist economic plans are realistic is to be explained primarily by the fact that the Communist Party takes profound and sober account of the objective regularities of the development of socialist society. Planning harmoniously blends the action of subjective and objective factors. The leading role of the CPSU in the country's economic life stems from the objective conditions of the existence of Soviet socialist society.

History shows that neither in the past nor at present has the capitalist world achieved such high and stable rates of growth as the USSR has managed—a country where the CPSU is the ruling party. To see this, we need only compare the rates of industrial development in the USSR and a number of leading capitalist countries over the period 1918-1970. While the average annual rate of industrial growth in the USSR has been 9.8 percent over this period, in the United States it has been only 3.6 percent, in Britain 2.1 percent, in France 3.9 percent and in the FRG 3.7 percent. These figures show the creative, innovative role of the CPSU, which firmly and confidently leads the Soviet people to victory in the economic competition with the capitalist countries.

The services of the CPSU in the economic progress of the Soviet Union are so obvious that even some convinced anti-

communists have had perforce to recognize them. For example, the American professor of economics, Stanislaw Swianiewicz, holds that in the three decades after the October Revolution Western scholars considered Russian Communists to be idealists possessed by unrealistic goals. But in fact "Soviet Communists . . . represent a particularly strong will to economic growth and they have demonstrated their ability to generate the expansion of production on a tremendous scale".¹

* * *

Soviet economic growth in the first 10 to 15 postwar years brought a change in the economic balance between the socialist and capitalist systems. Soviet victory in the economic competition with the bourgeois states, the United States above all, became a realistic prospect. The ruling circles in the West and their ideologists began to show a more sober attitude to the evaluation of the results of the economic activity of the Soviet state.

The literature meant for a narrow circle of businessmen, politicians and economists began to provide a great deal of information giving a quite accurate portrayal of the achievements of the economic policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. For the public at large, imperialist propaganda could not set forth this information without "appropriate" commentary. Moreover, this propaganda began to make extensive use of the theory of "industrial society", a theory widely circulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in its analysis of Soviet economic practice.

The ostensible objectivity of this theory is combined with overt tendentiousness in its treatment of the economic policy of the CPSU. The false thesis that the CPSU has been "irrelevant" to the economic achievements of the USSR—a thesis advanced by the champions of this theory—is not in line with the facts of history.

¹ *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 30, Oct. 1968, No. 4, pp. 465-66.

2. THE MYTH OF THE SOVIET "COMMAND ECONOMY" AND ITS "INEFFICIENCY"

The Soviet people's successful rebuilding of the war-ravaged economy in a historically brief period and the economic advances made by the working people of the USSR under the leadership of the Communist Party made the further progress of Soviet society possible. However, these conditions could be utilized only given constant improvement of the management of the economy.

Analyzing economic processes, the Party generalizes from existing experience that has demonstrated its vitality and effectiveness, criticizes failings that have come to light and, taking all of the foregoing into account, makes adjustments in the economic mechanism. "From our present heights," L. I. Brezhnev has observed, "it is not at all difficult to see the miscalculations and mistakes of the past. Some things could unquestionably have been accomplished faster, better and with less cost. But in order to arrive at an objective assessment of the road that has been covered it should always be remembered that for us every step was a quest. . . ."¹

The ideologists of anti-communism try to ignore positive phenomena in the Soviet economy, to ignore its achievements, but every failure, even the most insignificant, becomes an object for their criticism. Such failures and temporary difficulties are given a fundamental significance, often even "fatal" for socialism. And it is not surprising that in such cases "sovietologists" endeavor to prove the "fallaciousness" of the CPSU's direction of the country's economic life and attribute a "command character" to the Soviet economy.

Bourgeois interpreters of Soviet reality intentionally ignore the fact that the causes of the economic difficulties in the USSR are not "flaws" in the socialist system, but the extremely difficult circumstances in which the country was placed by the efforts of imperialist states.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, pp. 16-17.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, with the economy mobilized to meet the needs of the front, the management of the country's economy was rigidly centralized. This was a forced and temporary measure undertaken by the Soviet government in severe wartime conditions.

However, anti-communists use this fact for purposes of falsification and, contrary to historical truth, attempt to slander the Soviet economy, describing it as an inherently "command" economy and denying the extensive participation of the working people in the development and improvement of the socialist economic system.

"Specialists on Soviet affairs" try to show that in the Soviet Union's economic life everything is done on command from above. This is allegedly an "unnatural", "abnormal" economy, involving "the systematic disregard of the pressure of existing economic forces",¹ "constraint" on the "eternal" economic laws, which are founded on the instincts of individualism. For example, J. S. Prybyla, professor of economics at Pennsylvania State University, maintains that the establishment of economic targets by the planning organs of the USSR on the basis of Party directives results in economically irrational decisions. Henri Chambre, a well-known French economist and sociologist, includes Party leadership of the economy among the brakes that are supposedly restricting economic development.²

The point of departure for many bourgeois critics of the Soviet economic system are the dogmas of "free private enterprise" and "the sovereignty of the consumer" as the supposedly indispensable preconditions for economic efficiency. This conception defends, in effect, the principle of the eternal and unrestricted dominance of private property. The bourgeois economists Ludwig Mises and Friedrich Hayek,

¹ Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy. An Introduction*, New York, 1966, p. XXI; J. Wilerinsky, *Profit, Risk and Incentives under Socialist Planning*, London, 1973.

² Henri Chambre, *Union Soviétique et développement économique*, Paris, 1967, pp. 207-56.

who preached this thesis in the 1930s, defended the idea that it was impossible to manage an economy on the basis of public ownership. Their present-day cohorts, for their part, paint a false, "totalitarian" picture of the Soviet economy.

In the view of such critics, there are no laws other than those of the capitalist market, spontaneously regulated, economy. The economy, as they see it, will not suffer intervention from without, will not suffer "command".

Where is the way out of this dead end, ask the "sovietologists". In their view, it consists in taking the Communist Party out of the economy. The authors of the previously mentioned *New Directions in the Soviet Economy* write, "major adjustments ... such as would have a substantial effect on performance, would require some fundamental changes in the system, most especially perhaps in respect to the extent of party involvement in the operation of the economy".¹

Let us look at what has really happened in the management of the Soviet economy in the postwar period. After the victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism, economic rebuilding got under way. The Party and government adopted a number of measures in the early 1950s whose purpose was to strengthen democratic principles in the country's economic life. Important in this connection was the expansion of the economic rights of the Union republics and local bodies. In accordance with the resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of May 4, 1955, the system of state planning for and financing of the economies of the Union republics was changed. The governments of these republics were entrusted with deciding on major questions that had previously been within the competence of all-Union organs.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet reorganized a number of all-Union ministries (for the petroleum industry, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, textiles, light industry,

¹ *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part 1, Washington, 1966, p. 44.

geology and conservation of sub-soil wealth) into Union-republican ministries. A large number of enterprises were subordinated to republic-level rather than all-Union organs. By the beginning of 1956, more than 11 thousand industrial enterprises had been put under the charge of the Union republics. As a result, the responsibility of republic and local organizations for the condition and development of industry and agriculture in individual economic areas was increased, and it was possible to make better use of local resources. The contribution that each republic made to the national concern of improving the socialist economy had thereby been increased.

The resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers of April 11, 1953, "On Expanding the Prerogatives of the USSR Ministers", and of May 4, 1955, "On Some Supplementary Prerogatives of the USSR Ministers", broadened the prerogatives of the economic leaders of the ministries, departments and enterprises. Beginning in April 1953, ministers began to decide independently such questions as the establishment, reorganization and liquidation of departmental design organizations, research institutes, technical colleges and vocational training complexes; the organization of courses for increasing the skills of workers, expansion courses for engineering and technical personnel and clerical staff; and the transfer of equipment from one enterprise to another.

The Central Committee of the CPSU proposed that the USSR ministers and heads of departments make full use of the powers granted them and, within the limits of their competence, make independent decisions on matters in the economic sectors within their jurisdiction. At the same time, the Central Committee recommended that the USSR Council of Ministers pass on to the appropriate ministries and departments for review a large number of questions that fell within their competence.

At the end of 1953, further steps were taken to improve the work of the Party and state apparatus. For this purpose, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council

of Ministers reviewed the activity of many central, territorial and district state organs. The results of this review were incorporated in the Central Committee resolution of January 25, 1954, "On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Party and State Apparatus". This resolution sharply condemned manifestations of bureaucratism in state administration and obliged Party and Soviet organs to focus their attention on organizational and political activity among workers, collective farmers, the intelligentsia and specialists in all sectors of the economy.

As a result of these measures, ministries and departments were freed of many superfluous sections that duplicated each other's work. Bureaucratic growths were removed from the economic planning system. The forms and indices used in economic accounting and reporting were simplified and reduced, the number of indices in annual economic plans was cut. For example, in the 1955 plan the number of items separately planned in industry was reduced threefold as against 1953 and by one-third as against the prewar plan.

The number of administrative personnel was reduced in the center and locally. Most employees, specialists in particular, were transferred to the realm of material production. The measures adopted to change the structure and character of the work of the administrative apparatus increased management effectiveness and created favorable conditions for the development of initiative from below.

In 1957, the sectoral system of managing industry and construction was replaced by a territorial system. For this purpose, regional economic councils were set up. To a certain extent, this improved regional coordination of production and united some enterprises that were complementary and not far from each other. However, the management of industry through regional economic councils in time came into contradiction with the requirements of the developing scientific and technological revolution. Sectoral management of industry proved to be fragmented into numerous economic regions, there were difficulties in implementing a uni-

form policy with respect to technology, research organizations were cut off from production, and this delayed the development and application of new technology.

The difficulties that had arisen were subjected to profound analysis by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government and were discussed at the March and September (1965) plenary sessions of the Central Committee. As a result of the thorough study of the reasons for the reduced rate of development of production, and as a result of a number of major economic studies and experiments, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers drew up a set of measures for surmounting the shortcomings in the economy.

A predominantly sectoral system of industrial management was introduced. This did not mean a simple return to the past. The recreated centralized sectoral management was combined with a substantial expansion of the rights of enterprises and their associations, with an increased use of economic methods of management. This was the new system's principal advantage over the previous sectoral system of management, which often had an administrative approach to dealing with economic tasks and underestimated the importance of material incentives to labor, which had reduced workers and employees' interest in the fruits of their activity.

At the same time, the Party indicated that the change in the forms and methods of industrial management did not mean a complete renunciation of the territorial approach to management. What was at issue was a proper combination of the sectoral and territorial principles.

For all the ministries' responsibility for the development of industry by sectors, local organs were not removed from management. This permitted successful treatment of questions of the inter-sectoral, comprehensive development of industry and the economy within the country as a whole and within republics, regions and districts.

In the course of improving the management system, the working masses took part in a movement for raising labor

productivity. Indicative in this respect was the case of the Rybinsk heavy engineering plant. Communists at this enterprise pioneered in the movement to raise labor productivity and the quality of output by introducing a scientific organization of labor. The intensive search for new and effective forms of work, the creative approach to production problems ensured success. In a comparatively short time, delegates came to the Rybinsk plant from more than 80 cities and towns. Many hundreds of enterprises adopted the Rybinsk experience.

Another example is the work of the Party committee of the Tbilisi worsteds mill, Soviet Georgia. As the enterprise prepared to convert to the new system of planning and economic stimulation, the Party committee extensively publicized the decisions of the September (1965) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Theoretical conferences, seminars and meetings of Communists were held. As a result of the Party organization's extensive educational and organizational work, the workers, engineers and technicians and the management of the enterprise successfully converted to the new system, and this was soon reflected in production indices. In 1968 alone, the combine won a high ranking four times in a row in nationwide socialist emulation.

The next step in improving industrial management was the creation of production associations. "Experience shows," said L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "that only major associations are able to concentrate a sufficient number of qualified specialists, to ensure rapid technological progress, to use all resources better and more fully."

In accordance with the Directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU on the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Soviet Economy for the Years 1971-1975, in March 1973 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decision, "On Some Measures for the Further Improvement of Industrial Management". Under this decision, work was undertaken to concentrate produc-

tion, to organize major industrial associations, to eliminate multi-level management. In addition to enterprises, research and design organizations are included in integrated economic complexes. This allows an acceleration in scientific and technological progress and of the rate of production development.

Associations and combines are becoming the basic self-sustained units of social production. Experience with many of them shows that they have appreciably higher rates of growth of output and labor productivity, that they are able to put new articles into production more rapidly, and that they are more able to deal with the social development of the workers' collectives.

The ZIL (the Moscow Automobile Works), Uralmasb (the Urals Heavy Machine-Building Plant), Lomo, Zaporozh-transformator and other associations are good examples. After switching to the new form of management, the performance of the Volgograd tractor builders rose sharply. In three years of work in the association, they produced more than 20 million rubles' worth of additional goods and tractors.

The decisive role in setting up and adjusting the work of the associations is played by Party committees, which ensure the selection of qualified leadership personnel in the production teams, the economics training of practical workers and the reassignment to new jobs of the released personnel.

The Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980 adopted by the CPSU at its 25th Congress reaffirmed the policy of improving the organizational structure of management in this five-year drive for efficiency and quality. Under the general management schemes put into effect in some industries, production associations are being formed to replace the old sectoral chief administrations, and the echelons of management are being reduced in number. In the beginning of 1976 there were 2,300 production associations, accounting for 24 percent of industrial output. Production associations will be established

through the economy in the course of this tenth five-year plan period. "These associations," it says in the Guidelines, "are a qualitatively new phenomenon in the management of industrial production. They are not a mechanical agglomeration of enterprises, but a coherent production-economic complex in which science and production form an integral whole and specialization and co-operation are extensively developed."

These and other facts show that the CPSU has been and remains a party of innovators, actively responding to the demands of life and ensuring that the necessary progressive changes are made in the economic apparatus and in the way that apparatus operates.

The "sovietologists'" thesis that the Soviet economy is of a "command" or "totalitarian" character brings in its train the affirmation that the Soviet economy is inefficient. But such statements remain unproved. It is no longer so simple to ignore the USSR's economic progress. More moderate views are expressed. Adherents of the concept of the "command economy" make extensive use of a dual approach: at first, the USSR's economic system was (if not completely, then in part) efficient, while it has now ceased to be so. The first period of development they call extensive, the latter they call intensive.

Characterizing these two "phases", bourgeois economists concern themselves with whether the Soviet socio-economic system has achieved "industrial maturity", or, in other words, a modern level of development of its forces of production.

Bourgeois economists cannot, however, decide when exactly the Soviet economy moved from one phase to the other. Thus, the West German "investigator" Theodor Arnold, of the Cologne Center for Political Education, holds that before the 1950s, the Soviet economy was developing extensively, i.e., by drawing in new labor resources and capital investments.¹ But at that point the Soviet Union reached a

¹ *Die Geschichte Sowjetrusslands (1917-1964)*, Bd. 12, München, 1964, S. 11.

certain level of "industrial saturation" and exhausted the sources of rapid growth. A new stage began that required the intensification of production, of which, according to Arnold, the Soviet economy is incapable.

We learn from the voluminous handbook, *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (London, 1970), that the turning point in Soviet economic policy was the mid-1950s, not the early years of the decade.¹ As opposed to the authors of this handbook, Alec Nove, George Lensen, the authors of *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, date the transition from one phase to the other five years later, i.e., in the late 1950s and early 1960s.² Gertrude Schroeder, a visiting professor of economics at the University of Virginia, provided yet another periodization, setting the turning point another five years later: "...termination of the Seven-Year Plan in 1965 marked the completion of a long historical period of 'extensive' growth and brought the need to initiate a new era of 'intensive' development..."³

In March of 1971, an article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The State of Communism", appeared in *Newsweek*; his book, *Between Two Ages, America's Role in the Technotronic Era*, had appeared somewhat earlier.⁴ If we are to believe Brzezinski, the turning point that "sovietologists" are seeking should be dated at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. The Soviet economic system, in his view, "successfully stimulated the emulative industrialization of the country".⁵ It is a different matter in the present "technotronic age". Discovering these two "eras", Brzezinski,

¹ *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*. A Handbook, Ed. by George Schöpplin, London, 1970, p. 136.

² A. Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, p. 27; G. Lensen, *The Soviet Union*, New York, 1967, p. 49 in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part I.

³ *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1971, No. 4, p. 36.

⁴ Z. Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages, America's Role in the Technotronic Era*, New York, 1970.

⁵ Z. Brzezinski, "The State of Communism", *Newsweek*, March 15, 1971, p. 66.

as is easy to see, simply gives a new wording to the old scheme of "extensive" and "intensive" phases of Soviet economic development advanced by Arnold, Nove and others.

One could end the list of these contradictory opinions if it were not for the fact that in April 1973 numerous statements were published by Western commentators on the occasion of the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers "On Some Measures for the Further Improvement of Industrial Management". The authors of these statements obviously refer the beginning of the "intensive" phase to the date of publication of this resolution and declare that the measures adopted earlier were unsuccessful.

This seemingly scientific periodization serves one goal: to substantiate the "obsolescence" of the Soviet system of centralized economic planning and Party direction of the economy. "Intensification of production," writes Theodor Arnold, "makes it necessary to alter all of labor and social policy,"¹ in other words a change of the social and economic system. Alec Nove asserts that the Soviet economic system "tends to outgrow itself, to the very extent to which it succeeds in establishing a modern industrialized economy and emerges into a period of relative normality".² John Hardt, Dimitri Gallik and Vladimir Treml "extend" Nove. It is not enough, they write, to say that the Soviet planning and control system can "not cope with the new problems", it is in fact experiencing "gradually declining responsiveness... to commands from above, which is eroding the policy-making powers of the party".³

All of the opinions cited above seem to lead to the conclusion that the Soviet economy is "inefficient" and "lacks historical prospects".

¹ *Die Geschichte Sowjetrusslands (1917-1964)*, Bd. 12, S. 12.

² *The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years*, New York, 1967, p. 71.

³ *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part 1, p. 47.

Let us now review, with the aid of real data, the rate of Soviet economic development and, in this connection, the activity of the CPSU in the postwar period.

In the Directives for the Fifth Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR over the Years 1951-1955, adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU (1952), the average annual growth of gross industrial output was set at approximately 12 percent. Yet for the Fourth Five-Year Plan, this figure had been slightly under 15 percent. The Communist Party, taking into account the available resources, intentionally reduced the rate of industrial development.

There were two basic reasons for this, both connected with the specifics of the first years after the war. By 1948, 8.5 million men had been demobilized from the army, and they had entered the labor force. The number of workers in industry by 1950 was 1.5 times greater than in 1945. The former soldiers, having become combatants on the labor front, made a major contribution to the achievement of unusually high rates of industrial output growth. In the fifth five-year plan period, this temporary factor had ceased to operate. By 1955, the number of workers in industry had risen by one-fourth over the 1950 level.

The rate of growth was also influenced by a reduction of the number of major state industrial enterprises put into operation—a reduction stemming from the completion of the postwar economic reconstruction. While during the fourth five-year plan period (1946-1950) 6,200 major enterprises were put into operation (most of them the war-damaged enterprises which were rebuilt anew) the figure for the Fifth Five-Year Plan was 3,200.

These circumstances were taken into account in the Directives for the Fifth Five-Year Plan. For the 1950s, the average annual rate of growth remained at approximately the level set for the Fifth Five-Year Plan—11.8 percent.

The West German "sovietologist" Theodor Arnold does not take the trouble to get at the meaning of this figure. For him what is most important is to establish that there was

a reduction—even if objectively justified—in the rate of Soviet industrial growth in the 1950s as compared to the first postwar five-year plan period. This seems to him sufficient grounds for maintaining that there was a "structural crisis" in the Soviet economy.¹

This situation has been described in no less gloomy tones by a member of the Hamburg Institute for General Economic Problems, Erik Boettcher, in *Die Sowjetische Wirtschaftspolitik am Scheidewege* (Tübingen, 1969), the West German economist Günter Wagenlehner in *Das Sowjetische Wirtschaftssystem und Karl Marx* (Köln, 1960) and some others.

American "specialists on the Soviet economy" also search actively for "crises" in the history of the economy of the USSR. Their inclinations in this direction are shown quite clearly in the statement that "...all of Soviet history has been merely a history of crises".²

What do the facts of history tell us? The control figures for the development of the Soviet economy for the years 1959-1965, control figures endorsed by the 21st Congress of the CPSU, called for an average annual growth rate of approximately 8.6 percent. There was, thus, a certain pre-planned reduction of the average rate of industrial growth—by 25 percent as against the preceding five-year plan period.

This caused a furor among "sovietologists". Some sought to exaggerate or even falsify the data. In early January of 1964, the US Central Intelligence Agency published a so-called analytic survey of the economic situation in the Soviet Union. It followed from the survey that Soviet economic growth in 1962 and 1963 had been less than 2.5 percent per year.

A propaganda hoopla grew up in the capitalist world around this "sensational" document. On February 28, 1964, the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress published

¹ *Die Geschichte Sowjetrusslands (1917-1964)*, Bd. 12, S. 11.

² *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part I, p. 16.

in support of the CIA a report on annual Soviet economic indices. This document maintained that the average increase in Soviet output had fallen to 4.6 percent per year in the period 1959-1962, as against 6.8 percent for the years 1950-1958. The Committee agreed with the CIA's conclusion that the USSR's growth rate for 1962 was 2.5 percent.

These fantasies were convincingly refuted in the Soviet press. We shall confine ourselves here to observing that the conclusions of the American falsifiers were so unfounded that they were criticized even in the bourgeois, including the American, press. *The New York Times*, for one, stated that the majority of non-governmental experts, including those teaching at universities, in the field of the Soviet economy were raising doubts about the CIA conclusions. In their opinion, the CIA had produced unreal data.

Another American newspaper, the *New York Herald Tribune*, admitted that the CIA report on the situation in Russia had had an unexpected countereffect in Europe. In the final analysis, all this forced a number of bourgeois economists to take Soviet statistics more seriously. Some said quite frankly that statements to the effect that Soviet statistics were mere propagandists' inventions were baseless legends.

In the 1960s, the theme of the "fading" of Soviet economic growth, allegedly leading to a "crisis" in the socialist economic system, became fashionable in the Western press. And many such statements can still be heard today.

From the end of the 1950s, the weight of extensive factors of development in the growth of industrial production did in fact begin to fall. For example, in the sixth five-year plan period the number of workers increased over the previous five-year period by 32 percent; the increase was 19 percent for the seventh five-year plan period, 13 percent for the eighth. The increase in the number of industrial workers was cut almost in half in the 1960s. This could not but have an effect on the rate of economic development.

Beginning with the eighth five-year period, labor shortages began to appear in most areas of the country, especially

in the major industrial centers and in Siberia and the Far East. The reasons for this situation were as follows: a noticeable reduction in the flow of labor from agriculture to industry as compared to the recent past; an increase in the number of young people who were in school; and, finally, the fact that almost all able-bodied persons employed at home or on personal plots had been drawn into production.

A reduction in the rate of capital investment also had some effect on industrial development. While in the sixth five-year plan period capital investment increased by 63 percent over the previous five-year period, the corresponding increase was only 48 percent in the seventh five-year period and 38 percent in the eighth. The rate of investment growth had thus fallen by a little less than one-fourth in each of the successive five-year periods.

While in the seventh five-year plan period—not to mention the earlier periods—the annual growth of investment significantly outstripped the increase in the national income, the two rates are now nearly identical. This is a predictable and progressive process permitting the allocation of increasing resources for consumption.

One other circumstance should be taken into account. As a result of the reduction of the work week in industry from an average of 48 hours in 1957 to 41 hours in 1961, the number of man-hours spent per person per year in industry is now lower in the USSR than in any other industrially developed country. The corresponding figure in 1963 was about 20 percent higher in France, Japan and Britain, 17.5 percent higher in the FRG and 5 percent higher in Italy and the United States.

It is thus clear that a certain reduction in the USSR's rate of economic growth in the 1960s as compared to the 1950s was inevitable and stemmed from the goal of increasing the people's well-being.

All these considerations explain, for all practical purposes, why the average annual rate of industrial growth in the 1960s fell by approximately one-fourth as compared to the

preceding decade. If the Soviet economic system had been incapable of intensive development, as bourgeois "sovietologists" maintain, then with the maximum utilization of possibilities for extensive growth the rate of economic development should over time have approached zero. But this did not occur because the Soviet economic system has enormous potential for the intensification of production. If this were not the case, it could not have maintained, in the present circumstances, stable economic growth that usually surpasses the indices of the capitalist cycle.

In this connection, it is appropriate to trace the dynamic of industrial production in the USSR and the developed capitalist countries in the 1970s.

Economic Growth Rates
(Percentage Growth over the Preceding Year)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
USSR	8.5	7.7	6.5	7.5	8.0
USA	-4.1	±0	7.9	8.8	-0.6
Common Market countries (excluding Denmark)	5.2	1.3	4.8	7.8	0.1

It is clear from the table that over a relatively short, five-year, period the United States and the Common Market countries have gone through two crises or crisis slumps: in 1970-71 and in 1974. The latter crisis, which has affected the entire capitalist system and shaken it to its foundations, became even more acute in 1975. In this connection there is no dearth of the most gloomy evaluations and prognoses in the Western press. The 1974-1975 crisis is often compared with the great depression of the 1930s.

In 1974, the Gallup Institute carried out an extensive survey of American public opinion. It turned out that none of those interviewed considered the situation in the country satisfactory. Moreover, 46 percent of American citizens de-

clared that the American economy was moving towards a catastrophe similar to the crisis of the early 1930s.¹

In contrast to the capitalist system, the socialist system demonstrates stability and superiority in its rate of economic growth. The table shows that Soviet industry in the 1970s has developed, on the average, twice as fast as the industry of the Common Market countries and more than three times as fast as American industry.

A most important factor in increasing the efficiency of social production is the growth of labor productivity. In this area, the USSR has done considerably better than the developed capitalist countries. For a 21-year period (1951-1971), the average annual increase in labor productivity in industry in the Soviet Union has been 6.3 percent, as against 3.3 percent in the United States, 2.7 percent in Britain, 5.1 percent in France and 4.7 percent in the FRG. As a result, the Soviet state has overtaken and surpassed Britain, France and the FRG in the level of industrial labor productivity and has appreciably reduced the lag behind the United States, which has long been the most advanced country of the world in this respect.

The growth of labor productivity plays a decisive role in building up production capacity. While the United States required 18 years to double its industrial output, Britain required 22 years and the Federal Republic of Germany 11 years, the Soviet Union required only 8.5 years.

In the fifth, sixth and seventh five-year plan periods, more than two-thirds of the increment of industrial output in the Soviet Union was due to increased labor productivity—a prime factor in the intensification of production. Consequently, extensive factors accounted for no more than one-third of the increment. And this ratio is not constant. For example, in the seventh five-year plan period increased labor productivity accounted for 62 percent of the growth of industrial output, while the same factor contributed 73 per-

¹ *Rudé právo*, 14 yena, 1974.

cent of the industrial growth in the eighth five-year period. In other words, increased labor productivity now accounts for almost three-fourths of the increment in industrial production.

As compared to the years 1956-1959, in the seventh five-year plan period the use of production capacity improved substantially, materials consumption was reduced, which yielded savings of 30 thousand million rubles over the five-year period. The negative tendency towards a reduced return on assets was overcome. While between 1961 and 1965 the return on assets in industry fell by 13 percent, between 1966 and 1970 it rose by 3.4 percent.

The Central Committee Report to the 25th Party Congress noted that production efficiency, which is a fundamental factor, was raised visibly under the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975). The most general indicator of this was the accelerated growth of labor productivity, which accounted for as much as 84 percent of the accretion in output. This is a result of the higher proficiency of the work force and the extensive technological improvements, the rising machine-to-man ratio. The Party set forth the ways to raise further the efficiency of industrial production. These were, first, a further cutting down on the consumption of materials, economy of raw and other materials; second, more rational use of manpower resources, a reduction of labor outlays, principally by cutting down manual and physically arduous labor; third, substantial improvement of the quality of products and, accordingly, the development of production sectors that facilitate the solution of this problem.

The decisions of the 24th and 25th Party Congresses testify to the great and intensive work that the CPSU carries out to improve socialist production. Introduction of a new system of planning and economic incentives and an expansion of the economic autonomy of industrial enterprises provided a greater opportunity for displaying initiative in labor.

Simultaneously, the new terms of economic work required that production collectives take a greater part in enterprise

management, that Party organizations become even more active in improving production. Implementing the recommendations of the Central Committee of the CPSU, local Party organizations were even more involved in the production life of enterprises.

Instructive in this respect was the activity of the Rostov Regional Party organization. Some years ago, the shaft-benders at the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant, led by the foreman D. Elimov, switched over to work under an improved-quality economic plan. The plant Party committee and the Communists immediately supported this initiative. Earlier, these workers had worked under a plan that consisted primarily of quantitative indices; now, obligations to improve technology and the production process, to economize and to turn out only high-quality products have been included in the plan. Personal targets were set for each point in the plan. The Rostov Regional Party Committee recognized the value of this innovation and recommended that all primary organizations, city committees and district committees of the CPSU familiarize themselves with the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant's experience. T. Lukina's brigade of communist labor at the Taganrog Combine Plant was the first to respond to this initiative. A few years later, hundreds of thousands of workers in the Rostov-on-Don region had adopted improved-quality plans.

Many Party organizations gained valuable experience in increasing the production efficiency. At factories and plants in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and other industrial centers, every worker's labor productivity is continually growing. Heavy engineering workers in Minsk and Yaroslavl are increasing the durability of tractor and automobile engines, which is equivalent to increasing the number of engines produced.

Many work collectives, making their five-year plans more precise, have tried to make use of every possible source for increasing productivity. This is what has been done, for example, at the Krasnaya Roza (Red Rose) silk factory in

Moscow. The plan for this enterprise, worked out jointly with scientists, calls for making extensive use of scientific and technological advances, which will unquestionably make for a significant increase in labor productivity. The workers, specialists, and the Party organization of this enterprise, after precise calculations, decided to increase labor productivity by 78 percent over the next five years, instead of the 37 percent planned under the ministry's target figures.

Improving the management of the economy, the Communist Party has always stressed the need for a proper use of both material and moral incentives. The commodity-money relations still existing in the socialist economy allow the use of cost accounting, prices, revenue, credit and forms of material reward to promote successful production activity by the working masses.

Every major change in the economic policy of the CPSU, every change in the methods of directing the Soviet economy, has given rise to a mass of rumors and falsifications in bourgeois circles in the West, has been used for yet another attempt to discover a crisis in the socialist system and signs of an imminent restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

However, despite all the efforts of the falsifiers, the socialist system of production management, with its cardinal principle of democratic centralism, demonstrates as before its superiority over capitalist economic management.

* * *

One practical purpose of the bourgeois myth of the "command economy" is to prove the "inefficiency" of the Soviet economic system and the non-competitiveness of Soviet goods on the world market. "Sovietologists" place the responsibility for these imaginary defects on the Communist Party. They see the way out of the dead end that they have invented in the elimination of the Party from the leadership of economic development, in dismantling the system of centralized planning in the USSR and reestablishing the mechanism of market regulation.

Bourgeois critics rely in many instances on genuine data on the development of the Soviet economy. But their selection and interpretation is exceedingly tendentious. Slighting the USSR's economic advances, they exaggerate the shortcomings and difficulties that occur in Soviet economic work. But the latter do not typify the main line of Soviet economic development.

Taken as a whole, data on the economic activity of the Soviet state show convincingly that in the postwar period the Soviet economy has demonstrated its efficiency, and that the economic apparatus has shown flexibility and democracy. This gives the proponents of the theory of the Soviet "command economy" no grounds to stand on.

3. ON THE PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL GOODS SECTOR

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, when all the energies of the Soviet people were directed to rebuilding the war-ravaged economy, the country's principal task was to develop heavy industry, the foundation of the entire economy.

The Party's orientation toward priority development of capital goods production was given legislative form in the postwar economic plans. "The Communist Party," stressed the resolution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU on the Central Committee Report (1956), "believes it absolutely essential to continue the priority development of the heavy industries, chiefly ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, coal and oil, power, engineering, chemicals and building materials."¹

This orientation was reaffirmed by the 21st Congress of the CPSU (1959), which in a resolution "On Control Figures for the Economic Development of the USSR for 1959-1965" described heavy industry as the key factor in developing the

¹ *Resolutions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1956, p. 15.

productive forces and raising labor productivity in all sectors of the economy. This course of the Party was consistently implemented. Thus, the average annual rate of growth of capital goods production under the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) surpassed the growth rate of consumer goods production by 1.15 times, in the years 1956-1960 by 1.35 times and in the years 1961-1965 by 1.5 times.

In the eighth five-year plan period (1966-1970), the development of capital goods production continued to outstrip the growth of consumer goods production, though the difference in tempo was, in accordance with the Directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU (1966), significantly reduced.

The bourgeois historians J. N. Westwood and R. Pethybridge dispute the correctness of this policy, calling it the result of ideological "dogmatism" and "narrow-mindedness".¹ Alec Nove puts forth the same ideas in many of his works on the Soviet economy, and he is joined in this by D. M. Gallik and V. G. Treml. They try to show that the CPSU's policy of accelerated development of the capital goods sector is groundless and dictated by subjectivism.

History shows, however, that this policy is soundly and objectively based on the requirements of the law of the priority development of capital goods production. At all stages of economic development, the CPSU has taken strict account of the requirements of this law. Without a policy of priority development of heavy industry, it would have been impossible to build socialism, to expand and modernize the material and technological base of the economy, to increase the country's defense capacity, to provide assistance to other socialist countries.

Increasing labor productivity, without which it is impossible to create a socio-political order more advanced than capitalism, as Lenin indicated, "first of all requires that the material basis of large-scale industry shall be assured, name-

¹ J. N. Westwood, *Russia: 1917-1964*, London, 1966, pp. 181-85; R. W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia*.

ly, the development of the production of fuel, iron, the engineering and chemical industries".¹

It is difficult to imagine that Alec Nove and other "sovietologists" do not know that the expansion of capitalist reproduction, and consequently the domestic market, occurs primarily through expanding capital goods production, and only to a lesser extent through expansion of consumer goods production. Society expends more labor on the reproduction of capital goods (plant, machinery, equipment, raw materials and other stocks) than on the production of consumer goods. If the reverse were true, technological progress would cease. These conclusions are indirectly confirmed by comparing the rates of development of capital goods production, on the one hand, and consumer goods production, on the other.

Growth Rates of the Principal Elements of Social Production
in the USA, the FRG and the USSR, 1964-1969

(1963=100)

	Total industrial output	Chemical and petro-chemical industry	Heavy engineering and metal processing	Production of electricity and natural gas	Food industry	Textile industry	Agricultural production
United States	139	157	146	158	119	132	104
West Germany	144	162	143	161	128	128	117
USSR	162	201	187	177	146	145	130

This table is based on data from the statistical yearbook of the United Nations for 1970. We see that the sectors playing the decisive role in capital goods production (heavy engineering and metal processing, production of electricity and natural gas, the chemical industry) are developing fast-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 257.

er than the other sectors of social production. At the same time, the growth of consumer goods production (the food and textile industries, agriculture) lags appreciably behind the average rate of development of industry as a whole.

Thus, the law that capital goods production is the leading sector is a reality. In bourgeois society, it is subordinate to deriving maximum profit.

In the second half of the 1940s, when the workers of the Soviet Union brought the country back to, and then advanced appreciably beyond, the prewar industrial level, the standard of living of the Soviet people rose sharply as a result of the increased output of consumer goods, of the monetary reform and the end of rationing, as well as because retail prices were repeatedly lowered. In the United States, on the other hand, there was a strike movement to halt the decline in wages and to obtain a living wage. That is one symptomatic fact, and many more could be cited.

In Soviet society, the priority development of capital goods production is carried out subject to the basic law of socialism—the improvement of the people's standard of living. This means that the development of Department I (heavy industry) is subordinate to the task of increasing the production of consumer goods.

Bourgeois economists attempt to refute this truth. Many of them juxtapose the development of heavy industry in the USSR to the production of consumer goods, endeavoring to show—as the American economist Rush V. Greenslade does, for example—that in the USSR heavy industry develops to the detriment of the consumer industry. According to Greenslade, the Soviet consumer suffers from the fact that production is carried out in the Soviet Union for the sake of production.¹

Even in the first postwar years, when the country was experiencing great difficulties, the Communist Party and the Soviet government did everything possible to develop indus-

tries providing for the immediate needs of the population. For example, in December 1946, the USSR Council of Ministers passed an enactment "On Measures for Accelerating the Development of State Light Industry Producing Items of Mass Consumption". This called for increasing investment and taking other steps to increase the output of consumer goods. Somewhat later, the February (1947) plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party set Party and Soviet organs and collective and state farms the task of providing light industry with the necessary raw materials.

The light and food industries were in dire need of technological modernization and of replacing worn-out machinery with more advanced equipment. And Soviet engineering began to meet these needs on an increasing scale. For example, in the course of the five-year plan period, the textile, knitted goods, sewing and footwear industries were provided with 170 thousand pieces of machinery. Important measures were taken to modernize the technological base of the food industry, too.

In subsequent years, the development of the light and food industries continued to be of concern to the Communist Party and the Soviet government. In accordance with the Directives for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR in 1951-1955, adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU, a large number of enterprises were built in the light and food industries, in particular cotton mills, cotton cleaning factories, enterprises for the production of artificial fibers, as well as silk, sewing, tanning and footwear, sugar, creamery and vegetable dehydration plants, and enterprises in the confectionery, tea, preserving, meat, brewing, wine, fishing, butter and cheese industries. Automation and mechanization were extensively introduced in the production of food and consumer manufactured goods.

In the course of the fifth five-year plan period, the Party amended the planned rate of development of consumer goods production. Technological modernization of existing en-

¹ *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part I, pp. 4-9.

terprises and the construction of new enterprises were accelerated. In 1954, twice as much money was allocated for capital construction in the light industry as in the preceding year, and as much was allocated for this purpose to the food industry as in the first two years of the five-year plan.

The 20th, 21st and 22nd Party Congresses devoted much attention to the development of the light and food industries. Investment in these sectors was more than 3 times as great in the period of 1956-1965 as in the preceding decade.

All these measures provided for high rates of modernization of equipment and comprehensive mechanization in the light and food industries. In 1959, a decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers led to the establishment of eight modern pilot enterprises in light industry. In 1960 alone, the textile industry received 11,089 automatic looms. In 1961, the baking industry put into operation 135 mechanized lines for the production of bread and baked goods. Modernization of equipment and improvement of the production process have led to an appreciable increase in the output of consumer goods.

As a result of the priority development of capital goods production, by the mid-1960s the Soviet Union had achieved a gigantic industrial upsurge. Soviet industry had become capable of dealing with the most complex production and technological tasks, of ensuring rapid development of the entire economy. The Soviet Union had achieved new success in the economic competition with capitalism.

But the Party was far from exaggerating the results achieved. For instance, the output of consumer goods did not yet completely satisfy demand. The 23rd Congress of the CPSU, while maintaining the higher rate of development in heavy industry, set out to develop intensively those industries that directly satisfy the material and cultural needs of the population. In the Eighth Five-Year Plan, almost as much money was allocated to the development of consumer industries as had been allocated in the preceding two five-year plans together.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971) reinforced and extended this policy.

"While securing resources for continued economic growth, while technically re-equipping production, and investing enormously in science and education," noted the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Party Congress, "we must at the same time concentrate more and more energy and means on tasks relating to the improvement of the Soviet people's well-being."¹

The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) allocated almost twice as many resources—8.7 thousand million rubles—as in the preceding plan for the development of light industry, and around 14 thousand million rubles for the development of the food, meat and dairy, and fishing industries. The amount of technology available to enterprises in the light and food industries increased sharply, and the production of equipment for these industries was doubled.

The constant and ever growing concern of the CPSU for strengthening the material and technological base for the production of consumer goods explains the rapid and stable growth of consumer goods output. It is not to the "detriment", as bourgeois economists assert, but to the benefit of these sectors that heavy industry has been developed in the USSR.

The following table gives a graphic picture of this.

Growth Indices for the Two Basic Sectors
of Social Production
in the USSR for the Years 1945-1970
(as a percentage of 1945)

	1945	1950	1960	1965	1970
Production of capital goods	100	183	594	941	1,421
Production of consumer goods	100	207	549	745	1,110

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 48.

It is noteworthy that in the most difficult, first postwar five-year plan period, the rate of production of consumer goods ran considerably ahead of the growth of capital goods production. Later, however, heavy industry received priority development. As can be seen in the table, in the following 20 postwar years production of capital goods increased approximately 14 times, production of consumer goods approximately 11 times.

The sharp increase in heavy industry's delivery of technology and materials to the light and food industries in accordance with the Directives adopted by the 23rd Congress of the CPSU led to stepped-up production of consumer goods. As a result, during the eighth five-year plan period the growth rates of the capital goods and consumer goods industries converged. While capital goods production grew by 51 percent as compared to the 1965 level, consumer goods production increased by 49 percent. The difference is minimal.

The Directives adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU for the 1971-1975 economic development plan called for increasing production of capital goods by 41-45 percent in these five years, while increasing the production of consumer goods by 44-48 percent. This goal was met.

In 1971-1975 growth of the production of means of production continued to be greater than growth of consumer production. But this did not mean that consumer production was neglected. The drive to expand output of consumer goods continues. The 25th Congress of the CPSU has set the increase of consumer output at 43-46 thousand million rubles in the tenth five-year plan period against the 39 thousand million rubles increase in the ninth.

* * *

The facts cited above refute the "sovietologists'" conjectures to the effect that priority development of capital goods production is not an economic law but a product of "dogmatism" and "subjectivism" that fetters and undermines

the production of consumer goods in the Soviet Union. In fact, this economic law—which is as well a sociological law—operates not only in socialist society, but also in capitalist society. But it operates differently, because of the differing socio-economic structures. In the USSR, as distinct from capitalist countries, where production is subordinate to profit maximization, the growth of capital goods production helps to increase the production of consumer goods and, consequently, to increase the well-being of the people.

4. THE CPSU'S AGRARIAN POLICY AS INTERPRETED BY ITS ENEMIES

The Communist Party has always given much attention to the development of agriculture. In the postwar years, however, when draft animals, fodder, seeds and machinery were lacking, and the village population consisted largely of women, older persons and children, restoring agriculture required especially great efforts.

The Party proceeded from the consideration that collective farm agriculture was to be rebuilt on the basis of extensive mechanization and electrification of agricultural chores. The countryside had to be supplied with modern technology, fuel, electrical energy and technical personnel. This could not be done unless industry had been developed on a priority basis.

In dealing with the task of agricultural development, the Party had to overcome enormous difficulties of both a subjective and an objective nature. The Nazi aggressors had inflicted enormous damage on the country's agriculture. Resource limitations made it impossible to develop industry and agriculture at an accelerated rate simultaneously. As a result, in the first half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, there were serious imbalances in the development of agriculture and industry. Moreover, weather was bad in some years. All these factors, as well as mistakes and miscalcula-

tions in carrying out the agricultural policy, made the rebuilding and development of agriculture more difficult.

The Party did not conceal these difficulties from the people. "Sovietologists", on the other hand, seek to exaggerate them in every way possible. They see one of the principal flaws in the Party's "tutelage" over agricultural production, a tutelage they think should be eliminated. According to the "sovietologists", the "permanent crisis" in agriculture stems principally from the Party's "dogmatic" adherence to the collective form of agricultural production and the policy of priority development of industry.

The Soviet Union's ideological opponents attribute to agriculture the role of a "buffer sector" that absorbs all the blows of a "discriminatory" economic policy. R. W. Pethybridge's *A History of Postwar Russia*, for example, maintains that after the Second World War Soviet "agriculture not only did not recover from the war, but manifestly decayed".¹ Pethybridge sees the causes of this imaginary "decay" in the fact that "in the period after the war, Soviet authorities concealed the true extent of the damage to agriculture. This was done chiefly in order to cover up another and more serious problem, the overall impracticability of the planned system of agriculture, which retarded the recovery of this sector of the economy".²

It is well known that the Communist Party and the Soviet government did not idealize the situation in agriculture in the early 1950s. That situation was given a proper evaluation by the September (1953) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where it was recognized that agriculture was lagging somewhat behind industry's need for raw materials and the population's need for food. The prewar level of grain production had not been reached by the beginning of the 1950s, but the prewar level had been surpassed in meat production (which Pethybridge intentionally

¹ R. W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia*, p. 66.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

ignores). In 1928, there were in the USSR 58.2 million head of cattle, in 1953—56.1 million head. Pethybridge cites only this difference in the size of the herds, without wishing to take note of the fact that the smaller herd of 1950 yielded just as much, or more, by way of food products as the 1928 herd (in 1928, 4.9 million tons of meat and 31 million tons of milk were produced; in 1950, 4.9 million tons of meat and 35.3 million tons of milk). Pethybridge's analysis thus disregards the totality of facts that describe the development of Soviet agriculture in the postwar years.

Yet while in some areas agricultural production had not reached the prewar level by 1950, in gross output agriculture did at that point achieve the prewar level. These facts do not conform to the picture of the "decay" of Soviet agriculture, and for that reason they are simply absent from the works of the falsifiers. There is even less reason to look for signs of a "crisis" in Soviet agriculture in the headlong rebuilding and development of socialist industry in the postwar years. Yes, agriculture did at that time develop appreciably more slowly than industry. But this does not mean that the latter progressed at the expense of the former, as bourgeois theoreticians attempt to show.

More rapid development of large-scale industry provided a reliable basis for the growth of agricultural production. In 1950, there were seven tractor factories, as opposed to three before the war. All enterprises and the organizations supplying them were charged with giving priority to orders for agriculture and with meeting them without delays. In 1947, competition for filling orders for the village ahead of schedule was begun on the initiative of the Communists at the Frezer and Krasny Proletary (Red Proletarian) plants in Moscow. The workers at these enterprises, led by their Party organizations, found untapped reserves for increasing and accelerating the production of agricultural machinery. Various sorts of material assistance to the countryside were provided through patronage relations between enterprises and collective farms, machine-and-tractor stations and state

farms. The same thing occurred throughout the country. The entire people helped to rebuild agriculture.

During the fourth five-year plan period, agriculture received 536 thousand tractors (in 15 h.p. units), 93 thousand grain harvester combines, and hundreds of thousands of other pieces of machinery. Heavy industry also provided agriculture with 115 new types of machines, among them one-row beet combines, cotton harvesters, machines for threshing rice, self-propelled combines, and new and powerful diesel tractors. More agricultural machines were produced between 1946 and 1950 than in the first two five-year plan periods together.

By the end of 1950, considerably more equipment was being used by Soviet agriculture than before the war. As a result, the mechanization of state and collective farm production increased perceptibly. The most laborious field work—plowing fallow land and the autumn ploughing—were more than 90 percent mechanized on the collective farms in 1950. On state farms, 95 percent of the ploughing, sowing, harvesting and threshing of grain was done with machinery. Collective farm production assets increased rapidly. By the end of the fourth five-year period (1950), collective farm production assets were greater than before the war. Relying on the growing and, to a considerable extent, modernized material and technological basis, agricultural workers had by this time managed, for all practical purposes, to restore the prewar level of agricultural production.

However, because of the underestimation of the importance of material incentives in the work of collective farmers, the rate of agricultural development in the USSR in the years 1950-1953 fell sharply. This is to be explained by subjective, transitory causes, primarily violations of the Leninist principle of giving agricultural workers a material interest in the development of social production (this was expressed above all in the establishment of excessively low purchase prices for agricultural produce). After these distortions had

been largely eliminated, the rate of agricultural development picked up considerably.

Admitting the irrefutable fact that this rate did in fact pick up, Robert Conquest and R. W. Pethybridge nevertheless explain the progress in Soviet agriculture by certain "temporary concession" to peasants, whose psychology has allegedly been altered neither by the revolution nor by collectivization and who remain, as before, individualists.¹ Pethybridge attributes increased production in these years primarily to the collective farmers' private plots. In support of this, he cites data on the sale of agricultural produce in 1956 at collective farm markets, where, allegedly, only one-tenth of the sales were of collective farms' goods, the rest coming from the peasants' private plots.²

This conclusion would have some basis if the collective farm market was under socialism the only channel by which the population is supplied with agricultural goods. However, in socialist countries the collective farm markets play an ancillary role, the principal supplies of agricultural produce reaching the population through state and cooperative retail organizations. Hence it is quite logical that the share of state and cooperative retail organizations in the food sales increased from 82.7 percent in 1950 to 95.1 percent in 1960, while the share of the collective farm markets fell from 17.3 percent to 4.9 percent.

A number of bourgeois economists and historians, recognizing that there were certain advances in agricultural output between 1953 and 1958, are all the more zealous in attacking the CPSU's agricultural policy between 1959 and 1964, accusing the Party of bringing agriculture to a state of total "crisis". Conquest and Pethybridge, attempting to provide a basis for this conclusion, speak of limitations imposed on the "private capitalist ventures on the part of the

¹ Robert Conquest, *Agricultural Workers in the USSR*, London, 1968, p. 70; R. W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia*.

² R. W. Pethybridge, op. cit.

peasants", of the Party and Soviet leadership's "disregard" for the problems of agriculture.¹

We know that from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s there were serious difficulties in the development of Soviet agriculture. But as L. I. Brezhnev reported to the July (1970) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "they have nothing in common with the inventions of anti-Soviet propagandists. They have a completely different character. Given the present growth of our economy, greater demands are being made of agriculture, and this is just as it should be".

All the same, in these years the country's agriculture on the whole made certain advances. Gross agricultural output in 1965 was 15.4 percent greater than in 1958. However, the agricultural growth rate was considerably lower than between 1954 and 1958. This was in turn felt in the development of the entire economy and led to a reduction in the rate at which the gross national product grew. But even in such difficult periods Soviet agriculture grew more rapidly than agriculture in capitalist countries.

As examples, let us look at the production of grain and milk. Both are important indices of overall agricultural production. In 1967, approximately twice as much grain was laid in in the Soviet Union as in 1951. In the same period, grain production rose in the United States by only 54 percent, in France by 23 percent, in the FRG by 37 percent. As to production of grain per capita, the Soviet Union was at almost the same level as France and far surpassed Britain, Italy and the FRG. The Soviet Union also made great advances in milk production, more than doubling the yield between 1951 and 1967.

Under capitalism, there is a tendency for the gap between prices for industrial and agricultural goods to widen. Industrial and commercial monopolies sell goods to farmers at high monopoly prices while purchasing farm produce at

¹ R. W. Pethybridge, *A History of Postwar Russia*, p. 65.

low prices. In the United States, for example, the price index for farm products rose from 100 to 248 between 1940 and 1965, while the index for industrial goods rose over the same period from 124 to 321. Prices for agricultural commodities in the United States cover only 67 percent of the farmers' outlays.

Under socialism, the ratio between the prices at which produce is bought from collective farms (kolkhozes) and the wholesale prices for means of agricultural production is such that it promotes the simultaneous growth of both sectors of socialist production. The Program of the CPSU states: "The policy in the sphere of state purchasing prices of agricultural produce and state selling prices of means of production for the countryside must take account of the interests of extended reproduction in both industry and agriculture and of the need to accumulate funds in the kolkhozes."¹

Between 1958 and 1970, important measures were carried out for adjusting prices for agricultural goods. The ratio of industrial and agricultural prices was substantially improved, which ensured a rapid increase of the return on agricultural production. The average annual gross income of the collective farms between 1966 and 1969 was 20 thousand million rubles, 5.8 thousand million rubles more than in the years 1962-1965. Gross output of state farms rose from 21 thousand million rubles in 1965 to 24 thousand million rubles in 1969.

The achievements of the CPSU's agrarian policy have forced some bourgeois economists to recognize that socialist agriculture allows for higher rates of growth for the entire economy. The British economist Erich Strauss, whom it is impossible to suspect of sympathy for the socialist order, writes in *Soviet Agriculture in Perspective* that "...a number of conditions for catching up with Western Europe and America undoubtedly exist in the Soviet Union". The principal conditions are that "there is no shortage of competent

¹ *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 528-29.

and trained scientific personnel, hence there is general awareness and specific knowledge of the basic techniques and their application to Soviet conditions . . . and finally there is a determination . . . to make the production of most or all agricultural commodities economically attractive. . . ."¹

Even the authors of the highly biased American collection, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, could not ignore the major achievements of Soviet agriculture. Douglas Diamond, the author of "Trends in Output, Inputs, and Factor Productivity in Soviet Agriculture", disputing the most convinced anti-Soviet authors, notes: "Contrary to popular belief, the Soviet regime in this 15-year period (he has in mind 1950-1965—N.M.) has not neglected agriculture." On the basis of his own calculations, he comes to the following conclusion: "The difference between the 70-percent growth in output since 1950 and the one-third growth in inputs is, of course, the effect of the increased productivity of the resources devoted to Soviet agriculture. Today, the combined productivity of the land, labor, capital and other conventional inputs in agriculture is about 25 percent greater than in 1950. . . . All of this gain in productivity occurred before 1959. . . ."²

Without stopping to determine the precision of the figures Diamond adduces, we will note only that this "sovietologist" has been forced to deal with objective reality. Among the factors promoting increased labor productivity in Soviet agriculture are, as he sees it, the following: "1) improvement in production techniques and the application of new knowledge over a wider area; 2) a rise in the level of education and training of the labor force; 3) improvement in the training and skill of managers and administrators; 4) improvement in the system of management and incentives; 5) economies of scale resulting from, say, an increase in the size

¹ Erich Strauss, *Soviet Agriculture in Perspective. A Study of Its Successes and Failures*, New York, 1969, pp. 299-300.

² *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*. Part II-B, p. 343.

of the individual farm or from a pooling of repair facilities for farm machinery; and 6) improvements in the efficiency with which inputs are combined and used."¹

The March (1965) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU introduced necessary changes in the existing system of agricultural produce purchases from collective farms; fixed plans for the purchase of agricultural goods were established. The plan for agricultural purchases in 1965 that had been ratified earlier was reduced from 4 thousand million poods² to 3 thousand million poods of grain. It was decided to leave this plan in force for the next six years, through 1970. This procedure in planning purchases, a procedure in line with increasing the productive forces of agriculture and meeting the needs of collective and state farms, was held to be effective by the 24th Congress of the CPSU and was extended into the subsequent five-year plan period.

At the same time, purchase prices for agricultural products were raised—before, these prices had not always covered real production costs and had therefore reduced the collective and state farms' material interest in expanding production. Moreover, a bonus was introduced for produce delivered above the plan. Investment in agriculture was considerably increased. Thus, stable economic conditions were established that stimulated an increase in agricultural production.

The Party's work directed to an agricultural upsurge resulted in major achievements during the years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan. The average annual volume of agricultural production increased 21 percent, as against a 12 percent increase during the preceding five-year plan. The total grain harvest rose by 37 million tons, or 1.3 times. Agricultural output in 1970 was remarkable—186 million tons of grain were harvested (an average of 15.6 centners per hectare), as were 6.9 million tons of cotton.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

² One pood is equal to 16 kilograms or about 36 pounds avoirdupois.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU envisaged a number of important new measures for further increasing and improving agricultural output. Considering it insufficient to confine itself to isolated measures of an agrotechnical or organizational nature, the Party decided to make maximum use in its economic policy of the entire range of conditions that could maximize agricultural development; these included supplying countryside with technology and fertilizers, expanding capital construction, improving land, training personnel and improving the organization of production.

The Soviet Union can now allocate much more resources to the development of agriculture than it could previously. During the ninth five-year plan period, approximately one-third of the country's total investment was allocated to agriculture and sectors that supply agriculture with materials and technology (production of mineral fertilizers, agricultural machinery, mixed feeds, electrical energy, as well as the microbiological industry and others).

The CPSU Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress contains the following passage: "We are realists, and we are quite well aware that a qualitative reorganization of agricultural production requires time, labour and huge investments, especially because for a number of mainly objective historical reasons we have only in the recent period begun to allocate large sums for this branch. Of the 320,000 million rubles invested in agriculture during the entire period of the Soviet power, 213,000 million rubles were invested during the past two five-year periods."¹

In the past ten years (1966-1975) the collective and state farms were supplied more than three million new tractors, 900,000 harvester combines, 1,800,000 trucks and special-purpose vehicles, and other farm machinery worth many billions of rubles. The energy-to-man ratio in agriculture has doubled. Some 6,400,000 hectares of irrigated and more

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, p. 59.

than 8 million hectares of drained land have been put under the plough. There has been extensive land improvement. Use of fertilizers has increased 180 percent and of insecticides and herbicides more than 100 percent.

This has laid a dependable foundation for farming to become a highly developed sector of the Soviet economy. In the past two five-year periods the grain yield has increased 40 percent, and the productivity of farm labor 58 percent.

All in all, farm output per head of population (with a population growth of 23 million) has gone up nearly 25 percent.

New development is planned in the tenth five-year plan period. Here, says the Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress, the Party has set two interconnected objectives: "The first is to secure a reliable supply of food and agricultural primary materials for the country and always to have adequate reserves for this. The second is to make steady progress in levelling up the material, cultural and everyday conditions of life in town and countryside, this being our programme requirement.

"Both these aims are of fundamental economic and political importance. Both determine the content of the Party's guidelines, which are a creative development of the Leninist agrarian policy. These guidelines are entirely consistent with the basic interests of the collective-farm peasantry and the working class, have stood the test of time and received nationwide approval."¹

As much as 172 thousand million rubles has been earmarked for further agricultural development in the new five-year plan, or 41 thousand million more than in the previous five years. In 1976-1980 the collective and state farms will get another 1,900,000 tractors, 1,350,000 trucks, 538,000 grain harvesters, 1,580,000 tractor trailers, 100,000 excavators, 106,500 bulldozers, around 48,000 scrapers, and much other highly productive farm machinery. The energy-to-man

¹ Ibid., pp. 58-59.

ratio will go up substantially, more chemicals will be used, there will be extensive land improvement, drainage work and the like. By and large, this will complete the overall mechanization of grain crop farming and raise the degree of mechanization in other sectors of agriculture, including animal husbandry. Ultimately, output of grain and other crops, and of animal products, will reach the targets set by the 25th CPSU Congress.

Coupled with scientific and technological progress, the establishment of large-scale specialized agricultural enterprises and associations is paving the way to further agro-industrial integration and an organic merging of agricultural and industrial production in a far-flung network of agro-industrial enterprises and associations. As noted in the CC CPSU resolution, "Further Development of Specialization and Concentration of Agricultural Production on the Basis of Inter-Farm Cooperation and Agro-Industrial Integration" (1972), conditions are gradually shaping for the convergence of cooperative collective farm property with state property and their fusion in the long term into property of the whole people. As we see, communist construction is bringing closer the day when that age-old problem of eliminating the social distinctions between town and village will finally be solved.

These and many other facts refute the bourgeois myth that Soviet agriculture is a "buffer sector". Implementation of the program of comprehensive development of agriculture will mean an increase in output that will in the near future permit systematic expansion and improvement of the supply of food products to the population and raw material to industry. Socialist agriculture has once more demonstrated its great vitality and its capacity to overcome temporary difficulties.

* * *

The triumph of the collective farm system in the Soviet village provokes the unconcealed anger of anti-communists.

Forced to reconcile themselves to this irrefutable fact, "sovietologists" distort and falsify in every way possible the development of Soviet agriculture and seek to "bring to light" a conflict between workers and collective farmers, between the Communist Party and the peasantry.

Contrary to the assertions of bourgeois propaganda, socialist agriculture is making steady progress, improving its output indices with every passing year. The vanguard role in this belongs to the village Communists—a glorious contingent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The CPSU and its Leninist Central Committee see one of the principal tasks in further strengthening the alliance of hammer and sickle—the Soviet working class and peasantry.

5. ANTI-COMMUNISTS ON THE POLICY OF THE CPSU IN THE AREA OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

Socialist production relations provide unlimited potential for the development of the forces of production, for scientific and technological progress. Success in transforming society along communist lines depends to a major extent on the level of development of science and technology. This is why the problems of providing technology for the economy have always been at the center of the Communist Party's attention. Under the first postwar five-year plan for the years 1946-1950, the task was set: "To ensure *further technological progress in all sectors of the economy of the USSR* as a condition for a major upsurge in production and for increasing labor productivity..."¹

In connection with the enormous scale of rebuilding and capital construction, the plan called for increasing the power available per worker and for mechanizing physically

¹ *Sittings of the USSR Supreme Soviet (First Session). 12-19 March, 1946. Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1946, p. 360 (in Russian).*

arduous and labor-intensive jobs. A major role in this was assigned to engineering. Designers created in a short period, and engineering industries put into production, 220 new types of machines for mechanizing labor-intensive jobs in industry, construction and transport.

New industries began to develop in the postwar period—electronics and atomic power generation among others. For the USSR, the 1950s were a period of rapid scientific and technological progress, prepared by all the preceding development of the Soviet economy.

It became an exceedingly difficult task for “sovietologists” to affirm that this progress was lacking or, at worst, that it was “second-rate”. For instance, Ayn Rand, author of *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*, sees the “moving force” of this progress in the efforts of Soviet leaders “to copy, borrow or steal the technological achievements of the West”.¹ Thus, the falsifiers try to prove that the USSR is obliged for its scientific and technological progress not to itself, not to the Party’s policy in this area, but to the capitalist West.

Another “sovietologist”, Harry Schwartz, takes a different view of scientific and technological progress in the USSR, but one that just as intentionally advances false premises. Speaking of the June (1955) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which discussed the improvement of the organization of production and the utilization of the latest achievements of science and technology, Schwartz, in *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*, seeks to convince the reader that a socialist economy lacks internal stimuli for steady scientific and technological progress.²

The June 1955 plenary session discussed the basic directions of technological progress, improvement of the organization of production, and the identification of concealed or

¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 113, Washington, August 16, 1967, p. II 10635.

² Harry Schwartz, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*, New York, 1965, pp. 85-100.

under-utilized production reserves. The major achievements of the USSR in the area of science and technology were noted. However, as was indicated at the same time, the problems of technological progress had not been adequately dealt with in all industries, and at times the advances of Soviet and foreign science were put to use in production too slowly.

Yet for all the specific shortcomings, the Soviet economy was moving steadily along the path of technological progress. An example was the world’s first man-made satellite—the Sputnik—the decades-old myth of the Soviet state’s scientific and technological inferiority was undercut. “Not many years ago,” writes the American historian Anatole G. Mazour, “a popular idea was nurtured that the Soviet Union was basically one of the backward oafs, a country noted for its imitative rather than its technological talent. It took three Sputniks to disprove this notion, demonstrate Soviet industrial capacity, call for a more rational appraisal of the impressive progress attained by the Soviet government.”¹

The following figures provide convincing evidence of the achievement of the USSR in the realm of scientific and technological progress. While between 1951 and 1961 in the USSR 9,118 new types of machinery and equipment and 2,716 new types of instruments and means of automation were created, the corresponding figures for the period 1962-1964 were 9,506 and 3,746, and for 1965-1967 they were 10,229 and 4,273. By mid-1967, 52,329 mechanized production lines and 6,840 transfer lines had been put into operation. The introduction of new and more advanced technology had a decisive impact on labor productivity, which grew by 75 percent between 1958 and 1967.

By the beginning of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, Soviet science had taken a leading position in many of the most important areas of international scientific and technological progress. This and much other data testifying to the im-

¹ Anatole G. Mazour, *Russia Tsarist and Communist*, New York, 1962, p. 871.

mense contribution that the CPSU has made in ensuring scientific and technological progress in the USSR refute the false arguments of Schwartz and Rand.

The Party has constantly promoted rapid development of scientific research. This was reflected in the Directives for the Eighth Five-Year Plan, adopted by the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, and, especially, in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers of September 24, 1968, "On Measures for Increasing the Effectiveness of the Work of Scientific Organizations and Acceleration of the Utilization of the Scientific and Technological Advances in the Economy". This resolution indicated the ways to improve the structure of research institutions and to increase their role in the economy. Economic incentives for employees at research institutions and in institutions of higher education were made directly dependent on the efficiency with which scientific recommendations and new technology were put to use in the economy.

In an era when science has become one of society's productive forces, a high scientific and technological level is necessary in all production. This strategic line in economic policy was set by the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the decisions of which played an immense role in mobilizing and accelerating the country's scientific and technological progress.

The training of technical personnel takes on great importance in this connection. The number of engineers in the Soviet Union is constantly growing, as is the number of other specialists with academic degrees employed in the economy. While in 1950 there were 37 thousand engineers with at least a college-level education in the USSR and 61 thousand such persons in the United States, by 1960 the corresponding figures were 120 thousand and 43 thousand and by 1969—231 thousand and 52 thousand. The leading capitalist country lags appreciably behind the Soviet Union in the number of specialists employed in the economy. In 1950, there were 400 thousand such specialists in the Soviet Union and 310 thousand in the United States; in 1969, the figures

were 2,400 thousand and 870 thousand, respectively. The Soviet Union's superiority in training engineering and technical personnel has become so obvious that even some "specialists in Soviet affairs" recognize it.

Figures on the number of scientific personnel in the USSR are even more impressive. In 1947, the Soviet Union had 145.6 thousand scientific personnel; by 1970, their numbers had grown to 927.4 thousand. Under the leadership of the CPSU, the country achieved outstanding results in organizing scientific research. Typical in this respect is the admission in Arnold Barach's *USA and Its Economic Future*. "The fast-paced technological and scientific achievements of the modern world," Barach writes, "have resulted in urgent demands that America not be left behind in the training and education of her youth. Some people call this the 'Sputnik' effect—produced in reaction to public concern over the Russian feat of being first to launch a space satellite."¹

But while recognizing the Soviet Union's outstanding achievements in scientific and technological discovery, anti-communists forget to mention the main point—the favorable impact of scientific and technological progress on the Soviet people's standard of living. They resort to the most open falsification of Soviet reality. Ayn Rand, for example, has said that "in a 'people's state' (i.e., a socialist state—*N.M.*), the progress of science is a threat to the people, and every advance is taken out of the people's shrinking hides".²

History has shown that, as opposed to capitalism, socialism uses scientific and technological achievements in the vital interests of working people. It is enough to recall that immediately after the July (1955) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was devoted to the development of industry, technological progress and improvement of the organization of production, the USSR

¹ A. Barach, *USA and Its Economic Future*, New York, 1964, p. 64.

² *Congressional Record*, Vol. 113, Washington, August 16, 1967, p. H 10635.

Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU, summing up the experience at hand, adopted a resolution on the extensive development of industrial methods of construction. Use of such methods led to a technological revolution in the construction industry, in housing construction in particular. The following table provides a picture of how this benefited the people.

Year	Number of Apartments (thousands)	Number of Persons Receiving Living Space (millions)
1951-1955	6,052	30.6
1956-1960	11,292	54.0

As can be seen from the table, in the second half of the 1950s the number of apartments built and the number of persons receiving new living space practically doubled.

In 1957-1966 nearly half the country's population moved into new apartments and cottages, or had their housing conditions improved. In the subsequent period the rate of house-building was just as high. More than 11 million apartments and cottages were built in 1971-1975 (with a total area of 544 million sq. meters). This meant better housing for 56 million people. All in all, two thousand million sq. meters of new housing was constructed in the Soviet Union in the past four five-year plan periods. This has no parallel in history. As distinct from scientific and technological progress in the capitalist economy, in the socialist economic system scientific and technological progress—with an accelerated growth of labor productivity—provides Soviet citizens with full employment and increased well-being.

Typical of socialism is mass participation in invention and the rationalization of production. The past few years witnessed a significant growth of the creative activity of scientists, engineers and production innovators who responded to the Party's call for an acceleration of technical progress

with the introduction of a greater number of inventions and proposals for rationalizing production.

As we know, some American businessmen have attempted to copy some of the forms of the organization of labor used in the USSR—that very labor that “sovietologists” call “forced” and “compulsory”. Two American companies—Polaroid Corporation and IBM—for example, have carried out experiments for involving some workers in the rationalization of production. However, creative activity by workers contradicts the essence of capitalism and the attempt to utilize Soviet experience is therefore doomed to failure. As the well-known American sociologist, David Riesman, writes, “that reorganization is hardly possible in a fiercely competitive industry”.¹

In capitalist countries, the scientific and technological revolution is turned against working people. The competitive struggle is stepped up. In West Germany, the United States and other developed capitalist countries, increased labor productivity is attended by increased unemployment.

* * *

In the USSR, the necessary conditions for the accelerated development of science, technology and production have been established. Contrary to the unsubstantiated assertions of the falsifiers, those working in socialist production have a profound stake in creating and applying new technology, since this meets their own interests and those of society as a whole and furthers the growth of their own well-being and culture.

6. FICTIONS ABOUT THE “COST” OF THE USSR'S ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS

Directly connected with the concept of the “command economy” is the false thesis on the “cost” at which the economic policy of the CPSU has been implemented. This

¹ *Contemporary Social Problems*, New York, 1966, p. 579.

thesis is based on the proposition that all the advances of the Soviet economy have been achieved at the expense of a reduction in the working people's standard of living; such inventions figure in works by bourgeois economists. The "sovietologists'" speculations on the "cost of modernization" in Soviet Russia have been subjected to general critical treatment in the Soviet literature. Here we shall dwell only on the way Soviet postwar history is presented in the light of this thesis.

As is well known, the terrible consequences of the war created enormous difficulties for rebuilding and developing the Soviet economy. Soviet citizens consciously accepted privations in order the more rapidly to rebuild the war-ravaged economy. And it is these terribly difficult conditions into which the Soviet Union was put by the imperialist aggression that the majority of "sovietologists" present as the result of "flaws" in the Soviet economic system. Many of them pharisaically lament that the "cost" of the USSR's postwar economic development was too great, neglecting to mention those who were truly responsible for the situation.

The authors of *The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years*, written by leading contributors to *The New York Times* under the general editorship of Harrison Salisbury, crudely falsify the history of the first postwar years. In the section "Fifty Years That Shook the World", Salisbury writes that the USSR, having rebuilt the economy, entered the 1950s "dazed, exhausted, sullen, dispirited, sodden with bardship, sacrifices and violence".¹ Looking back on the road travelled by the Soviet state, this falsifier asks pathetically: "Was this necessary?" And he answers, citing some anonymous "Soviet" authors: No!

Salisbury's conclusions are so false that some "sovietologists" have been forced to amend them. George A. Lensen, professor of history at Florida State University, makes the following admission: "The task of reconstruction following World War II was enormous, and the living conditions of

¹ *The Soviet Union: The Fifty Years*, p. 16.

the people remained pitiful. But renewed patriotism and pride in their victorious armed forces filled the Russian people."¹ Patriotism and labor enthusiasm were, in fact, most important factors in the unusually rapid restoration and further development of the country's economy. Soviet citizens reconciled themselves to temporary difficulties, because they knew that through their labor they were creating the necessary basis for subsequent prosperity, because they knew that the Communist Party did the maximum at each historically new stage to improve their living standards.

There is in contemporary bourgeois political economy an incorrect opinion that rapid economic development in socialist countries reduces consumption in favor of accumulation. Drawing this conclusion, "sovietologists" affirm that rapid economic development in the USSR was in the postwar period the result entirely of a reduction of the working people's standard of living, of an artificial limitation of consumption.

The well-known British Marxist economist, Maurice Dobb, gives fair evaluation of the true state of affairs in his works. He argues that in a rational economic policy it is "how you use the investible surplus you have and how you harness its results that is crucial, rather than its initial size in Year One". And he concludes correctly, "once you have achieved an adequate growth-rate by ploughing back the increment, there will soon be an ample margin for increasing both consumption and investment at the same time".²

Soviet economic practice confirms Dobb's conclusions. The economic growth rate achieved by the Soviet Union by the end of the 1950s permitted in the following decade the allocation of sufficient resources for the simultaneous increase of both consumption and investment. Even in the 15 years following the war, despite the still quite limited possibilities, the Soviet state actively stimulated increased consump-

¹ G. Lensen, *The Soviet Union*, p. 44.

² M. Dobb, *Economic Growth and Underdeveloped Countries*, London, 1963, pp. 42-43.

tion. This is shown by the average monthly pay of workers and employees.

Year	Average Monthly Wages (rubles)	Average Monthly Wages Plus Payments and Benefits from Social Consumption Funds (rubles)
1946	47.5	62.4
1950	63.9	82.4
1955	71.5	91.8
1960	80.1	107.7

Peasants' income in money and in kind from their social labor and private plots grew at the following rate (percentage growth, with 1950 as a base year):

1950	1956	1960
100	162	188.6

For a more complete picture, let us look at the figures on the annual consumption of the most important food products and consumer manufactures (per capita):

	1950	1960
Meat and animal fat (including fowl and meat by-products) (kg)	26	40
Fish and fish products (kg)	7.0	9.9
Milk and dairy products (in milk weight) (kg)	172	240
Eggs (quantity)	60	118
Vegetables and melons (kg)	51	70
Sugar (kg)	11.6	28.0
Fabrics (sq. meters)	16.47	26.06

We can add to this that while in 1960 104.5 thousand million rubles were expended on consumption, the figure in 1965 was 140.3 thousand million rubles and in 1969—187.5 thousand million rubles. Correspondingly, the accumulation fund was in 1960 38.3 thousand million rubles, in 1965 50.2 thousand million rubles and in 1969 69.1 thousand million rubles.

From these figures, it is evident that the "sovietologists'" assertions that consumption in the USSR is restricted for the sake of accumulation are nothing more than a myth.

The falsifiers do not adduce a single fact to support their thesis because such facts simply do not exist. But there are numerous facts of the opposite sort. And they all testify to the CPSU's constant concern for increasing the people's well-being. In the postwar years, the Party has conducted work to this end along a broad front: workers' and employees' pay has increased, the collective farmers' income in money and in kind has grown, retail prices have been reduced, and taxes have been reduced and in some cases eliminated; the social funds for the free satisfaction of the needs of the population and for providing benefits in obtaining an education, medical services, social insurance and vacation opportunities have grown.

The increase in consumption in the USSR in the postwar period has been so obvious that even some bourgeois economists admit it. Philip Hanson, in *The Consumer in the Soviet Economy*, has noted the rapid increase in consumption in the postwar years.¹

The CPSU surely and steadily pursues a policy of seeing that every increase in the social product is attended by an improvement in the standard of living. It sees in this the principal criterion of the efficiency of socialist production.

Imperialist propaganda along these lines was stepped up in connection with the preparation for and meeting of the

¹ Philip Hanson, *The Consumer in the Soviet Economy*, London, 1968, p. 39.

24th Congress of the CPSU. And bourgeois ideologists again brought out the old idea of the "incompatibility" of the interests of the consumer and the growth of the Soviet economy.

The resolutions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU fully refuted this sort of falsification. A substantial increase in the people's well-being was set as the principal task of the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

"From the first days of Soviet power," noted the Report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "our Party and state have been doing their utmost in this respect. But for well-known historical reasons our possibilities were limited for a long time. Now they are substantially greater, which enables the Party to raise the question of centering economic development still more fully on improving the life of the people."¹

In the period since the 24th Congress, the CPSU has continued to implement the policy of substantially increasing the people's well-being. Between 1971 and 1973, real per capita income in the USSR rose 13.5 percent, the pay of every third worker and employee was raised and the housing of 34 million persons was improved (in 1973 alone, more than 11 million people celebrated a housewarming).

Prices for food and consumer manufactures have been stable—in contrast to the situation in the capitalist countries. As the London *Morning Star* wrote on October 21, 1974, price stability in the USSR "has played a major role in ensuring a steadily rising standard of living". The paper went on to note that in the last 47 years there have been no rent increases in the USSR, that since 1935 there has been no increase in the charge for public transportation or electricity.

There is in the USSR a growing demand for labor, even a labor shortage in a number of areas.

These achievements are especially evident against the

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 51.

background of the economic situation in the capitalist world, which recalls in many respects the great depression of the early 1930s. Unemployment and the cost of living are on the rise, the monetary crisis is deepening. Constant inflation and state-monopoly regulation of incomes, prices and taxes reduce to naught wage increases that working people in capitalist countries obtain through stubborn class struggle.

The economy of the capitalist world provides more than adequate grounds for pessimistic assessments and prognoses. As the American *International Herald Tribune* noted, the "U.S. economy is beginning to look increasingly like a pitiful, helpless giant..."¹ In 1973 and 1974, there was a larger drop in workers' real wages than at any time in American history—9 percent.² In May 1975, unemployment in the United States reached 9.2 percent—a record for the postwar period.³ In the most powerful capitalist country in the world, workers are demanding a reduction in prices to the 1970 level and the provision of work for all unemployed. The National Coalition Against Inflation and Unemployment organized in November 1974 a demonstration on this score in 40 American cities.⁴

Real per capita incomes in the Soviet Union tend to double about every 15 years, meaning that our socialist society has gone from one standard of consumption to a radically higher one several times in the life of one generation. In 1975 the average monthly wage was 146 rubles, and 198 rubles with benefits and allowances added. Collective farmers' pay went up 25 percent in the ninth five-year plan period or precisely as envisioned by the 24th CPSU Congress.

In the tenth five-year plan period average wages and salaries will rise 16-18 percent, climbing to at least 170 rubles monthly by 1980. Collective farmers' incomes will go

¹ *International Herald Tribune*, April 22, 1974, p. 3.

² *World Marxist Review*, April 1975, No. 4, p. 18.

³ *Rudé právo*, 16 června, 1975.

⁴ *World Marxist Review*, April 1975, No. 4, p. 19.

up still more palpably. Their pay will rise 24-27 percent, up to some 118 rubles monthly.

As before, benefits from what are known as public consumption funds, which are to expand 28-30 percent in these five years, will add considerably to the main source of income—the cash payments according to the quantity and quality of the work done.

The Party's wages and consumption policy envisages increases of payments for work as the chief means of raising incomes. The increases will account for three-quarters of the accretion of incomes. The aim is to assure a steady growth of consumption, and also to enhance the incentive factor of wages and salaries, and the collective farmers' emoluments, by making them more dependent on the efficiency and end results of production.

Such is the striking contrast between the economic policy of the CPSU, which calls for a constant increase in the people's standard of living, and the economic policy of bourgeois parties, a policy that disregards the vital needs of the people in the name of enriching the monopolies. Attempts to refute the basic goal of socialist social production—and with it, the basic economic law of socialism—thus fail ingloriously.

* * *

The widespread theory among "sovietologists" of the "cost" of the postwar economic achievements in the USSR is intended to falsify the true character of the economic policy of the CPSU and the entire Soviet economic system. The assertion that economic growth in the USSR is achieved by "infringing" on the interests of the people is false from beginning to end. The facts show just the opposite. The Communist Party's provision for high growth rates pursues no purposes other than increasing the well-being of the people. This policy is dictated by and conforms to the basic economic law of socialism. All this is reflected in the steady growth of real income, in the increase in the consumption of food pro-

ducts and manufactured goods, in the expansion of housing construction, and so on. If Soviet citizens had to face temporary material difficulties in the immediate postwar years, if the improvement in the people's material situation was not as great as the CPSU and the Soviet government wished it to be, it was imperialism that was to blame, the aggressive forces of which unleashed the Second World War and then the uncontrolled arms race.

7. ANTI-COMMUNISTS ON THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

"Socialism," observes L. I. Brezhnev, "knows no goal other than concern for the interests of the people, which above all presupposes the fight against war..."¹

The rate of reconstructing the war-ravaged economy, the creation of a developed socialist society and the passage to the building of communism depend to no little extent on external conditions. In the postwar years, the foreign policy of the CPSU—a policy of peace, security and friendship among nations—aimed at providing favorable external conditions.

At the end of the war, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, turned to the rebuilding of the economy. It is worth noting that the Soviet economy began reconversion to peace-time production even before Hitlerite Germany capitulated.

The CPSU and the Soviet government planned and implemented a number of measures for increasing investment in the civilian sectors of the economy; enterprises—military enterprises included—received assignments to turn out civilian goods; the work force, raw materials and stocks were reallocated to the advantage of civilian needs; normal labor conditions were restored, obligatory overtime work was ended.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 53.

The postwar conversion of industry was completed by the end of 1946. This was extremely complex and attended by a certain reduction of output. Industrial output, which at the end of the war was 92 percent of the 1940 level, fell by 16.3 percent to a low of 77 percent of the prewar level. But as soon as the conversion of industry to peace-time production had been completed, output mounted rapidly. In 1947 alone, industrial production grew by 21 percent, and, as noted, by the end of 1948 it had significantly surpassed the prewar level.

But the rate of postwar development and the increase of the people's well-being would have been considerably greater if the imperialist powers had not undertaken an arms race, as a result of which the Soviet Union was forced to allocate considerable resources to the needs of defense—resources that, given other conditions, could have been used for peaceful purposes.

Strengthening the country's defense capacity in the event that the aggressive forces of imperialism succeeded in unleashing a new world war, the Party simultaneously directed its efforts to defusing international tension and worked to end the arms race. The peaceful foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government won the sympathy and support of millions of working people on all continents.

In order, on the one hand, to check the influence of the peaceful Soviet foreign policy on people in the capitalist world and the developing countries and, on the other hand, to distract world public opinion from the monstrous militarization of the economies of the bourgeois states, bourgeois ideologists advanced the concept of the "military economy" that was alleged to exist in the USSR.

For example, Harry Schwartz attempts to prove that preparation for war is "the highest purpose" of the Soviet economy.¹ Some American, British and West German historians and economists express themselves in the same spirit.

¹ H. Schwartz, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*.

The report of the Economic and Industrial Research Corporation prepared for the US Senate remarked that the Soviet Union intended to conquer the world for communism, and that the USSR's recent economic plans showed that the Soviet Union was mobilizing its rapidly growing industry for this purpose. The report also alleged that Soviet efforts in the cold war were increasingly focused in the economic realm. Thus, the principal purpose of the concept of the "Soviet military economy" is to shift the responsibility for the arms race from imperialism to socialism.

The unprecedented growth of militarism in the capitalist countries in the years after the Second World War can be easily explained: the arms race is a means for providing super-profits to the monopolies.

In the postwar years, militarism acquired its most dangerous character in the United States. The military machine created in the United States between 1941 and 1945 stimulated an enormous growth of military output, the further expansion of which ceased to be a necessity as the war drew to a close. Economic reconversion was in order. But this was not in the interests of the major corporations. Voicing the fears of big business, President Harry Truman of the United States told a special session of the American Congress in September 1945: "The Congress reconvenes at a time of great emergency. The end of the war came more swiftly than most of us anticipated. Widespread cutbacks in war orders followed promptly. . . . This led to a natural feeling of uneasiness. . . ."¹

After the Second World War, the American economy was not reconverted for peace-time purposes—it was merely re-oriented along semi-military lines. A similar process went on in other developed capitalist countries. According to the calculations of experts, between the 1945/46 and 1967/68 fiscal years, direct military expenditures (in 1957-1959 prices) in the United States were twice as great as such expendi-

¹ Gunther Stein, *The World the Dollar Built*, London, 1952, p. 73.

tures (in the same prices) over the entire course of American history through 1945—including the years of the First and Second World Wars. In a mere five years (1966-1970), the United States spent around 400 thousand million dollars for military purposes.

In the NATO countries, total direct military expenditures between 1949 and 1966 reached an astronomical sum—1,050 thousand million dollars. Of this total, 74.3 percent was contributed by the United States, 7.7 percent by Britain, 4.2 percent by the FRG—with the latter's share of military expenditures rising sharply. In subsequent years, militarism continued to expand in the NATO countries. In 1970 alone, the countries in this bloc invested 103 thousand million dollars in preparations for war.

The most graphic socio-economic expression of militarism today is the military-industrial complex that has taken shape in the United States. In *The Crippled Giant. American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic Consequences*, J. William Fulbright, the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has written on this score: "Spawned by our global military involvements, the military-industrial complex has become a powerful force for the perpetuation of those involvements...."

"The military have become ardent and dangerous competitors for power in American society."¹

Even some confirmed adherents of capitalism expressed their alarm over this.

But the picture would be incomplete if we did not add one further, external, so to speak, inducement that explains the imperialist bourgeoisie's devotion to the arms race in the postwar period. Some military experts in the West reason: the arms race is more burdensome for the Soviet Union than for the Western capitalist countries, therefore the USSR will not be able to stand its pace, and this will lead to victory for the United States without a world war.

¹ J. William Fulbright, *The Crippled Giant. American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic Consequences*, New York, 1972, pp. 252, 253.

Having involved their economies in the arms race, building up the military-industrial potential of their countries to the detriment of the working people's standard of living, imperialists are not loath to accuse the Soviet Union of all this. The facts, however, prove the opposite.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, in its 1973 yearbook *World Armaments and Disarmament*, provides a table with data on military expenditures by countries. It includes the following figures:

Military Expenditures by the United States
and the USSR, 1951-1972, Inclusive
(in millions of American dollars)¹

Country	Year					
	1951	1955	1960	1965	1970	1972
USA	49,552	58,299	59,554	63,826	77,827	73,911
USSR	22,948	25,476	22,143	30,476	42,619	42,619

It is evident from the table that, over these more than two decades, Soviet military expenditures have been approximately half those of the United States; this quite graphically demonstrates the peaceful course of development of the Soviet economy and the militarist nature of the American economy. Bourgeois ideologists are increasingly coming to grips with the truth. For example, the outstanding American physicist, Herbert York, in a book with the indicative title *Race to Oblivion. A Participant's View of the Arms Race*, shows that it is the United States that has been the leader in the arms race in the postwar period, that it is the United States that has taken the initiative in actions setting the pace of the arms race and the scope of the arms market; examples are the creation of the atomic bomb, intercontinental bom-

¹ *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1973*, Stockholm, New York, London, 1973, pp. 234-35.

bers, ballistic missiles fired from submarines, multiple warheads. Similar views are held by historians and sociologists such as D. F. Fleming, William Appelman Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Gabriel Kolko, Diane Shaver Clemens and many other Western scholars.

So the curtain of lies erected by imperialist propaganda around the arms race is crumbling. "The fight of the Soviet Union for peace and friendship between peoples has completely dispelled the false legend about 'the aggressiveness of Moscow' and 'the communist threat'.... The peoples and even some bourgeois governments are more and more overtly evincing their desire to cast off the fetters that had been imposed on them, and to dissociate themselves from the dangerous adventuristic policy of the organisers and leaders of the imperialist blocs."¹

The arms race boomeranged and hit the economies of the capitalist countries, particularly the economy of the USA which began losing its positions on the world market. Even some of the American strategy theorists who, in the 1950s and 1960s, actively advocated the US military supremacy as a key to world hegemony begin realizing that now the military factors are no longer crucial. H. Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs admit: "Internal economic and technical development, perhaps combined with peaceful trade and overseas investment, rather than imperialism or aggression, seem today the more efficient as well as the more acceptable techniques for achieving most national objectives."²

In the Soviet Union, as opposed to the capitalist countries, there are no social groups or classes with a material stake in the militarization of the economy. In connection with this, the function of the defense industry, which under capitalism serves to enrich the monopoly bourgeoisie, undergoes a cardinal change. It is indicative that at present 42 percent of

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 62.

² Herman Kahn, B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come. Thinking About the Seventies and Eighties*, New York, 1972, p. 124.

the total output of the Soviet defense industry goes to civilian purposes.

* * *

From the end of the Second World War down to the present, the economies of the capitalist countries have been intensively militarized. In an effort to justify in the eyes of the public the arms race that is so beneficial to monopolies, bourgeois ideologists accuse the Soviet Union of being the responsible party. Imperialist propaganda strives to present the economic measures of the CPSU and the Soviet government for the strengthening of the country's defense capacity as evidence of the "aggressiveness" of the Soviet state, as the source of the "Red danger".

Unlike capitalist society, socialist society does not have the social and economic conditions under which a social group could grow rich from the development of the country's military potential—hence it has no intrinsic need for an arms race.

At the same time, the people of the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the CPSU, are doing everything possible to strengthen the Armed Forces of the USSR—but only in pursuit of defense, only to the extent necessary to maintain the Armed Forces at a such level that they can inflict a devastating blow on any aggressor. The facts, figures and comparisons cited above show that not destructive, but creative forces play the decisive role in the Soviet economy.

The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress said on this score: "Nor should there be any doubt in anyone's mind that our Party will do everything to have the splendid Armed Forces of the Soviet Union provided, in the future as well, with all the necessary means for fulfilling their responsible task of standing on guard over the Soviet people's peaceful labour and acting as the bulwark of world peace."¹

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 99.

THE ROLE OF THE CPSU IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND BOURGEOIS FALSIFICATIONS

1. THE BASELESSNESS OF BOURGEOIS FABRICATIONS ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY

The social structure of Soviet society is determined by the existence of friendly classes and groups of working people, by the unity of their interests, by their common stake in the creation of a communist society.

The social policy of the Communist Party is to ensure the further convergence of the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia, to ensure that substantive differences between city and village, between mental and physical labor, are overcome.

The working class is the leading creative force in Soviet society. The present-day Soviet worker differs not only from the pre-revolutionary proletariat but also from the worker of the 1930s. His role as the leading socio-political and economic force in society has grown. The working class is now the country's largest class numerically—around 65 million persons, more than two-thirds of whom are industrial workers.

The collective farm peasantry is the reliable ally of the working class. Its contribution to the construction of socialism has been invaluable. In the postwar period, the measures taken by the Party to stimulate agriculture through the development of socialist industry have further strengthened the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, an alliance that is the political foundation of Soviet society.

The role of the intelligentsia is growing in all areas of the country's life. The intelligentsia's interests are inextricably linked with those of the workers and peasants. In the postwar

years, the size of the intelligentsia—especially the technical intelligentsia—has grown rapidly. This is a natural process, the result of the Party's policy of accelerating scientific and technological progress, of promoting the continued cultural development of the people.

The unity of Soviet society, in which relations of friendship and cooperation among nations and nationalities have established themselves, has grown stronger in the postwar years; a firm foundation for their further convergence and prosperity has been created, this being the practical embodiment of the nationalities policy of the Communist Party.

A new historical community, the Soviet people, has taken shape in the years of socialist construction. The Report of the Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU stressed: "New, harmonious relations, relations of friendship and co-operation, were formed between the classes and social groups, nations and nationalities in joint labour, in the struggle for socialism and in the battles fought in defence of socialism. Our people are welded together by a common Marxist-Leninist ideology and the lofty aims of building communism. The multi-national Soviet people demonstrate this monolithic unity by their labour and by their unanimous approval of the Communist Party's policy."¹

As with all other aspects of socialist society, its social structure has not been ignored by "sovietologists". In their writings, they frame a "model" of Soviet society on the bourgeois pattern, attributing to the socialist system the cancers and flaws of capitalism. Alex Inkeles, a professor of sociology at Harvard University, asserts that the Soviet social structure is much like that of the United States and other Western industrial countries.² "We should emphasize the obvious fact that the Western world is not 'capitalist' nor is the communist bloc 'socialist',"—that is how Robert Strausz-

¹ *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 92.

² A. Inkeles, *Social Change in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1968, p. 86.

Hupé, William Kinter and Stefan Possony, American "specialists" in the realm of political strategy, formulate the jesuitical method of the ideological struggle against socialism.¹

It is very tempting to "sovietologists" to "turn" Marxism against Soviet reality, against socialism, in order to disorient the working people of their own countries. Goebbels, the Hitlerite Minister of Propaganda, used this tactic in his time. In his pasquil *Kommunismus ohne Maske*, which appeared in 1936, he "juxtaposed" an "infinitesimal minority" allegedly ruling in the USSR to an "exploited people" of his own invention. In the postwar period, no few "specialists" in Soviet affairs have attempted to base their conclusions on this obviously false postulate.

The "exploitative minority"—by which is meant the Soviet intelligentsia, or a part of it—that the falsifiers have invented is presented in the guise of a "special social stratum" that is alleged to wield political, economic and ideological power over the people. Georg von Rauch, for example, reviewing the changes that occurred in the social structure of Soviet society in the period from the 1920s through the 1950s, asserts that "this period has seen the rise of a new ruling class, the Soviet intellectuals—often called the Bolshevik bourgeoisie".²

Since statements to the effect that there is an "exploitative minority" in the USSR are unprovable, some of the more cautious anti-communists take this thesis with a grain of salt. Isaac Deutscher, for example, has been forced to admit that the thesis of a "new class of exploiters" and similar ideas about the Soviet 'managerial society' are simplifications which, far from clarifying the issue, obscure it".³ Deutscher is not alone in criticizing the thesis of "Soviet exploiters". Raymond Aron, an important Western sociologist

¹ R. Strausz-Hupé, W. Kinter, S. Possony, *A Forward Strategy for America*, New York, 1961, p. 267.

² G. von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia*, New York, 1962, p. 448.

³ I. Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution. Russia: 1917-1967*, London, 1967, p. 54.

whom it is difficult to suspect of sympathizing with communism, expresses himself even more categorically. In his study of classes and the class struggle, he gives us to understand that in the USSR there is no private expropriation of profits, hence no opposing classes. In another study, *L'Esquisse d'une Théorie des Régimes politiques*, he criticizes the theory, popular in the West, of the managers' class and their inevitable advent to power throughout the world; he calls the efforts to put the Soviet leaders into a special class absurd.⁴ Such assessments are quite characteristic for a number of Western bourgeois scholars who have been forced to reckon with unarguable facts. The facts show that in Soviet socialist society the intelligentsia is a social stratum consisting of persons professionally employed in highly skilled mental labor and, as a rule, having a specific level of education.

Moreover, the falsifiers are silent on the increasing effacement of the boundaries between the intelligentsia, on the one hand, and the working class and peasantry, on the other. At present, the proportion of highly skilled employees in whose activity the dominant role is played by mental labor is increasing rapidly in the working class. There is an analogous, though somewhat slower, process in the countryside. Changes in the nature of labor bring in their train the formation, among workers engaged in physical labor, of an ever expanding group that is little different from engineering and technical personnel.

Marxists-Leninists have never asserted that all types of inequality among men are liquidated with the construction of a socialist society. Marx indicated that, because of the as yet insufficient development of productive forces, this not allowing an abundance of goods, in the first stage of communism distribution will be guided by the principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work". And since the quantity and quality of the work

⁴ R. Aron, *L'Esquisse d'une Théorie des Régimes politiques*, Centre de documentation universitaire, 1964.

done by people differ, the products of labor will be distributed unequally. In the higher phase of communist society, goods will be distributed according to need. Bourgeois and reformist ideologists base their arguments about "class inequality and antagonism in Soviet society" on the fact that under socialism there is a certain inequality in the satisfaction of the needs of the population. But they ignore or gloss over socialism's important characteristic: despite the still existing differences in the goods that individuals receive for their labor, exploitation of man by man is impossible, "because," as Lenin noted, "it will be impossible to seize the *means of production*—the factories, machines, land, etc.—and make them private property".¹ Bourgeois ideologists do not wish to see that under socialism there are two great principles of social justice giving it a decisive advantage over capitalism: "He who does not work neither shall he eat" and "Equal goods for equal labor". These principles are given legal foundation in the Soviet Constitution and are strictly implemented.

The socialist system, founded on public ownership of the means of production, completely excludes the possibility of the exploitation of man by man, in particular the possibility that persons engaged in mental labor will exploit those engaged in physical labor.

Socialist public ownership does not divide, but rather unites all members of society, all social groups—workers, peasants, intelligentsia—making impossible the use of the means of production for the enrichment of some at the expense of others.

The Soviet intelligentsia, whose role and place in Soviet society is so maliciously falsified by bourgeois "sovietology", enjoys—either formally or in fact—no social privileges vis-à-vis other social groups.

Defining, contrary to objective fact, the Soviet intelligentsia as an "exploitative minority", anti-communists affirm that this minority appropriates the "surplus value" created

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 471.

by workers' labour. In support, they most often cite wage differences in the USSR. If equality in wages is lacking, most of them reason, then there is no socialism. They equate socialism with levelling. The West German "sovietologist" Rudolf Becker considers that equality vis-à-vis the means of production alone, without equality in terms of distribution and consumption, does not conform to Marxist ideas, and that all of Soviet society is in conflict with Marx's teaching.¹

If Soviet society is not socialist in the distribution of the personal consumption funds, then, according to the logic of Soviet society's critics, that society occupies a place among the capitalist states. Becker maintains that socialist countries, the USSR above all, have been compelled to make increasing use of capitalist methods of distribution, as a result of which, he alleges, the socialist countries are converging with the West European countries of social capitalism.² The American sociologist Mervyn Matthews, in *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, also propounds this false thesis.

Any unprejudiced investigator who familiarizes himself with the works of Karl Marx will conclude that Marx presumed that unequal pay for labor would inevitably exist under socialism. Under socialism, labor productivity is not yet high enough to ensure an abundance of material goods and distribution according to the principle of "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs". If under socialism an employee who works well were paid as much as a person who but poorly performs his obligations, or if a highly skilled specialist were paid the same as an unskilled employee, the incentive to increase labor productivity—which alone will lead to abundance—would disappear. "Sovietologists" urge the socialist countries to a levelling hoping that this would undermine true socialism economically.

¹ *Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetunion*, Bd. 1. *Das Wirtschaftssystem*, Köln, 1965.

² *Ibid.*

Under socialism, as Marx noted, "the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. . . . The same amount of labour which he has given to society in one form he receives back in another".¹

We should note here that socialism is marked by a tendency towards the reduction of the gap between extremes in wages. While in 1946 the wages of the top 10 percent of highly skilled employees were 7.24 times greater than the wages of the lowest 10 percent of unskilled workers, in 1966 the differential was only a factor of 3.26, i.e., had been reduced by 2.2 times.² Many bourgeois economists have been forced to recognize this tendency.

Bourgeois economists do not take into account the major changes in the wage structure that have occurred in the post-war period. Yet the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Council of Ministers and the All-Union Council of Trade Unions of September 8, 1956, on raising wages for low-paid workers as of January 1, 1957, was of great importance.

In 1959 and 1960, in fulfilment of the Directives of the 21st Party Congress, adjustments were made in the wages of the overwhelming majority of workers and other personnel employed in material production; this led to a major increase in the average monthly pay of industrial workers. In 1961, the proportion of low-paid groups of workers in industry fell: those receiving up to 40 rubles per month by a factor of 4, those receiving from 41 to 50 rubles per month by a factor of 2.5 and those receiving from 51 to 60 rubles per month by a factor of 2. At the same time, the number of workers earning from 100 to 160 rubles per month almost doubled—and this wage scale corresponds to that for engineering and technical personnel.

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, pp. 17-18.

² *A Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of the Socialist Economy*, Moscow, 1974, p. 97 (in Russian).

During the eighth five-year plan period, in accordance with the Directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, the minimum wage for workers and employees was raised to 60 rubles per month. The 24th Party Congress outlined a number of measures for appreciably raising the wages of workers and all working people.

Between 1971 and 1974, implementation of these measures resulted in almost 50 million workers and employees receiving increased wages. The minimum monthly wage for many categories of working people was increased to 70 rubles, and medium-level wages and salaries were raised. Workers and employees earning no more than 70 rubles per month were freed from taxation, and the rate of taxation was reduced for those earning 90 rubles or less per month.

A number of bourgeois economists are beginning to admit that there is a tendency for wages to converge in the USSR.

In the capitalist world, on the other hand, another tendency continues to make itself felt—the rich grow richer, the poor poorer.

The Soviet working class, led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has always been the leading force in socialist society and actively participates in administering the state. "Sovietologists", of course, in addition to reducing the Soviet working class to an "exploited" status, maintain that the working class lacks the opportunity to take part in managing production or to deal with affairs of state. They ignore the fact that in the USSR power belongs to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, that the Communist Party is concerned to increase the influence of workers in the Soviets.

In the ten years between 1955 and 1965, the representation of workers in local Soviets increased by 18 percent, in city and town Soviets by almost 20 percent. The proportion of workers in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the Supreme Soviets of the Union and autonomous republics is growing. In the seventh USSR Supreme Soviet, elected on June 12, 1966, 26.6 percent of the deputies were workers. By way of

comparison, workers are absent from the US Congress and local organs of power in the United States. This is the result of bourgeois policy, which intentionally bars the proletariat from participation in affairs of state.

"Sovietologists", questioning the participation of the Soviet working class in managing production, distort the role of production conferences, in which workers predominate. Under the statute on production conferences, workers participate on equal terms with engineering and technical personnel in drawing up drafts of current and long-range production plans and plans for housing and public services; they hear reports by management on the results of economic activity and on other questions connected with improving the work of enterprises. Decisions made by production conferences are obligatory for management.

Production conferences are a unique school of civic self-administration. As of July 1, 1971, there were 158.7 thousand factory and shop standing production conferences—14.9 percent more than on January 1, 1968. The number of persons taking part in the conferences increased over the same period by 14.3 percent and reached a total of 5.9 million.

Soviet society fully implements Lenin's instruction on the need "to teach the people the art of administration, not from books, not from lectures or meetings, but from practical experience, so that instead of just the vanguard of the proletariat which has been set to command and organise, more and more fresh blood may enter the departments, and this new section may be reinforced by ten others like it".¹

The Soviet state and the Communist Party have created for all workers identical and constantly expanding opportunities to obtain a secondary and higher education, to improve their skills, their political education and to move into state work. Data from the most recent censuses testify to the broad access that the Soviet worker has to knowledge

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 426.

and culture. While in 1959 there were 386 workers with a secondary or higher education per 1,000, the figure had risen to 550 per 1,000 in 1970.

These figures, facts and examples demonstrate irrefutably the false character of bourgeois sociological theories of the exploiting minority and the exploited majority in the USSR.

The anti-communists' sociological "studies" are capped by their treatment of the role and place of the collective farm peasantry in socialist society. They harp on the false thesis that the peasantry is the most exploited part of Soviet society. The facts, however, show convincingly that the well-being of Soviet peasants is increasing from year to year, not falling, as is true in capitalist countries. The fact that the well-being of the collective farmers is increasing faster than that of the urban population testifies to the rising standard of living of the villagers, to the convergence of the material situation of village and city. While the real income of workers and employees grew 2.9 times between 1940 and 1970, the real income of the peasants increased 4.7 times. During the eighth five-year plan period, members of collective farms were provided a guaranteed wage, their retirement age was lowered and payments for illness and incapacitation were established for them.

Isaac Deutscher has given much "attention" to the situation of the Soviet collective farm peasantry. Dealing with the moral-political make-up of the villager, he writes that there is "more than the normal amount of apathy and inertia in the countryside", and that it is upon these that the Soviet power, so hateful to him, rests in the village.¹

Published archival materials, the testimony of contemporaries, and Soviet monographs on the subject are far from minimizing the difficulties with which the Soviet peasantry met in the first five to ten years after the war. "Sovietologists" therefore have no basis for accusing Soviet historiography on the problems of the collective farm peasantry of a

¹ I. Deutscher, *The Unfinished Revolution, Russia: 1917-1967*, p. 52.

lack of objectivity. Life itself refutes the apathy and inertia that Deutscher attributes to the Soviet peasantry. The facts show that in overcoming postwar difficulties, the collective farm peasantry was an active revolutionary force.

The growth of agriculture's productive forces, the gradual conversion of agricultural into a variety of industrial labor, the rising cultural level of the countryside—all this brings in its train a change in the social make-up and psychology of the peasantry. The peasantry has ever more in common with the working class, and the number of collective farmers who work directly with machinery and other equipment is increasing.

The level of education in the village is rising. While on the eve of the war only 6 percent of the peasants had a secondary or higher education, at the end of 1970 more than half of the village population had completed secondary school or an institution of higher education.

Thanks to the socialist transformation of the countryside, the collective farm peasantry has not only become increasingly well-off, it has also become self-aware and its political outlook has expanded. Socialism has drawn the peasantry into political and civic activity, into the active struggle for communist ideals. The Communist Party is ever concerned to increase the peasantry's role in administering the state. Of great importance in this connection was the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Improving the Work of Village and Township Soviets of Working People's Deputies" (March, 1967). The increased number of peasants among the deputies to local Soviets has been one of the important conditions for heightening the Soviets' activism.

The civic initiative of the peasantry is expressed variously. Street councils, women's councils, organizations of people's inspectors, and popular militia, among others, have become widespread.

The collective farm peasantry participates not only in the work of local Soviets, it is also extensively represented in

the higher state organs of the USSR and the Union republics. In 1967 5,829 deputies were elected to the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics, and of these 1,346 (i.e., 23.1 percent) were collective farmers. This is somewhat greater, in fact, than their proportion in the population.

* * *

Concrete analysis of the classes and social groups in Soviet society indicates that the antagonism and irresolvable contradictions inherent to capitalism and which "sovietologists" attempt to ascribe to socialism, are alien to Soviet society, which is made up of classes and groups among whom relations are amicable.

2. THE NATIONALITIES POLICY OF THE CPSU AND "SOVIETOLOGY"

In December 1971, *The American Historical Review*, the organ of the American Historical Association, advanced as one of the principal tasks of "sovietology" exposure of "Soviet claims that Leninist nationality policy has created something entirely new in history—a multinational society without national hostilities—and that the party's nationality policy created the friendship among the peoples".¹

Much has been written about the "threat" of the Soviet method of solving the nationality question, a method that has made it possible to turn a backward country into an advanced one in a minimal period of time. The great attraction of Soviet experience in dealing with the nationality question and the thoroughgoing development of the national republics—that is what terrifies the ruling circles of the capitalist countries and forces "sovietologists" in their service

¹ *The American Historical Review*, Washington, Vol. 76, No. 5, December 1971, p. 1577.

to redouble their efforts to "expose" the achievements of Soviet nationalities policy.

But what about the facts? The anti-communists' answer is simple: if there are no suitable facts, then they must be invented or distorted beyond the point of recognition.

For example, when racial discrimination was at its height in the United States, imperialist propaganda broadcast the myth that racial conflicts are a universal problem, that segregation and color bars are a common phenomenon in most countries, and that in many countries racial antagonism goes much deeper than anywhere in America. The lie about racial conflicts in other countries, the Soviet Union included, was meant to distract the attention of the masses from American racism.

"Sovietologists'" activity along this line picked up especially in connection with the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. In their attempt to expose the nationalities policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, they by and large continue a tendency marked earlier in the bourgeois falsification of the nationalities question in the USSR.

In his time, Alfred Meyer, a professor at the University of Michigan, who oscillates between extreme anti-communism and a liberal-objectivist assessment of the Soviet experience, wrote in the collection *Mid-Twentieth Century Nationalism* that the Communist Party strives to suppress or neutralize national self-consciousness, since it is, allegedly, a threat to the political integrity of the USSR.¹ The falsifiers openly accuse the CPSU and the Soviet state of "colonialism", of "Soviet imperialism".

There are few anti-communists who would now categorically deny the economic achievements of the socialist nations. They have been forced to recognize these achievements, but they maintain that they are "alien" to the interests of the Soviet peoples.

For example, in their *Russia on Our Minds. Reflections on*

¹ *Mid-Twentieth Century Nationalism*, Detroit, 1965, p. 63.

Another World, Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn allege that the Soviet system satisfies Russians alone. "At least a quarter of the Soviet people live under a system that is alien and often beyond their understanding."¹

The American "sovietologist" Walter Kolarz tries to translate this judgement, common to the falsifiers, into economic language. In his opinion, the rapid development of industry in the national republics was not economically justified, was dictated only by political and military considerations, and was meant to sow socialism by force. Industrialization allegedly increased the dependence of the non-Russian, Asian races in the USSR on Russians and increased the existing inequality.

Numerous facts from the past and present testify, contrary to the assertions of the falsifiers, that the intensive development of industry, heavy industry above all, is a prime condition for any nation's independence.

Perpetuating the economic backwardness of a number of Asian and African countries, neocolonialists strive to keep them in a state of dependence. Countries that are underdeveloped economically are agrarian and raw materials appendages of the imperialist states and cannot put an end to poverty, since neocolonialists take an enormous share of the national income, particularly through non-equivalent exchange.

The great historical service of the CPSU is that, under Lenin's leadership, it outlined and then implemented a policy of eliminating the backwardness of the nations formerly oppressed in tsarist Russia, a policy of equalizing and at the same time increasing the level of their economic development.

In the postwar period, especially with the building of a developed socialist society, the policy of the CPSU was determined not by the need to overcome the economic back-

¹ Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, *Russia on Our Minds. Reflections on Another World*, Garden City, 1970, p. 105.

wardness of specific national republics or districts, but above all by the need for the most rapid economic progress of the Soviet Union as a whole and its constituent republics through the increased efficiency of the entire economy. At present, the fraternal Soviet republics are no longer divided into agrarian and industrially developed, into those supplying raw materials and those that manufacture. They have all become highly developed, economically interlocking industrial-agrarian complexes.

A half-century ago, the basic tool of the Uzbek *dehkanin* (farmer, or peasant) was the *ketmen*—an ancient, hand-wielded implement much like a hoe. In pre-revolutionary Turkestan there were only a few dozen cottage industry-type workshops. Modern Uzbekistan has a highly developed industry equipped with the latest technology. A total of 1,200 major industrial enterprises have been built. The republic's modern industry includes multi-sectoral engineering, a power industry, chemicals, petroleum, coal, gas, mining, metallurgy, gold mining, electrical engineering, electronics and much else besides.

Those who visit Uzbekistan today speak with enthusiasm of the achievements of this once backward borderland of tsarist Russia during the years since the revolution. For instance, Mohamed Harmel, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tunisian Communist Party, has said:

"At a time when underdevelopment has become dramatically accentuated and is a veritable scourge for millions, when different development policies have still to yield tangible results, Uzbekistan's rapid progress from underdevelopment to socialism is a universal lesson to be reflected upon by everyone who sincerely wants to see his country break out of economic backwardness.

"Even Western non-Marxist experts admit that Uzbekistan is now a developed country. Having broken out of the 'vicious circle' of underdevelopment, having overcome 'zero growth' and having accomplished an impressive 'take-off'—I

deliberately use their terminology—it has become a flourishing and harmoniously and dynamically developing, industrial-agrarian country, and a centre also, of culture and science. . . . No Third World country can boast of so modern an industrial structure."¹

Or let us take the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, earlier known as Bessarabia. As of November 1917, it was economically much more developed than the other borderlands of Russia, though it was behind Central Russia and the Ukraine in this respect. In the 22 years before it was reunited with Soviet Moldavia in 1940, Bessarabia was part of the capitalist world and remained in the "vicious circle" of underdevelopment. Only reunification with Soviet Moldavia gave Bessarabia a powerful impetus to development.

As Larbi Bouhali, a member of the National Leadership of the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria, who visited the Moldavian SSR in 1972, observed: "At reunification in 1940, Moldavia was lagging rather far behind other Soviet republics socio-economically and culturally. Thanks to the socialist system and to aid from other Soviet nations, it was not long before Moldavia overtook other republics of the Union.

"In 1940, industry's share in Bessarabian production was two or three percent. In 1971, its contribution to the republic's economy was 56.7 percent."²

The industrial development of the Soviet republics is subordinated to the principal goal of socialist production—maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the people. Between 1940 and 1973, real per capita income grew 4.5 times over in the Soviet Union. And the rate of increase of the standard of living of the formerly oppressed national minorities has appreciably outstripped the all-Union average.

In the close-knit and cohesive family of the Soviet nations, there is no counterposing of people of one nationality

¹ *World Marxist Review*, October 1972, No. 10, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

to another—nor can there be. People are judged by their labor, their contribution to the common cause, on the basis of laws common for all, no matter what their nationality. Equality and cooperation among peoples predetermines their drawing closer, and this serves as a great source of strength for the Soviet socialist order.

The Tatar Autonomous Republic can serve as a graphic example. Under tsarism, Kazan Province was 44th out of 55 provinces of Central Russia in the level of literacy. Its entire industry consisted of 196 workshops. In order to eliminate this backwardness in a short time, the Party undertook measures to accelerate the development of the republic's economy. "The Tatar Republic," remarked V. V. Kuibyshev, an outstanding figure in the Communist Party and the Soviet state, at the 17th Party Congress in 1934, "is among those areas where industrialization has been carried out especially energetically."

Relying on the support and assistance of the fraternal peoples of the Soviet state, strengthening its economic ties with all the national republics, the Tatar Republic has developed economically at more than double the national rate in the postwar years. Utilizing the valuable expertise of Azerbaidzhan specialists, the Tatar oil industry has been able at a record rate to exploit rich oilfields and in the last year of the 8th five-year plan period produced 100 million tons of oil. More than 150 industrial enterprises and research institutes in different cities of the Soviet Union are now helping to construct an automobile plant that will be one of the largest enterprises in its industry in Europe.

"The construction of the automobile plant on the Kama," writes M. Valeyev, Secretary of the Tatar Regional Committee of the CPSU, "is a new manifestation of socialist internationalism. Engineer Tadas Rubliauskas came to Naberezhniye Chelny from Lithuania, truck driver Leon Gogheridze—from Georgia, gas welder Eduard Ataev—from Turkmenia, rigger Unhet Tursunbaev—from Kazakhstan, plasterer Ashot Parazyany—from Armenia. Representatives

of several dozen nationalities are now at work on the construction site of the automobile complex. And they are all plenipotentiaries of economic areas connected with the Kama project through thousands of economic links. If we were to mark on a map of our country the cities that send designs, material, machinery, equipment and people to Naberezhniye Chelny, where the plant is being built, multicolored circles would be thick over the entire Soviet Union."

Such are the tangible fruits of friendship among peoples.

The Soviet republics have equal rights both politically and economically. They are joined by the common aspiration to do their utmost in the struggle to build communism. But national republics and districts do not dispose of equal natural resources. Some of their national and ethnic or labor traditions are not identical either. Such differences are inevitable. They are taken into account in the economic policy of the Party and government.

There has taken shape and been refined in the USSR a territorial division of labor based on the development in each Union republic of those sectors and industries that most correspond to its potential.

Bourgeois ideologists intentionally substitute "economic backwardness" for "differences in level of development", concepts that are different in principle. Yet differences in level of development presuppose comparison of states that are economically of the same type. For example, the ratio of income per capita in France and the United States is approximately 1 to 2. But no bourgeois economist would conclude from this that France is a backward country. On the other hand, the ratio of the same index of 1 to 10 between Morocco and France does indicate Morocco's economic backwardness. In this light, the senselessness of attempts by bourgeois falsifiers to speculate with the still existing slight differences in the levels of economic development of the republics is especially clear.

Using central planning and one national budget, the Soviet state ensures an appropriate allocation of the na-

tional income, and this provides favorable conditions for the development of enterprises and economic sectors important for the entire Soviet people.

Having joined their economies into a mighty economic alliance, the Soviet republics have enormously accelerated the development of the forces of production, which in turn ensures a colossal rise in the well-being of all the nationalities.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the first in history to demonstrate to the entire world that relations among different peoples can be founded on friendship and equality. Only a party of a new type proved able to combine harmonically national interests with the interests of the individual national republics and districts. The CPSU has firmly and unwaveringly carried out a policy of bringing the economies of the republics to a common level; the Party pays great attention to the needs and specifics of the development of each nation and nationality.

Nevertheless, bourgeois "theorists" continue to falsify the socio-political side of nationality relations in the USSR in the spirit of "Soviet colonialism". Lev Dobriansky, a professor at Georgetown University (USA), has slanderously written in *The Vulnerable Russians* that the Russian people holds in the captivity of "psychological warfare" 123 million non-Russians, and that the Soviet state is an entity maintained through the violence of the communist central apparatus.¹ Such an interpretation quite naturally excludes the possibility of any sovereignty for the national republics in the USSR.

On what do "sovietologists" base this absolutely false thesis? Intentionally moving to the fore the principle of centralism in the Soviet state system, the falsifiers "forget" that this is combined with extensive democratism. As a result, the true picture of political life in the USSR is crudely distorted.

¹ L. E. Dobriansky, *The Vulnerable Russians*, New York, 1967.

It is widely known that the peoples of the USSR voluntarily entered the Soviet federation and handed over a number of functions to the central organs, which can more rationally implement them in the interests of all the nationalities.

Furthermore, the central state bodies are not in charge of all matters. Under the Soviet Constitution a vast number of questions is an independent prerogative of the Union republics and other national entities.

In the USSR the competence of the Union and autonomous republics is expanding. The Communist Party is concerned to develop the socialist sovereignty of nations, to perfect the forms of national statehood. Important steps have been taken in the direction of further expanding the rights of the Union republics in economic management and in the direction of cultural and state development.

The Communist Parties of the Union republics and the Party organizations of other national-state entities are autonomous in dealing with many important questions, especially those associated with specific local conditions. This is furthered by the fact that local personnel are well represented in the higher Party and state organs. All the secretaries of the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties and other national-state entities have a seat on the Central Committee of the CPSU, and some are elected members of the Politbureau. There is a special chamber—the Council of Nationalities—in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that expresses the national interests of all the peoples of the USSR. Representatives of all the Union republics are Deputy Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Two dialectically connected tendencies operate in the relations among the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union. On the strength of one of them, there is a convergence of nations under the influence of the great common goal—building communism in the USSR. On the strength of the other tendency, the cultures—national in form and socialist in con-

tent—of all nations and nationalities in the country are flourishing. It has now become more difficult for “sovietologists” to deny that the nations in the USSR are thriving.

In “sovietology”, the CPSU’s policy of bringing the nations together and at the same time combatting remnants of nationalism that obstruct this process is often identified with tsarism’s chauvinist policy of Russification. The West German “sovietologist” Benjamin Appel asserts: “Ukrainians, Georgians, Jews, and every other nationality were given opportunities they had never had under the tsars. But just the same, the Soviet Union, like the Holy Russia of the Tsars, had its own age-old Russian direction.”¹

The development of Soviet culture refutes such slanderous statements by “sovietologists”. Every socialist nation has created a highly developed culture, the achievements of which are the common birthright of all the peoples of the USSR. Supporting progressive national traditions, the Party at the same time develops in every way Soviet traditions identical for all nations (love for the socialist homeland, loyalty to the ideals of communism, internationalism, friendship and brotherhood among all the peoples of the USSR, collectivism and comradely assistance, etc.). National forms of culture are not frozen once and for all—under the influence of internationalist content they are modified and the cultures converge, mutually inspiring and enriching each other.

The Party’s policy with respect to national languages is founded on Leninist ideas of the complete freedom and equality of languages. The CPSU ensures the development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR, the freedom for every citizen to speak and to raise and instruct his children in any language, permitting no privileges, limitations or compulsion in the use of any given language. At the same time, the Russian language, which has become the language

¹ B. Appel, *Why the Russians Are the Way They Are*, Boston, 1966, p. 34.

of international discourse and cooperation in the Soviet Union, plays an invaluable role in the convergence and mutual enrichment of the national cultures and in acquainting the peoples of the USSR with the achievements of Soviet and world culture.

There is no economic or socio-political soil on which nationalism could grow in the USSR. This does not exclude, however, the possibility that nationalistic prejudices may exist among a certain part of the population. Nationalism in any of its manifestations (a feeling of national superiority, national seclusion and bigotry, maintenance of reactionary traditions and customs) is hostile to socialism. The Party unwaveringly pursues a policy of raising the people of all nations in the spirit of socialist internationalism and irreconcilability to nationalism and chauvinism.

The new human community that has taken shape in the USSR—the Soviet people—does not nullify national peculiarities but includes them organically as a constituent element in a socially homogeneous international whole. The USSR is a fraternal family of the nations and nationalities that inhabit the country.

The appearance in the cultural make-up of the nations and nationalities of an increasing number of common features marking the membership of all citizens in the Soviet people as a new social community, the struggle of the CPSU against all manifestations of nationalism in the name of friendship and cooperation among peoples, does not at all mean that nations and nationalities are losing their national uniqueness. This uniqueness obtains free expression in the powerful exemplars of national culture.

In his speech at the ceremony dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, L. I. Brezhnev remarked: “Bourgeois falsifiers try to maintain that the cultural revolution being carried out in our country is attended by a ‘loss of national traditions’. But Soviet reality graphically demonstrates the total lack of foundation of these inventions. It is

true that today the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the outstanding Kazakh enlighteners Chokan Valikhanov, Ibrai Altynsarin and Abai Kunanbaev actively acquaint themselves with the great treasure house of Marxism-Leninism in their native language, that they master and multiply the riches that have been created by other peoples, by all mankind over the course of its entire history. But it is also true that under socialism the distinctive culture of the Kazakh people, as that of all the nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union, has flowered to an unprecedented degree, that their contribution to the common storehouse of culture of our socialist homeland has grown enormously."

These facts are so obvious that many objective foreign observers are beginning to recognize them. In *Sovjet—kontinent i förvandling* (Stockholm, 1968), the Swedish journalists Rita and Victor Vinde, who have repeatedly visited the Soviet Union, refute the assertions often made in the West to the effect that the peoples of Central Asia have been assimilated by the Russians; they note the enormous achievements of the non-Russian peoples in the development of the economy and their own national cultures.

Friendship and brotherhood among the peoples of the USSR are inviolable. They have withstood the sternest tests of the time. They will not be shattered by the maneuvers of aggressive imperialist circles seeking to estrange the nations of the USSR.

* * *

"Sovietologists" are especially concerned to falsify the nationalities policy of the CPSU in view of its enormous influence on the national liberation movement and on the entire international revolutionary process. The accusations by bourgeois "specialists" on the nationalities problems in the USSR, to the effect that the nationalities policy of the CPSU is of a colonial character with respect to the formerly oppressed peoples of Russia, are without foundation. The facts

show that this policy has always been based on the principles of friendship, equality and respect for the national feelings of these peoples. The great achievement of the CPSU has been to eliminate political, economic and cultural inequality among peoples, to attain solidarity and a flowering of nations that is historically unprecedented.

3. THE UNITY OF THE CPSU AND THE PEOPLE DOES NOT SUIT ANTI-COMMUNISTS

The strength of the Communist Party consists in its indissoluble connection with the broad masses of the people. "The people," reads the Program of the CPSU, "are the decisive force in the building of communism. *The Party exists for the people, and it is in serving the people that it sees the purpose of its activity.* To further extend and deepen the ties between the Party and the people is an imperative condition of success in the struggle for communism."¹

In the postwar period the CPSU has roused, organized and inspired the Soviet people to great accomplishments because its ties with the masses have grown stronger. This prime factor in the development of Soviet society is ignored by anti-communists, who substitute for it inventions as to the estrangement of the Party from the people, its isolation from and even hostility to the people.

All the links between the Communist Party and the people are crudely falsified by anti-communists. As we know, the link with the masses is in the first instance realized through the representative character of the Party itself. But in "sovietology" there are no few specialists who attempt to demonstrate that the Party represents no one but itself. Imperialist propaganda makes extensive use of the concept of the "élite", i.e., the "irreplacable ruling stratum". Brzezinski, for one, calls the Communist Party the "ruling élite".²

¹ *The Road to Communism*, p. 587.

² Z. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, London, 1962.

"Sovietologists" often use the strict admission procedures for Party membership for speculative purposes. But this fact in no way means that the Party, as the falsifiers maintain, is closed in on itself. The entire history of the Leninist party has been marked by growth, reinforcement by new forces, by the best representatives of the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia. As the vanguard of the working class and the entire people, the Party accepts into its ranks only the most politically conscious and organized persons who are true to the cause of communism. At the same time, the Party strictly punishes those who do not justify its trust: personnel who slide into bureaucratism, those who are morally unstable, unprincipled persons, career seekers, cowards, and the like. The CPSU is not a "closed caste", but a genuinely people's party, linked with the people by a thousand threads.

The number of workers accepted into the Party is growing constantly. Workers made up 27.2 percent of the candidates in 1952-1955, 40.6 percent in 1956-1961, 47.6 percent in 1962-1966 and 53.3 percent in 1967-1971.

In absolute terms, the number of workers in the Party grew 2.5 times between 1956 and 1971, while that of collective farmers increased by 1.7 times and white collar personnel by 1.8 times.

As the basic productive force in Soviet society, the working class is the most active politically. "Its revolutionary spirit, discipline, organization and collectivism determine its leading position in the system of socialist social relations."¹ Therefore, the Party is always ready to accept into its ranks the best representatives of the working class.

In the conditions of developed socialism the CPSU has become a party of the whole people. But this does not mean that it has lost its class character. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress says on this score: "The CPSU has been and remains a party of the working class. We are

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 88.

deeply pleased with the fact that 58 per cent of those now joining the Party are workers. This is natural and is a reflection of the leading role of the working class in the life of society."¹

Worker Communists are the true leaders of the masses. They provide models of labor valor, organization and discipline.

On the eve of the 21st Congress of the CPSU, a movement for a communist attitude towards labor was born in the ranks of the working class on the basis of mass socialist competition. Its inspirers and organizers were the Party committees at the enterprises. At many factories and plants, Communists were the initiators of the new movement. Forty-one million workers, collective farmers and white collar personnel now participate. It is impossible to imagine that this mass movement could have arisen if the worker Communists had cut themselves off from the masses in the sort of "workers' elite" that Robert Conquest depicts, or if they had allowed themselves to be "pushed aside" from participation in the affairs of the Party as Solomon Schwartz maintains.

A struggle for technological progress developed at enterprises and construction sites in the middle of the 1950s. The pioneers in this effort were Communists. The Communist V. N. Trutnev, a turner at the Bolshevik plant in Leningrad, showed remarkable initiative. He designed a device that permitted the performance of the same operations as with a hydraulically operated support, but at 100 times less cost and more easily manufactured. On the threshold of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Trutnev was elected a delegate to the Leningrad regional Party conference. In the Tavrichesky Palace, where the conference met, this leading worker demonstrated his device in operation.

There are innumerable examples of workers' creative attitude to their labor. A. M. Godyaev, a turner at

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 75.

the Krasnoc Sormovo plant in Gorky, turned out 14 years' worth of work between the beginning of 1959 and May of 1963; N. F. Yanchevsky, a milling machine operator at the Kirov works in Leningrad, did 11 years' worth of work between 1959 and 1964. I. D. Leonov, a milling machine operator at the same plant, fulfilled eight and one half annual assignments between 1959 and 1961, i.e., before the opening of the 22nd Party Congress, to which he was a delegate. K. Masly, a worker at the Urals Heavy Machine Building Plant, overfulfilled the 1959-1965 plan by 100 percent.

The worker Communist Munir Ganiyev, a member of the public bureau of economic analysis, through his recommendations helped the Tashkent Textile Machinery Plant, at which he worked, to make significant economies. He carried out his daily norm in 6 hours. The list of such examples could be continued.

The labor and political activism and initiative of worker Communists goes far beyond the bounds of the enterprises at which they work. They are interested in questions of the development of the entire national economy. Delegate F. S. Kuralenok, a construction worker from Byelorussia, spoke of working honor from the podium of the 24th Party Congress: "Today the highest and proudest calling in our country is that of the Soviet worker!... And we, worker Communists, as plenipotentiaries of the Party, will do everything to ensure that the concept of working honor and working pride ring out as the password of every Soviet worker. This must also be the task of every working collective, of every Party organization."

The leader of a brigade of fitters at the 1st Moscow Bearing plant, A. V. Viktorov (now Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions) said at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "We regular workers understand discipline not simply as coming to work on time, observing the work rules, not even as mere systematic fulfillment of output norms. The socialist discipline of labor means giving all one's energy to the cause, it means activism and initiative at

work, a conscientious attitude to production. It is confidence that one's work is necessary, that the production process is proceeding at the proper rhythm, and that one's comrades are working well. It is also, if one may put it this way, the reserves of the human soul—one can't put such reserves in plans or schedules, one can't designate them with figures." These words gave expression to the worker's awareness of his prominent position in Soviet society, his profound understanding of civic duty and his feeling of responsibility for the future of his country.

The number of workers in the USSR who, having a secondary education, continue to study, to acquaint themselves with the achievements of science and culture, is growing. Such workers are the strong right arm of the country's working force.

The biography of the miner I. I. Strelchenko is typical in this respect. The son of a collective farmer who died during the defense of Sevastopol, he arrived in the Donets Coal Basin through Komsomol assignment. From his first days at work, he sought persistently to master the complex miner's profession. When he was advanced to leader of the Komsomol-youth labor team, he saw that his knowledge was inadequate for mastering new technology. The young worker thereupon entered a mining college, from which he graduated by correspondence. His ability to get to know people, to mobilize them for the fulfillment of tasks set, his daily concern for the needs of every member of the team, won him authority among the miners. He is now much respected in the Donets Basin, a leading public figure, and a Hero of Socialist Labor.

Strelchenko's biography is quite similar to the working and civic career of Y. P. Proskurin, a smelter in the open-hearth shop of the Sergo Orjonikidze Metallurgical Works in Zaporozhye, and his comrades at work.

"I am 31 years old," he related to the delegates at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, in which he took part. "I have worked for 11 of these years at the plant. There I began

my working career, there I found my calling and goal in life. I learned much in the Komsomol at the plant. There I was accepted into the Party, and three years ago the Communists showed great faith in me—they elected me secretary of the Party organization of my shift.

"I came to the plant with only a sixth-grade education. The situation at the plant, the advice of older comrades, their friendly support and attention helped me to finish secondary school, and in 1968 to receive a diploma as a metallurgical technician."

All these examples show the baselessness of the "sovietologists'" assertions to the effect that the numerical, cultural and professional growth of the Soviet working class has not been reflected in the development of the USSR's socio-political system, that the influence of worker Communists in the CPSU is falling.

The heightened role of the Soviet working class has not infringed on the interests of other social groups. Soviet society is morally and politically one. It is for that reason that the CPSU has become a party expressing the interests of the entire people.

The CPSU is constantly expanding its links with the people. In the 20 years, between 1951 and 1970, the number of people in the Party has grown 2.2 times. At present, approximately every 11th citizen of 18 years or older is in the Party.

"Sovietology" traditionally describes the CPSU's attitude to the Soviet peasantry as "hostile", "unjust", etc., while the peasantry is in turn depicted as a force opposing the Party, a force aggravated by its situation. This assertion, however, in no way accords with the fact that there are more than two million village Communists in the Party, on the same basis as Communists who are workers and office personnel, and that these village Communists implement the policy of the CPSU, which is completely in line with the peasants' interest. 870 persons working in agriculture were delegates to the 24th Congress of the CPSU; two-thirds of

them were rank-and-file collective farmers and workers on state farms, team leaders, brigade leaders and farm managers.

Numerous rural delegates to the Congress won renown for themselves through their labor achievements: brigade leader M. I. Klepikov from the Kuban; the Byelorussian equipment operator V. F. Stasevich; V. P. Nutt, an Estonian milkmaid; I. Akhunova, a cotton grower from Uzbekistan; Zh. Moldasanov, a shepherd from Kazakhstan. One could cite countless examples of the rising level of education, culture and professional skill of collective farmers, of the advancement of many of them to leadership positions.

Along with workers and collective farmers, the CPSU unites in its ranks the most conscious elements of the Soviet working intelligentsia. The proportion of engineers and technical personnel, agronomists, doctors, economists and other specialists among Communist Party members in office jobs is increasing. Carrying out management functions, they objectively occupy the same position with respect to public property as workers, collective farmers or any other social group.

"To this day," remarked Marshal of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs, "in foreign political literature one not infrequently comes across the definition of Communists and Party personnel as an 'élite', a privileged stratum of our society. As a military man, I should wish any country to have such an 'élite', the representatives of which are so selflessly and heroically prepared to die for their native land..."¹

All these facts debunk the schemes of the "sovietologists", who maintain that the Communist Party is a non-worker, non-peasant party, that it is a "caste", an "élite" made up of a closed group of intelligentsia administrators. In Soviet literature, in particular in the study by the philosopher

¹ G. K. Zhukov, *Memoirs and Reflections*, Moscow, 1969, p. 282 (in Russian).

G. K. Ashin, *The Myth of the Élite* (in Russian), the theory of the "élite" is subjected to thorough criticism.

Soviet mass and public organizations—trade unions, the Komsomol, professional unions, and so on—reinforce the unity of the Party and the people. Party leadership of civic organizations is falsified to an extreme by "sovietologists". Seeking to cast a shadow over the CPSU, they spread the lie of the "dictatorship of the Party", of the conversion of these organizations into "appendages of the Party without rights", they seek to show the "illegitimacy" of the CPSU's leadership of them.

Recently, Soviet trade unions and their relations with the Party have become a prime object of "sovietology's" attention. Thousands of tons of paper have been consumed by "sovietologists" for the distortion of the activity of the CPSU in the leadership of trade unions. This leadership, which—to discredit it—they most often call "control", is in their eyes of a criminal nature.

The question of influence on trade unions, of the leadership of the union movement, has always been in the center of all political parties' attention. Bourgeois parties, seeking to cloak their aspiration to seize control of the workers' movement, to shield it from the influence of Communist parties, have long since advanced the notorious thesis of trade union "neutrality". Under present-day conditions no trade unions can be neutral vis-à-vis political parties. The crux of the matter is what kind of party exercises influence over the unions, whose interests that party represents.

Lenin called Soviet trade unions a school of communism, thereby defining their historic mission: to teach working people to live and work in a communist manner. Lenin's words reflect the great unity of goals between the Communist Party and the trade unions in socialist society.

As the leading force in Soviet society, the Party does not at all replace the unions. There is a precise division of functions between Party and union organs. The Party takes counsel with working people and in devising policy takes

their opinion into account—the opinion, especially, of the trade union masses.

When the foreign investigator treats the facts objectively, he inevitably comes to the same conclusion. This, for instance, occurred with Emily Brown, a professor of economics at Vassar College (USA), who has been to the Soviet Union a number of times and has visited 24 Soviet enterprises. In her study, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations*, she notes that the CPSU "increasingly . . . invited and organized mass discussion of particular major policies before new legislation was adopted. Many millions participated. When the party puts out a question for such discussion, the proposed policies and differing opinions on them get wide publicity".¹

Brown indicates further the impact of public opinion on the formation and implementation of Party policy. Can Soviet trade unions complain of a "lack of autonomy" when in the person of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions they enjoy, *inter alia*, the right of legislative initiative, which they actively exercise?

One of the main "negative" results that many "sovietologists" (and with them a number of reformist union leaders in the West) see in the CPSU's leadership of Soviet trade unions is "etatization", which is understood as the suppression of all union rights by the state organs and the CPSU. For example, *ICFTU. Viewpoints. A Selection of Editorials from Free Labour World*, asserts that the working people of socialist countries cannot organize trade unions of their own choice and are obliged to enter organizations controlled by the state which cannot claim that they express truly the workers' opinion.² The author of this allegation has no facts, but he does have bandy stereotypes created by imperialist propa-

¹ E. Brown, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1966, p. 311. Cf. C. Osakwe, *The Participation of the Soviet Union in Universal International Organizations*, Leiden, 1972, p. 63.

² *ICFTU. Viewpoints. A Selection of Editorials from Free Labour World*, Brussels, 1971, p. 9.

ganda: in the West everything is fine, in the USSR everything is rotten, including the trade unions—they are bad, “etatized” and “not genuine”.

Many foreign union leaders who have been to the USSR and have acquainted themselves with the life of Soviet trade unions speak more accurately of the role and place of unions in the economic system of a socialist state. Typical is the statement made in 1971 by Hans Rasmussen, a union activist from Denmark. To a question from the correspondents of *Aktuelt* and *Land og Folk* as to his opinion of the influence that Soviet trade unions exert on the decision-making process at enterprises, he answered that this influence is great not only at the enterprise level, but also for the economy as a whole.

In capitalist countries, the rights of trade unions to organize and operate are limited and only formally recognized. Under the influence of big business, the bourgeois state is increasingly intervening in relations between labor and capital supporting the latter. This tendency has taken the form of so-called “incomes policy”. A constituent part of this policy is the limitation of the democratic rights and freedoms of working people, including the right to strike. Anti-worker and anti-union laws are adopted that call for strict regulation of union activities, their subordination to state-monopoly capital. Among them are the anti-union law “on industrial relations” adopted on the initiative of the Conservative government in Britain but later abandoned, and economic measures by the US government directed, in particular, to “freezing” wages. Current practice has much in common with the action of bourgeois governments in the past. Under American law, in order to obtain legal status trade unions must submit to government registration, in the course of which their activity is limited in every way possible. The rights of trade unions in the United States are even more restricted under laws long in operation, such as the Taft-Hartley Act adopted in 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin Act that came into force in 1960.

Under socialism, the relations between state and trade unions are fundamentally different. As opposed to their antagonistic character under capitalism, these relations are those of mutual understanding and cooperation. And this is understandable—the Soviet government and the trade unions, after all, pursue the same goal, to increase the people's well-being.

The socialist state in no way limits the right of working people to form professional associations. Under existing legislation, unions in the Soviet Union do not need to register with state institutions.

The myth of the “non-worker” role of Soviet trade unions and of class conflicts in the USSR is widespread in bourgeois propaganda. But there are foreign liberal investigators who pay a certain tribute to objectivity in studying class structure and the true role of Soviet trade unions. They include the British legal scholar Mary McAuley who published *Labour Disputes in Soviet Russia: 1957-1965* on the basis of materials collected in the USSR. One cannot agree with everything she writes, but what is important is that she has relied on facts, and has overcome many anti-Soviet clichés current in anti-communist literature.

As McAuley observes, Western commentators refuse to recognize that the Soviet system has replaced industrial conflicts with harmonious relations.¹ In this connection she draws her opponents' attention to the difficulty of proving their thesis of “class conflicts” in the Soviet Union since in the USSR the workers' living conditions are improving, wages are rising and trade union rights are expanding.

Intentionally falsifying reality, “sovietologists” have often undertaken to demonstrate that Soviet trade unions concern themselves only with production matters, not with the defense of working people's interests. Commenting tendentiously on the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the AFL-

¹ M. McAuley, *Labour Disputes in Soviet Russia: 1957-1965*, Oxford, 1969, p. 7.

CIO's notorious *Free Trade News* (May, 1971) quite falsely reduced the tasks set to the unions by the Congress to forcing working people to work harder, to turn out more goods and to observe labor discipline more strictly.

The author of the commentary, the anti-communist Elly Borochovicz, tried to conceal from readers the CPSU's call at the Congress on trade unions to continue to defend the legitimate interests of working people. Borochovicz "forgot" to mention, too, that the Congress recommended that trade unions step up their work in involving working people in the administration of state and public affairs. Instead of speaking of the trade unions' efforts to nourish a communist attitude to labor, Borochovicz preferred to attribute to them a "coercive" function, the role of "overseer of the slaves".

It is enough for any unbiased observer to take any Soviet trade union handbook to see how multi-sided is the work of Soviet trade unions in seeing to the economic and cultural interests of working people. The handbook would list participation in setting wages and norms, concern for improving working and living conditions, management of social insurance, and so on.

Among the "sovietologists'" unrealizable hopes, of which there are many, one especially entices them: to rouse among Soviet youth, who now make up more than half of the population of the Soviet Union, lack of confidence in the policy of the CPSU. What is at stake is nothing more and nothing less than depriving the Soviet people of its future, of its younger generation.

Western "specialists" dream of the "decline" in the ideological élan of present-day Soviet youth in comparison with "the idealism of Civil War days and the great outpouring of energy and dedication which accompanied the first phase of the five-year plans".¹ So writes the American "sovietologist" Merle Fainsod.

Soviet reality decisively refutes the fabrications of bour-

¹ M. Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1963, p. 303.

geois ideologists. Proof are the labor initiatives undertaken by young workers. The feat of the young people who, on the call of the Party, went to the virgin lands will live forever in the history of the Soviet state. Further proof are the All-Union Komsomol shock construction projects going up in different areas of the country.

Of course, it would be wrong to deny that Soviet youth have their problems, dictated by their interests, that there are no unresolved questions in the relation between generations. They do exist. And it is on them that the bourgeois opponents speculate, exaggerating them to an extreme and picturing them as irresolvable and antagonistic "generational conflicts".

Actually, the contradictions in these relations are resolved, as practice shows, on the basis of socialism, in the name of strengthening and developing socialism. "As a matter of course," writes the Soviet sociologist and jurist G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, "such contradictions have nothing whatsoever to do with hostility and antagonism—each generation can live and move forward only by relying on the achievements of the preceding generation. This continuity and mutual dependence acquires special significance under socialism, where society sets for itself a monumental task, calculated for a number of generations—the construction of communism. But continuity itself inevitably has an element of dialectical development: the new generation, resting on the shoulders of the old, at the same time moves farther forward, discovers what it was not given to the preceding generation to discover".¹

In the alternation of generations in Soviet society, what is principal, determining and decisive is their unity, their inviolable ideological, political, economic and cultural cohesion.

It is this circumstance that to an enormous extent determined the rapid rebuilding of the war-ravaged economy,

¹ G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, *Socialist Democracy*, Moscow, 1972, p. 73 (in Russian).

the creation of a developed socialist society, the successful building of communism. Most "sovietologists" prefer to pass over this in silence. But there are among them those who, under the pressure of irrefutable facts, renounce the idea of a "conflict of generations". The American sociologist H. Kahn, for example, remarked that the most painstaking analysis of the information issuing from the Soviet Union had convinced him that in the Soviet Union, whatever the Western press might write, there is no opposition, on the contrary, one can observe unity around the decisions adopted by the Soviet leadership. He let it be understood that he somewhat envies Soviet society in this respect, in that it has, in his expression, no problems with the young. Kahn himself has two nephews who have declared war on modern American society and have joined the "hippies", who renounce Western civilization.

The Communist Party is connected with young people above all through the Lenin All-Union Young Communist League (Komsomol). The Komsomol is a mass civic-political organization. As the Party's reserve, its immediate assistant in the communist upbringing of the younger generation, the Komsomol is an autonomous organization, i.e., it deals with the matters within its competence independently. This fact, too, is denied by "sovietologists". Some "deprive" the Komsomol of the rights of an autonomous organization in their writings. By a simple "arithmetical" operation the Komsomol takes on the guise of a bureaucratic appendage of the Party without any rights.

Following this, authors such as Merle Fainsod, or the American "specialist" on the problems of Soviet youth, William Taubman, who has written *The View From Lenin Hills* (1967), spread it about that the Komsomol has "lost" prestige in the present day,¹ that it is opposed by the "hostile" mass of youth.²

¹ W. Taubman, *The View From Lenin Hills. Soviet Youth in Ferment*, New York, 1967, pp. 241-43.

² Ibid., pp. 244-49.

Such "investigators" conclude their falsified assertions on Soviet youth with declarations on the Komsomol's "compulsory" methods of operation.

Such judgements disgust even some bourgeois authors who scarcely nourish sympathy for communism. The French specialist in political science Patrice Gélard writes in his *Mass Organizations in the Soviet Union* that "trade unions and the Komsomol are juridical persons, they enjoy the benefits of financial autonomy and juridical competence.... They are, juridically at least, autonomous organizations, independent with respect to the institutions of state and Party".¹

In the postwar years, as throughout the entire preceding history of Soviet society, the CPSU has unwaveringly carried out a policy of developing independent initiative in the Komsomol's work. The Party has proceeded from the consideration that the Komsomol can be its true helper and reserve only when it shows maximum initiative and creative aptitude in its work. "The Young Communist League must be a shock force, helping in every job and displaying initiative and enterprise".² The Komsomol has always followed Lenin's commandment.

In the postwar years, the Komsomol assumed patronage over the rebuilding of war-ravaged cities and villages, some of the country's largest enterprises and the mines of the Donets Coal Basin and took an active part in raising agricultural production. Komsomol members were initiators of the struggle for high labor productivity.

In May 1956, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers asked the Komsomol and Soviet youth to send 400-500 thousand young men and women to work on new construction projects in the country's North and East and in the Donets Basin.

¹ P. Gélard, *Les organisations de masse en Union Soviétique. Syndicats et Komsomol*, Paris, 1965, p. 95.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 297.

Soviet youth, led by the Komsomol vanguard, responded ardently to the call of the Party and the Soviet government. By the end of 1956, more than 200 thousand young patriots had voluntarily gone to the North and East, and to the Donets Basin, through Komsomol assignment; they set to work with the energy and zeal inherent to them. More than 2 million young people went to shock construction sites all over the country.

What have Western "specialists" on the problems of Soviet youth to say of this, those "specialists" who speak of the Komsomol's "lack of authority", "submissiveness" and hureaucratism? Do they see, for example, the outpouring of young people's initiative that was summoned forth by the 13th Congress of the Komsomol, which in April 1958 declared the most important construction projects in Siberia, the North, the Far East and Kazakhstan to be Komsomol shock projects?

Young people are in the front ranks of those working for technological progress, for increasing the efficiency of social production, while bourgeois ideologists attempt to decry apoliticism and, more than that, hostility to communist ideals. At the end of the 1960s, the polling institute under the newspaper *Komsomolskaya pravda* (*Komsomol Truth*) conducted a mass survey of the young people of the country. Of 17,446 young men and women surveyed, 16,764 indicated what their goal in life was. These aspirations were fundamentally different from those that command the thoughts of millions of young people in the West—the aspiration for personal enrichment and for the satisfaction of acquisitive feelings. 95 of every 100 questionnaires spoke to the fact that the ideals of Soviet young people fully correspond to the ideals of socialist society.

Young Soviet men and women of course think of themselves, of a secure life and entertainment. There is nothing reprehensible in this. What is important is that they aspire to a better life as measured not by personal and private interests, but by public interests. The survey confirmed that young people wish to serve their country, to have perfect

mastery of their chosen occupation, to be genuine Communists.

"Our common goal is to build communism", engineer K. (those questioned were not required to use their names) from Leningrad answered in the name of his contemporaries, "not tomorrow, but today. This means that we must now inculcate in people those views that correspond to the exalted consciousness of our communist tomorrow. My personal goal is, to the degree that is within my power, to help the Party struggle against career seekers, hooligans, and chiselers who live at society's expense. For this, to try to imitate Lenin in all my life and work."

Bringing young people up in the spirit of communist ideals, the Party shows constant concern for their needs and aspirations. In 1966-1970, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government adopted enactments on the most important questions concerning the labor, education and life of young people. Among them were: "On Measures for Improving the Training of Specialists and Improving the Leadership of the Country's Institutions of Higher and Secondary Education", "On Improving the Living Conditions of Those Dwelling in Dormitories", "On Measures for Expanding Training and Job Placement in the Economy of Young Persons and Minors Who Have Graduated From General Education Schools", "On Establishing a Reduced Work Day for Working Persons Who Successfully Study in Schools for Working Youth", "On Measures for the Improvement of On-the-Job Training and Raising Skills", "On Measures for the Further Development of Tourism and Excursions Within the Country". The titles of the enactments speak for themselves.

The Party's ties with the masses take many forms. They are guaranteed by the Party's highly representative make-up, they are maintained through mass organizations and through direct democracy. We should recall that direct democracy means an order under which decisions are made on the basis of the direct and specific expression of the will of all citizens.

"Sovietologists" try to put in their far from true word here, too. They assert that the higher echelons of the Party do not take account of the opinion of the masses in making decisions. These assertions have nothing in common with reality. It is well known that the Central Committee of the CPSU systematically puts the cardinal questions of the life of Soviet society to national discussion. Such links with the masses as all-Union conferences of representatives of the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia on specific problems of communist construction, periodic trips by Party leaders to the localities, participation of path-breakers of production and scholars in the work of plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the CPSU—all these are becoming increasingly frequent.

On the eve of the 23rd Party Congress, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government worked out and published for discussion the draft Directives of the forthcoming Congress for the Five-Year Plan for the Development of the Soviet Economy in 1966-1970. The masses of workers, peasants and intelligentsia took part in the work of Party conferences and conferences of working people where the draft Directives were discussed. The discussion was carried out in an atmosphere of heightened activism.

In speeches at meetings, in the press and in numerous letters sent to leadership organs and the editorial boards of newspapers, Soviet citizens expressed many useful and profound opinions on the country's economic, social and cultural development. All were studied attentively. Some were reflected in the Directives adopted by the 23rd Congress, others were used in the formulation and implementation of the five-year plan. This practice was extended during the preparation and discussion of the draft Directives for the Ninth Five-Year Plan for the development of the Soviet economy approved by the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

The Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980 drafted by the Central

Committee for the 25th CPSU Congress were discussed in Party branches, at public meetings and in the press. This amounted to a countrywide examination of the Party's economic and social policy and the perspective and goals of the Soviet economy. The Soviet people expressed their wholehearted approval of the new document, and thus also of the Party's economic and social policy.

* * *

The theory of the "élite", employed extensively in "sovietology", is meant to discredit the inviolable unity of the Communist Party and the people. The social make-up of the CPSU, its growth, its interaction with civic organizations, the regular discussion of most important questions of the life of Soviet society by working people, testify to the fact that there is multi-sided, ever increasing, direct and reciprocal contact between the Party and the people. The Party leads, but it does not replace civic organizations; it gives the latter scope for initiative.

4. PARTY LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET STATE AS INTERPRETED BY "SOVIETOLOGISTS"

The principle of Party leadership of the Soviet state is written into the Constitution of the USSR. Implementation of this principle is one of the most important prerequisites for the building of communism in the Soviet Union.

The basic aspects of Party leadership of the state have been dealt with quite thoroughly by Soviet scholarship.¹ The

¹ G. Kh. Shakhnazarov, *Socialist Democracy*; by the same author, *The Leading Role of the Communist Party in Socialist Society*, Moscow, 1970; N. A. Petrovichev, *The Enlargement of the Leading Role of the CPSU in Building Communism*, Moscow, 1969; Y. G. Turishchev, "V. I. Lenin on the Role of the Party in the System of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (in *Leninist Principles of Party Leadership of the Masses in the First Years of the Construction of Soviet Society*, Moscow, 1967) and others (all in Russian).

Party elaborates the policy line by which state organs are guided in their activity; the Party makes sure that the policy is carried out and organizes the system of personnel selection and assignment in the state organs. It leads the organs of state, but it does not replace them.

The idea of a mutually complementing character and simultaneous precise delineation of the functions of Party and state organs was Lenin's. It has been implemented and confirmed by the political practice of the USSR.

Relations between the Communist Party and the Soviet state have always been a matter of great concern to "sovietologists". A number of Western authors attempt to force these relations into the framework of the notorious concept of "totalitarianism".

The concept of "totalitarianism" arose as the international authority of the Soviet Union increased immensely following the Soviet victory over German fascism. It was later taken over by the reactionary ruling circles of the United States. Harry Truman, as President of the United States, defined his policy with respect to the USSR in terms of this concept.

At first, those who preached the doctrine of "totalitarianism" intended to influence not so much the political consciousness as the feelings of the masses. Exploiting the hatred of all the people of the world for fascism, "sovietologists" at the same time glossed over fascism's class roots as a terroristic dictatorship of the most aggressive circles of monopoly capital, they dulled the vigilance of the masses with respect to real tendencies towards fascism in the contemporary bourgeois states. At the same time, they labelled the Soviet state "totalitarian", concealing the obvious fact that in the Soviet Union the full power belongs to the people, led by the working class.

The most important feature of totalitarianism, asserts Boris Meissner, Director of the Institute for Eastern Law at Cologne University and a Member of the Directorate of the Federal Institute for Eastern Science and International

Studies, is unlimited party autocracy, growing out of a one-party dictatorship.¹

Zbigniew Brzezinski and his coauthor Carl Friedrich, in *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* cite as one of the first hallmarks of totalitarianism the existence of a single party in the Soviet system.² In the *Dictionary of Political Science* published in Munich in 1970, the proposition of a "party monopoly", by which is meant a one-party system, figures as an essential feature of totalitarianism.³

The history of the Russian revolutionary movement knew no party that so consistently, selflessly, wisely and victoriously led the working masses to political and economic liberation as the Bolshevik Party. That is why the revolutionary peoples of Russia entrusted the fate of the revolution, and then of the first socialist state in the world, to the Communist Party, renouncing the other political parties that had outlived themselves.

The one-party system that has taken shape over the course of Soviet history is considered by bourgeois ideologists a "lack of democracy". As they present it, the degree of a system's democracy depends on the number of political parties active within it.

It is symptomatic that some bourgeois ideologists, who nourish no sympathy for the Soviet order, refuse to consider a one-party system a categoric "evil". For example, Ossip Flechtheim, a professor at the Free University in West Berlin, asserts in *Bolshevism 1917-1967* that "a one-party system is not on principle incompatible with democracy".⁴ Alfred Meyer goes further, considering it a positive contribution to the development of forms of government.⁵

¹ *Sowjetgesellschaft im Wandel. Russlands Weg zur Industriegesellschaft*, Stuttgart, 1966, S. 113.

² Z. Brzezinski and C. Friedrich, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, New York, 1966, p. 21.

³ *Handwörterbuch zur Politikwissenschaft*, München, 1970, S. 422.

⁴ O. K. Flechtheim, *Bolschewismus 1917-1967*, Wien, 1967, S. 137.

⁵ *The USSR after 50 Years. Promise and Reality*, New York, 1967, p. 55.

Numerous critics of the Soviet one-party system are put in a difficult position by current bourgeois political practice. State-monopoly capitalism has sharply curtailed the "free play" of political forces in bourgeois society. This was eloquently witnessed by the establishment of fascist one-party regimes in a number of bourgeois countries in the 1920s and 1930s.

In the postwar period, despite the destruction of the coalition of fascist powers, on the strength of the intrinsic laws of capitalism at its imperialist stage tendencies towards reaction and even outright fascism have continued in the practice of bourgeois states. Bourgeois-democratic freedoms are being increasingly restricted, power is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the ruling party. All forces supporting the dictatorship of monopoly capital group around this party. "This tendency," notes the Soviet scholar I. D. Levin, "is observed not only in countries with a multi-party system such as Italy, the FRG, Belgium and France (under the Fifth Republic), but even in countries with a two-party system, to wit... Britain, Austria and Australia. Countries such as Belgium are for all practical purposes being transformed into countries with a single principal party of monopoly capital and a reserve monopoly capital party in the guise of a right-socialist party."¹

Bourgeois scholars cannot but recognize this circumstance. Many of them, for instance Enrico Opocher, a bourgeois specialist on political problems, note that after the Second World War a phenomenon called "partocracy" has appeared in almost all the democracies of Western Europe. This is in essence a transition from the system of the plurality of parties to that of a single party, from the subordination of parties to the state to the subordination of the latter to a dominant party.²

¹ *Parties in the System of the Dictatorship of Monopolies*, Moscow, 1964, p. 71 (in Russian).

² *Political Thought Since World War II*, Ed. by W. T. Stankiewicz, London, 1964, p. 61.

That is why we may justifiably conclude that the question of the one-party system touches more on the functional aspect than the heart of the matter. The goal pursued, the interests of which class one or several parties work for—that is what is most important.

Hypocritically lamenting the Soviet one-party political system, "sovietologists" crudely falsify what is most important. In their "studies", the Communist Party acts not for the good or in the interests of the people, but to retain state power in its own hands.

All the activity of the CPSU shows that the Party has no interests other than those of the people. The history of the Party shows that it has never forced its leadership on anyone. All state and civic organizations have always accepted this leadership with great trust.

However, historical truth is scarcely a criterion for "sovietologists". Distorting the facts and providing prejudiced comments on aspects of Soviet reality, the adherents of the theory of "totalitarianism" view the connections between Party organs and Soviet state institutions as relations of dominance and subordination.

Some of them maintain that the Soviets play a secondary role in the political system of Soviet society, that they have been transformed into "executive agencies" of the Party.¹ Others say that the Party leadership is not interested in strengthening the Soviets, "because that would result in its own weakening".²

Anti-communists thus maliciously distort the true mechanism by which Party and state interact, ignoring the complete unity of tasks and goals of the Party and state leadership in the USSR.

The lack of objectivity and the falsifying approach of anti-communists to the party-state system in the Soviet

¹ *The USSR after 50 Years. Promise and Reality*, p. 56.

² *The USSR and the Future. An Analysis of the New Program of the CPSU*, Ed. by Leonard Schapiro, New York, 1963, p. 158.

Union is obvious even to some of their colleagues. For example, L. G. Churchward, reader in political science at the University of Melbourne, though he does not break completely with the anti-communist position, makes a number of observations on the Soviet political system that merit attention. He argues against outspoken anti-communists who deny that state organs have any autonomy whatsoever. In his *Contemporary Soviet Government*, Churchward shatters one of the most widespread arguments of anti-Soviet propaganda, an argument that treats the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as an automaton registering normative acts adopted by other organs.

All the material introduced by Churchward leads to the conclusion that the Soviets and their executive organs, guided by the Party's political line, link the Party to the people with a thousand threads, attending sensitively to the aspirations and proposals of the people and implementing them in their activity. The upshot of Churchward's line of reasoning is that the Supreme Soviet in fact exercises supreme state power independently and on its own initiative.¹

Accusing the Soviet state system of "totalitarianism", "sovietologists" attempt to extend this pseudo-totalitarianism to socialist production relations. This is expressed especially in the anti-communists' allegation that labor in the USSR is of a forced character and is coercion by the CPSU with respect to Soviet working people.

For instance, this argument was made by Stanley Page, professor of history at the City College of the City University of New York. He assigned the decisive role in the restoration of the economy in the postwar period to "coercion". Page is hypocritically distressed by the fact that after the Second World War Soviet citizens were allegedly "compelled" to work at an exhausting wartime tempo.² The reasons for such inventions are obvious: for scholars who are lackeys

¹ L. Churchward, *Contemporary Soviet Government*, London, 1968, pp. 223-74.

² S. Page, *Russia in Revolution*, New York, 1965.

of the bourgeoisie to admit that the gigantic growth of the Soviet Union's forces of production is rooted in the free labor of free people would be to pronounce sentence on the capitalist order that they are called to defend.

The "theory of totalitarianism" gave "sovietologists" grounds for "substantiating" the existence in the USSR of so-called "Soviet terror".

In this regard, bourgeois ideologists turn with especial frequency to the period of the cult of Stalin's personality. However, it is known that at the 20th Congress of the CPSU the Party condemned the unfounded repressions that had occurred. In the subsequent years, the Central Committee of the CPSU has adopted stern measures ensuring strict observation of socialist legality, based on respect for the rights and the person of the citizen. At the same time, the Soviet state continues to exercise the function of protecting socialist property and the legitimate interests of Soviet citizens. Compulsion is applied to thieves and plunderers, hooligans, hooligans and other violators of the law, who make up an insignificant minority of the population.

Thus, the "totalitarianism" of the Soviet system is in fact nothing other than one further falsification of the policy of the CPSU in the postwar period by anti-communists.

The shaky and ineffective "totalitarian" theory is beginning to prompt an increasing number of objections even in anti-communist literature. "To be sure," writes Alfred Meyer in *The Soviet Political System*, "all those who use it [the term] might agree on a very broad and vague definition; but terms that are too vague become useless."¹

One of the derivatives of the theory of "totalitarianism" was the anti-communist concept of the "bureaucratism" of the Soviet system.

Where do "sovietologists" look for manifestations of "bureaucratism" in the USSR? Using the old refrain that

¹ A. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System. An Interpretation*, New York, 1965, p. 471.

leadership in the Soviet Union is "excessively centralized", and completely forgetting the principle of democratic centralism that reigns in the Soviet socio-economic system, anti-communists conclude that the administrative apparatus in the USSR is becoming increasingly bureaucratized.

Let us look at some figures to get a true picture of the administrative apparatus in the Soviet Union. Personnel in administrative organs made up 5.8 percent of the total number of workers and office employees in the economy in 1945, 4.5 percent in 1950, 2.7 percent in 1955, 2 percent in 1960 and 2 percent in 1967. In absolute figures, too, the number of employees in the state and economic managerial apparatus and in administrative bodies of cooperative and public organizations has tended to decline somewhat. In 1945 there were 1,645 thousand employees in the administrative apparatus, in 1967 only 1,640 thousand.

In striving to develop the thesis of "Soviet bureaucracy", anti-communists find themselves in a false position with respect to bourgeois sociology itself, which has been forced to take account of the monstrous growth of genuine bureaucracy in the capitalist world.

Max Lerner, a well-known American sociologist and journalist, has recognized that the "bureaucratization of life through the new managerial structures in business, the trade-union, the government ... are being extended through the whole culture" of the United States. Lerner defines the bureaucracy as a "New Feudalism" and compares the hierarchical system of command in corporations to the system of authority of feudal lords within the framework of medieval society.¹

A colleague of Lerner's, Ely Chinoy, argues that "bureaucracy has come to characterize more and more of contemporary life. ... The pervasiveness of bureaucracy is reflected in many ways. An increasing proportion of persons are employed in

¹ M. Lerner, *America as a Civilization. Life and Thought in the United States Today*, New York, 1957, pp. 287, 317.

bureaucratic positions and millions of others are subject to bureaucratic controls".¹

Such statements are not happenstance, they are supported by statistics. In the United States, for example, the proportion of employees in administrative posts with respect to all employed persons is three times greater than in the USSR, approximately 14 times greater in the area of finance and credit. The enormous number of employees in this line of work is characteristic for capitalist countries and testifies to the existence of an immensely overblown bureaucracy that "sovietologists" seek in vain to ascribe to the USSR.

In the Soviet Union, the elimination of exploiting classes and the cultural revolution have destroyed the social basis for the emergence and development of bureaucracy. Manifestations of bureaucracy are primarily remnants of capitalism, alien to socialist society. In the period under review, as at other stages in the development of Soviet society, a struggle has been waged against bureaucracy through criticism and self-criticism, systematic control over and inspection of implementation of decisions, reduction and refinement of the work of the apparatus.

The initiative in the struggle against bureaucracy rests with the CPSU, which relies on the Soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol, organs of public control, and cooperative, sport, defense and professional organizations. The broad front of these organizations, working under the guidance of the Communist Party, makes up the basis of Soviet democracy. Unbiased study of the data can compel even convinced anti-communists to reconsider certain "traditional" conceptions, to draw useful conclusions, as has happened with Meyer.

Unlike many of his colleagues, Alfred Meyer dares to admit that "the Soviet political system has established itself as a successful alternative to the social and political systems of Western Europe and North America". Meyer sees one of

¹ E. Chinoy, *Society. An Introduction to Sociology*, New York, 1961, p. 188.

the "important contributions to modern political experience" in the Soviet system's ability "to draw the masses of the citizens into active participation in public affairs, to mobilize them for productive work as well as civic activities".¹

* * *

The theory of "totalitarianism" is aimed squarely at the Communist Party's leadership of the activity of the Soviet state. This "theory" crudely distorts the principles of Party leadership. Increasing numbers of persons abroad see that the goals that the CPSU sets and the methods that it uses in directing the state apparatus are highly democratic. The Party directs but does not replace, hence does not deprive of authority and initiative, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their executive organs.

The principal method in the Party's work is persuasion. This method has been established, too, in the activity of the Soviet state. Anti-communist literature's allegation that the CPSU is the champion of "total", "terroristic methods of domination" has been discredited to such an extent that many "sovietologists" have rejected the "totalitarian" model as applied to Soviet society.

The false thesis of the "bureaucratism" of the CPSU and of all of Soviet society is also crude and inimical to Soviet reality. The facts show that at a time when bureaucratism is on the increase in the capitalist world, in the USSR democratism is becoming more extensive and an effective struggle is being waged against all manifestations of bureaucratism.

5. THE ILLUSORY AND THE TRUE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

Many Soviet and progressive foreign authors have devoted their writings to the democratism of the Soviet state system. The books and articles on this subject rate high the democrat-

¹ *The USSR after 50 Years*, pp. 54, 55.

ic achievements of the Soviet people under the leadership of the CPSU.

The establishment and development of the socialist order in the USSR has been attended by the refinement of Soviet democracy, by an expansion of the political rights of the working people of the Soviet Union. This process has been reflected in all areas of the country's socio-political and economic life, "in the increasingly broader participation of the masses in the administration of state and social affairs".¹ This is the true course of the evolution of the Soviet political system.

"Sovietologists" paint this evolution in different colors. The overwhelming majority of them totally deny the existence in the Soviet Union of democracy, in the first place. However, the Leninist foreign and domestic policy of the CPSU and Soviet reality itself, witnesses of which are the hundreds of thousands of foreign citizens who visit the Soviet Union every year, prove that there is the most extensive democracy in the country.

All this forces anti-communists to cloak their falsifications, to lend them an air of objectivity. They no longer deny the fact of the evolution of Soviet democracy, but define the direction of this evolution as movement from socialism to capitalism.

Such views are reflected most completely in the "sovietologists'" "theory of convergence". "Convergionists" recognize that the Soviet political system is developing. How? As it turns out, from the "undemocratic" stage in which it is now and which was temporary and transitory, something like growing pains, to Western-style democracy. True, assurances are given that the capitalist system, too, will move along a path that converges with the socialist system, the capitalist system freeing itself of the defects inherent to it.

Advocates of the theory of "convergence" speak of a certain "synthesis" in which the socialist and capitalist systems

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 99.

will eventually merge. In fact, behind these assertions lurks an attempt to demonstrate that the capitalist system will inevitably swallow the socialist.

Isaac Deutscher, Merle Fainsod, John Galbraith and other adherents of the "convergence" theory trust in the economic, material forces that allegedly operate in the depths of Soviet society, in the presumed inertia of its industrial development, which "inevitably" leads to the elimination or, as they put it, "transformation" of its political superstructure.

However, despite its popularity among some bourgeois scholars, the "convergence" theory has in recent years been subjected to sharp criticism. This criticism has issued from the right flank of anti-communism, from the militant wing of "sovietology"—Bertram Wolfe, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sidney Hook and others. According to Wolfe, the theory of convergence cannot withstand criticism, since instead of calling the West to active struggle against communism it calls for passively biding time till the moment when, as a result of the development of technology, Communists will cease to be Communists.¹

To Brzezinski and some other opponents of the convergence theory, another form of evolution seems more realistic: first a change in ideology and politics, then a change in the socio-economic order. The upshot of this other "evolution" is the same as with the first—the restoration of capitalism. This thesis has recently become especially popular among bourgeois "sovietologists".

Painting a false picture of the development of the Soviet political system, the "convergonists" and "evolutionists" give much thought to the role that the Communist Party will play in this process. They advance the false thesis that this role will decline and finally come to nothing. Brzezinski has written that the Communist Party and its monopoly of power

¹ B. Wolfe, *An Ideology in Power. Reflections on the Russian Revolution*, New York, 1969.

will fall victim to the historical process, that they will both disappear. They search painstakingly for facts that would support such unfounded hopes. There are no such facts in nature—quite to the contrary, everything testifies to the increased role of the CPSU in building the state.

The actual development of the Soviet political system in the postwar period has nothing in common with the inventions of the supporters of "convergence" and "evolution".

In the Soviet Union's postwar political development, the transformation of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the political organization of the entire people has been of cardinal importance. The people's state has personified the further development of socialist democracy along the path towards public communist self-administration.

One of the directions in the development of Soviet state democracy is the increasing role of Soviets and the expansion of their rights. In this connection, the Central Committee of the CPSU has in the postwar period adopted a number of appropriate resolutions: "On Improving the Activity of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies and Increasing Their Links with the Masses" (1957), "On the Work of Local Soviets of Working People's Deputies in Poltava Region" (1965), "On Improving the Work of Village and Township Soviets of Working People's Deputies" (1967). The decisions of the 23rd, 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU gave considerable attention to this issue. These decisions provided profound generalizations from the experience of the Soviets, identified the principal drawbacks in their work, and set out specific ways and means for overcoming these defects and for heightening the role of the Soviets.

Local Soviets are the state organs which have the greatest mass character. More than 2 million deputies sit in them. In addition, the Soviets are supported and assisted by more than 25 million activists—citizens who carry out state functions on an unpaid voluntary basis and are not deputies or staff members of the Soviets. Many such activists work in the Soviets' standing commissions.

On the initiative of the Central Committee of the CPSU and in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On Fundamental Rights and Duties of Village and Township Soviets of Working People's Deputies" (April 1968), the Soviets were given, along with new powers with respect to departmental and socio-cultural affairs within their competence, increased rights in relations with enterprises and organizations not subordinate to them but located in the territory of their competence (e.g., participation in working out plans, increased supervisory powers over production and extra-production activity, expanded opportunities for cutting short illegitimate activities, and so on). Simultaneously, the range of questions that Soviets were to deal with was expanded, which together with the reinforcement of the juridical status of deputies has been an important feature in the development of local Soviets.

In accordance with the proposals of the 24th CPSU Congress, a law was passed on the status of the deputy, defining the deputy's prerogatives and duties, and the duties towards deputies of state and public bodies. Many important issues are raised and settled by the Soviets on the initiative of deputies. L. I. Brezhnev said in the Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress:

"Let me say that the proposals being put forward by the deputies on the basis of instructions from their electors reflect the requirements and needs of our people and of our life as a whole."¹

The functions of local Soviets in economic management have been appreciably expanded. After the November (1965) plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU alone, more than 2 thousand enterprises in the metal processing, wood processing and food industries were placed under the control of local Soviets.

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 97.

Local Soviets are gradually being given control over housing and utilities earlier subordinate to other departments, as well as enterprises in the service sector. At the same time, local Soviets' control over cultural and service institutions and utilities not subordinate to them has been increased, as has their role in coordinating plans among industrial enterprises, economic organizations and various state organs and institutions not under their control.

The Soviets' functions in maintaining law and order and protecting the rights of citizens have also been expanded. Organs charged with maintaining public order and the militia have been subordinated to local Soviets, and the Soviets have been given extensive supervisory powers over corrective labor facilities. Analogous processes have gone on in other links of the Soviet state system.

In parallel with the developments mentioned above, Party leadership of the Soviets has been constantly improved. Much has been done to implement the instructions of the 23rd, 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU on the duties of Party organizations to develop fully and support the Soviets' initiative, to take a constant interest in selection of personnel for work in the Soviets, to observe and develop further the principles of socialist democracy.

The genuine evolution of the socialist system presumes the most extensive participation of the people in all areas of public life, production included. This can be illustrated by countless examples of the involvement of workers and office personnel in managing production at Soviet enterprises. As the country's economy develops, there has been an increasing need for the working collectives to take a greater and more immediate part in the life of industrial enterprises. As a result, by decision of the December (1957) plenary session of the CC CPSU standing production conferences, mentioned earlier, were set up at plants, factories and institutions. In addition, there are as before workers' conferences and general meetings of collective farmers. In 1970, 147 thousand conferences and meetings of this kind were held, with more than

37 million persons participating. On the average 1.5 million proposals are accepted at the conferences each year, and their implementation is of benefit to the entire society.

At present, new forms of production activism by working collectives are developing alongside existing ones. In recent years, public bureaus and groups for economic analysis have been set up, as have design and technology bureaus, research institutes, groups and laboratories, bureaus of standards, bureaus for technical information and other collectives through which millions of working people are involved in the management of the economy.

The development of permanent public forms through which the masses participate in production management indicates that these forms will be further refined and will spread their activities in the country's economy. Even today, for all practical purposes there is no question in the life of a collective which public organizations do not help deal with in one form or another.

We have dwelt on democracy in the sphere of production in the USSR because, first, it is entirely ignored by "sovietologists"; second, because it is indicative of the nature of the socialist system; and third, because it serves as an example for the working class of capitalist countries in their struggle for their social rights.

The development of democracy, which has occurred under the leadership of the Communist Party, has strengthened the Soviet social order. In vain do "sovietologists" attempt to impose on the country's economy the idea that it is necessary to "democratize" and "liberalize" the Soviet power. The development of the Soviet political system is proceeding along truly democratic lines.

"Bourgeois ideologues and revisionists," L. I. Brezhnev has noted, "raise a hypocritical hue and cry, alleging that we have no democracy. They offer us all sorts of 'advice' on how to 'improve' and 'democratise' socialism. But their concern is not for socialism, of course. They would like to return us to bourgeois practices and, therefore, try to force bourgeois

democracy on us, a democracy for exploiters, alien to the interests of the people."¹

Outlining improvements of the political system in the mature socialist society, the 25th Congress singled out the further development of socialist democracy as an all-important objective. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress said: "Today, we know not only from theory but also from long years of practice that genuine democracy is impossible without socialism, and that socialism is impossible without a steady development of democracy. We see the improvement of our socialist democracy as consisting above all in a steady effort to ensure ever fuller participation by the working people in running all the affairs of society, in further developing the democratic principles of our state system, and in creating the conditions for the all-round flourishing of the individual."²

* * *

Many "sovietologists" contemplate an evolution of the Soviet political system backwards to a bourgeois system. Their unrealizable dreams are cloaked in the form of a "political convergence" of Soviet society. This theory pursues the goal of glossing over the irreconcilable contradictions between the two world socio-economic systems, of suggesting working people the false notion of the need for Western-style "democratization" of the socialist political system, which is more democratic than any bourgeois-democratic political system.

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 99.

² L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 102.

THE CPSU'S IDEOLOGICAL WORK AND BOURGEOIS FALSIFICATIONS

1. THE LIE OF COERCION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The historic achievements of the Soviet people in rebuilding and developing the economy in the years after the Second World War were enormously assisted by the ideological and political training of working people carried out by the CPSU. This fact is denied or falsified in every way possible by "sovietologists".

The activity of the Communist Party in raising the man of the communist tomorrow is alien and hateful to the exponents of anti-communism. Distorting the substance of ideological work in the Soviet Union, "sovietologists" try to make it out as something that it is not. The thesis of "ideological coercion" allegedly carried out by the CPSU by means of propaganda is becoming increasingly widespread in the present-day literature of anti-communism. Professor Carl Friedrich of Harvard University substitutes coercion for persuasion, which is the only and permanent method of Party propaganda. This advocate of the "theory of totalitarianism" singles out coercion as the dominant feature of the Soviet education system. In his opinion, it manifests itself primarily in the coercion of minds, in the compulsory submission of men to a single ideology. Friedrich is seconded by the West German "experts" Ernst Fraenkel and Karl Dietrich Bracher, who also regard the propaganda of the Marxist-Leninist view of the world among Soviet citizens as "ideological coercion".¹ "Ideological coercion" is mani-

¹ E. Fraenkel, K. Bracher, *Staat und Politik*, Frankfurt am Main, 1973.

fested concretely, in the view of "sovietologists", in the struggle of Soviet Communists against such allegedly inherent human qualities as individualism, egoism, money-grubbing, career seeking, and so on.

From the false premise of man's "immutable" proprietary essence, "sovietologists" conclude that there is an inevitable "psychological coercion" of Soviet citizens in the name of the attainment of communist goals. A consequence of this is the alleged "apoliticism" of Soviet citizens and even a so-called "internal emigration" by many of them. Pseudo-scholarly discussions are conducted on the pages of anti-Soviet journals, with the participants competing to see who can most reduce the number of Soviet citizens who are sincere adherents to Marxist-Leninist ideas. Such a discussion was organized in 1965-1966, for instance, by the editors of the British anti-Soviet journal *Soviet Studies*.

The character of the Soviet citizen, his Marxist-Leninist view of the world, has been forged in indissoluble connection with the practice of building a new society. Not only were new factories and mines built and record harvests taken in through the efforts of enthusiasts during the first five-year plan periods; the bases for bringing up new men—true masters of their country and active builders of communism—were also laid. Socialist public ownership, having asserted its undivided sway in Soviet society, gave rise to collectivism and increased civic activism and initiative.

Socialism is the first social order in history that is truly concerned that all members of society be maximally politically conscious. This consciousness is derived first of all from the extensive participation of working people in dealing with the political and economic questions of socialist construction. Under socialism, the very character of the administration of social life presumes full publicity and the extensive participation of the masses. Party propaganda is an important means of involving people in running the country, it rouses them to enthusiasm, to labor and political activism.

The Central Committee of the CPSU put to Party organ-

izations the task of explaining to the people the essence of the first postwar five-year plan, of mobilizing them to fulfil and overfulfil the targets. The Party stressed the importance of fulfilment and overfulfilment—by every republic and region, by every industry and enterprise—of the annual, quarterly and monthly plans, it called for socialist emulation, explaining to working people that the early restoration of the war-ravaged economy, the fulfilment of the five-year plan, the further strengthening of the might of the socialist state and the increase in the material well-being of Soviet citizens depended on their efforts, on the intense and selfless labor of every person in the country.

The Soviet people responded actively to the Party's call. The great targets of the plan for the restoration and further development of the economy inspired working people and prompted a surge of creative energy. Party propaganda vigorously picked up everything new and advanced born in the thick of the masses and made it the common property of all. At the same time, it disclosed defects and criticized those who delayed economic development, it assisted in bringing lagging enterprises up to the level of leading enterprises.

November 1947, when the workers of the enterprises in Leningrad assumed the socialist obligation of fulfilling the five-year plan in four years, was a landmark in postwar Party propaganda. The Party press, radio and other mass media gave extensive support to this patriotic undertaking. Millions of people joined in the competition for fulfilling the economic plan ahead of time.

Inspired by the Communist Party, the Soviet working class set to work with such unprecedented energy that by the second half of 1948 gross industrial output exceeded the pre-war level, and by April 1, 1950—in 4 years and 3 months—the country had fulfilled the intensive plan for the first postwar five-year period. The Soviet people wrecked the calculations of imperialist circles in the West that the Soviet state would need many long years to rebuild its economy. We may

note for the sake of comparison that if in the first five postwar years the Soviet economy had developed at the rate the American economy developed, in 1950 the Soviet Union would have turned out not 27.3 million tons of steel, but half of that; not 10.2 million tons of cement, but 2.5 times less; not 2,991 million square meters of cotton fabric but less than half as much; not 2,523 thousand tons of sugar but one-fourth of that.

Such slow restoration and development of the Soviet economy would have meant a sharp worsening in the lives of working people. That is why the Party and government bent every effort to ensure the rapid rebuilding and development of the Soviet economy.

The selfless labor of the Soviet people and the achievements of the first postwar five-year plan period made it possible to carry out a number of measures for raising the people's standard of living. Rationing was ended in 1947, a monetary reform was carried out, and in subsequent years the prices of consumer necessities were repeatedly lowered.

The real overfulfilment by working people of the targets of the fourth and subsequent five-year plans (for example, the Fifth Five-Year Plan was fulfilled in 4 years and 4 months) is graphic testimony to the effectiveness of Party propaganda, the immense transforming force of socialist society.

A number of "sovietologists", though they recognize the positive impact of Party propaganda on Soviet workers, deny its efficacy with respect to the collective farm peasantry. M. C. Wren, for example, asserts that a *kulak* lurks within every collective farmer. Directly connected with this is his invention of "the inability of the regime heretofore to propagandize its goals in this, the most un-socialist, segment of the economy".¹ Wren presents no proof for his contention, and there are facts that refute it. As

¹ M. Wren, *The Course of Russian History*, New York, 1963, p. 718.

with the working class, the collective farm peasantry is profoundly loyal to communist ideals. The labor initiative that developed at industrial enterprises seized those working in the villages, too. Following the example of the cities, a movement for the title of work brigades of outstanding quality, for economizing and thrift, developed in the countryside. The initiators of new forms of socialist emulation in industry passed on their experience to farmers.

The Party carried out much agitation and propaganda work in connection with the decision of the February (1947) plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on agriculture. Discussions on measures for developing agriculture were carried on in collective farm production brigades and teams, advanced methods were propagandized, the Collective Farm Rules was explained, as were the rights and duties of collective farmers and the importance of maintaining labor discipline.

Mass political work in the countryside was carried on by a large army of propagandists. The moving words of Party propagandists found a lively response among those working in agriculture.

Despite the fact that, because of the sharp reduction in the able-bodied population in the villages, the sad state of the tractors and the reduction in the number of workhorses, it was more difficult to restore agriculture than industry, the village population had in most respects reached the prewar level of agricultural output by the end of the fourth five-year plan period.

Only collectivists who had the common good at heart could have accomplished this difficult task, not people with the souls of *kulaks*, as Wren and those like him affirm. Maurice Dobb, a progressive British economist, notes with justice: "Something much more than passive acquiescence was evidently needed to make collective farming a success, with its novel techniques and forms of labour, or to ensure that the multitudinous problems arising at the factory level

in the day-to-day carrying out of industrial plans were solved instead of being evaded. It is inconceivable that economic changes, so ambitious in their character and extent, could have been effected without a fairly radical transformation of attitudes and relationships in industry and in economic life generally; in particular, a transformation in the attitude and relationship of workers to the productive unit of which they were part."¹

In our day, the socialist ideology has become dominant in Soviet society. The course of history has shown irrefutably that the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was the result of the fraternal union of all peoples of the USSR, and was also a triumph for the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.

The establishment of the socialist ideology in Soviet society proceeded in parallel with the strengthening and development of socialism. The principles of communist community did not take hold in the mentality of millions of people of formerly tsarist Russia immediately. Only as a result of the educational work of the CPSU—work that was carried on on an enormous scale and that had a profound content—were behavior and relations among Soviet citizens radically changed, did what is called "remnants" become a part of the past, or at most an isolated phenomenon. In the postwar years, the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Party, resolutions that noted the achievements of Soviet culture and simultaneously exposed serious shortcomings in the development of literature and art, were met by the working people with understanding and approval.

Party organizations and professional associations of the Soviet intelligentsia carried out a great deal of work to develop further the principles of Soviet culture, to link Soviet art with the political tasks of the present.

¹ Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1966, p. 446.

The resolutions of the Party Central Committee on questions of literature and art were discussed in all professional organizations and at conferences conducted by the Party's regional and city committees. Hundreds of thousands of people took part in the discussions. An atmosphere, requiring that those working in the field of culture maintain high standards, an atmosphere of irreconcilability to ideological vacillation, was created in the country. Party organizations gave special attention to ideological and political work among Soviet citizens who had earlier been in territory occupied by the Nazis and had been subjected to bourgeois brain-washing.

In October 1958, newspapers told millions of Soviet working people of the new nationwide movement for a communist attitude towards labor. This movement rested on the rich experience of creative activity by the Soviet people, who embodied the glorious traditions of the builders of socialist society. By this time the conviction had been formed at a number of enterprises that socialist emulation needed a new form that would express more fully the demands of the time. The collective at the Moscow Shunting Yards initiated the new movement.

In the course of the successful construction of a socialist society and the gradual transition to communism, Party propaganda has become more sophisticated, has come ever closer to life, to production. At the same time, the transfer of the emphasis of mass agitation work to the sphere of production has brought some weaknesses to light, weaknesses ensuing from the need for a profound link between educational work and the specific sphere of its application. Many plenary sessions and conferences of Party organizations have drawn attention to this. Plenary sessions of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union republics and the regional committees of the CPSU have noted that political work among the masses must be aimed at getting concrete results, must fully reflect the life of Soviet society.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" and other decisions indicated the importance of a Marxist-Leninist understanding of such cardinal questions as the role of the masses, the Party and the individual in history, they indicated the need to combat distortions in the treatment of these questions.

Resolutions of the Central Committee adopted in the 1960s and devoted to the tasks of Party propaganda under present-day conditions have served as a program for the further improvement of all of the Party's ideological work. They have obliged Party organs to make serious improvements in their direction of mass propaganda work, to work persistently to raise its ideological level, to place communist education in the center of all Party organizations' attention. One of the resolutions stressed that it was necessary that every Soviet citizen understand the enormous socio-historical significance of his daily activity, that he see in it the decisive condition for increasing the number of material and cultural benefits for strengthening the might of his country, for the victory of communism.

Ideological and political work subsequently advanced to a new stage. Work on bringing up working people in a communist spirit, in developing their initiative and creativity, was stepped up. There has been increased attention to the substance of propaganda—it has become more specific and more business-like.

The Party's ideological and educational work has always centered on forming a communist world outlook among the masses. The Party's aim is that everyone master the basic tenets of scientific communism, moreover, that everyone be able to apply the knowledge obtained in practice, that knowledge become conviction.

Among the priority problems now is improving the moral education of working people, of the younger generation especially. The atmosphere in Soviet society helps to fortify—in all areas of social life, at work and in daily

life—respect and concern for man, honesty, an insistence on high moral standards for oneself and for others, trust combined with strict responsibility, a spirit of genuine comradeship.

Defining the ways in which the new man will take shape, the 24th Congress of the CPSU emphasized that a communist world outlook and morality are established in uncompromising struggle against survivals of the past in people's mentality, that any deviation from the norms and principles of communist morality are incompatible with the Soviet way of life.

The peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, the potential for which is expanding thanks to the purposeful, energetic and flexible foreign policy of the Party, does not mean that class struggle between the two systems ceases. Any reconciliation whatsoever with reactionary bourgeois ideology is inadmissible; in the realm of ideology there can be no peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism.

Party propaganda determinedly exposes bourgeois ideologists' slander of the Soviet way of life, thwarts imperialism's ideological subversion. The Party does everything to make sure that its educational, ideological activity conform to the spirit of our time, taking into account the enormous social shifts that have occurred, the scientific level achieved, the level of the masses' education.

"The moral and political make-up of Soviet people," stressed L. I. Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "is moulded by the entire socialist way of life, by the entire course of affairs in society, and, above all, by purposeful, persevering ideological and educational work by the Party, by all its organizations."¹

Following the 24th CPSU Congress, a number of Central Committee resolutions summed up the experience of ideological work and specified ways and means of improving it.

¹ 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 100.

The advances in science and technology are introducing novel aspects in the socio-economic conditions. Work with the masses has got to be of a higher order due to the people's rising political awareness and the greater flow of information.

Positive developments in world affairs have created favorable opportunities for the spread of socialist ideas. On the other hand, the ideological confrontation of the two systems is becoming more intensive and imperialist propaganda more refined. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress says: "There is no room for neutralism or compromise in the struggle between the two ideologies."¹

Conditions have changed. And the Party's ideological work must conform with these changes. There must be closer coordination between political, ethical and labor education with variations to suit the different population groups.

* * *

Party propaganda in Soviet society performs a truly humanist mission. It inspires Soviet citizens, enhances their human dignity, arouses creative energy in them, promotes the flourishing of their personality. Not "the coercion of minds" or "manipulation", as the falsifiers maintain, but persuasion—this is its only method.

"Sovietologists" ignore the fact that one of the principal missions of Party propaganda is to determine correctly the demands of the people, to take their interests into account in the making of decisions.

The postwar history of the Soviet state shows that the working people of the USSR responded with enthusiasm to the decisions of the Party and the government. This is understandable. After all, they had a precise and clear understanding of the purpose of what was being done. The

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 88.

correctness of the Party's overall policy, its realism, were determined first of all by the fact that the Party was well informed as to the needs of the population and took those needs into account.

2. ANTI-COMMUNISTS' FALSIFICATION OF THE THEORETICAL ACTIVITY OF THE CPSU

In its practical activity, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has always been guided by revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine. However, Communists never forget Lenin's commandment that socialists must not regard Marxism as something completed and inviolable, that in order to keep pace with life they must develop the theory in all directions.¹

Following the commandments of their leader, the Communists of the Soviet Union have developed and extended Marxist-Leninist theory in new historical conditions, have contributed much that is new to the international store of revolutionary experience.

Before the war, the Communist Party gave theoretical foundation to and proved the practical wisdom of Lenin's instructions on the need to industrialize the country, collectivize its agriculture and carry out a cultural revolution.

The CPSU's conclusions on the complete and final triumph of socialism in the USSR were historically important for Marxist-Leninist theory.

The theoretical propositions on building a socialist society worked out by the CPSU and corroborated by its practical activity are now studied and taken into consideration by Communist and Workers' Parties throughout the world in their revolutionary struggle. All this provokes furious attacks by "sovietologists" on the theoretical activity of the CPSU.

They deny, first of all, the very possibility of the Commu-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, pp. 211-12.

nist Party's combining in its activity two requirements that are a matter of fundamental importance: 1) steadfastness to Marxism-Leninism and 2) a creative approach to theory, development of theory in accordance with the changing conditions of the life of society.

If Marxism-Leninism is inviolable, they reason, how can it be developed, and on the other hand, if it is constantly developing how can we speak of its inviolability? Such logic is typical of bourgeois ideologists, for they do not take into account the laws of dialectics, hence deny the internal development of objective phenomena.

When they do speak of the development of the theory of scientific communism, they recommend to Communists the sort of "evolution" that in fact implies renunciation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. As the means for such "evolution" anti-communists have selected the so-called "theory of ideological (or cultural) convergence".

The American "sovietologist" Leonard Benson, for example, asserts in his *National Purpose. Ideology and Ambivalence in America* that all ideologies, especially those which seriously influence the life of society, have similar points of departure and similar ultimate goals. Therefore, in his opinion, there is a possibility for symbiosis, for a combination of ideologies.¹ Another anti-communist, Frederick Schuman, propounds a similar argument in his *The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect* (1962). He writes that "cultural convergence" is an "inevitable and unplanned process" in which different (even opposing) societies are influenced by the pressure of hidden tendencies and forces which may have different roots but similar results if we have in mind their influence on people's lives.

These abstract lines of reasoning are made more concrete by Professor Ossip Flechtheim of the Free University in West Berlin. He argues that, from the historical point of

¹ L. Benson, *National Purpose. Ideology and Ambivalence in America*, Washington, 1963, p. 5.

view, capitalism and socialism are transitional stages of development that will not last out the century. As both sides become aware of the imperfections of this stage, readiness for compromise should grow. In competing, they must make compromises. This allegedly demonstrates the need for working out new views and methods. Such a task can be carried out, asserts Flechtheim, by the new philosophy that has become widespread in the FRG, Austria, Britain, France and the United States—futurology.

However, a symbiosis of opposing ideologies is an unscientific, unreal undertaking. Socialist ideology, which rejects the exploitation of man by man and provides the scientific foundation for the law of the transformation of society along communist lines, not only cannot merge with, it cannot peacefully coexist with bourgeois ideology, which justifies the dominance of a handful of exploiters over the majority of the people.

In *What Is to Be Done?*, Lenin emphasized: "...The only choice is—either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a 'third' ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology."¹ This proposition retains its force to this day.

To waive Marxist-Leninist ideology in the name of "compromises" or the formation of some "new philosophy" à la the above-mentioned "futurology" would for the peoples of the Soviet Union mean in the final analysis to renounce the building of communism and to move towards the restoration of a bourgeois order. This is what bourgeois ideologists count on.

Hence it is not difficult to understand that in the struggle of the two ideologies, "ideological convergence", as the

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 384.

Soviet scholar A. N. Yakovlev notes in his "*Pax Americana*". *Imperial Ideology: Sources, Doctrines*, "is given the role of weakening the opponent, of sowing illusions, good-natured infantilism, and then, covered by hypocritical talk of 'ideological compromises' in the interests of all concerned, of introducing its own ideology, expanding the sphere of influence of the bourgeois view of the world".¹

In present-day "sovietology", fruitless attempts are made to disclose contradictions and mutually exclusive theoretical propositions developed by the CPSU in different periods of the life of the Soviet state. For example, the West German neo-fascist theoretician Theodor Arnold has discovered in the history of Soviet society in the 1950s a "thaw" that he defines as an attempt by "Soviet society (or at least its enlightened upper stratum), to free itself from the ideological torpor of institutionalized Marxism-Leninism and to search for values that can be truly guiding images for the new society and the 'new man'".²

The period when J. V. Stalin was General Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee enjoys the special "attention" of bourgeois ideologists. Speculating with the cult of Stalin's personality, anti-communists strike out the historic achievements of the Soviet people accomplished under the leadership of the CPSU in the period from the 1930s to the 1950s.

This stage, according to "sovietologists", was marked by a "decline" and "stagnation" of social thought in the USSR. Such inventions are nothing more than anti-communists' wishful thinking.

In the postwar period, Marxist-Leninist theory advanced to a new plane. The 20th Congress of the CPSU was an important landmark in this development. Scientific analysis of the Party's activity in the years preceding the Congress

¹ A. N. Yakovlev, "*Pax Americana*". *Imperial Ideology: Sources, Doctrines*, Moscow, 1969, p. 280 (in Russian).

² *Die Geschichte Sowjetrusslands (1917-1964)*, Bd. 12, S. 54.

and the events that had transpired in the world under the influence of the achievements of the socialist system, made it possible for the Congress to advance and provide a basis for a number of new propositions on the fundamental problems of international development and on some questions of building communism. These included: more concrete expression of the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems as applied to the present era; the conclusion that it is indeed possible to forestall a world war; development of the Leninist proposition on the variety of ways by which different countries will pass to socialism and the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism under certain specific conditions; determination of the ways to deal with the principal economic task in the USSR.

Simultaneously, the Party singled out serious shortcomings in ideological work—a certain gap between this work and the practical tasks of building communism, dogmatism and scholasticism—and waged a determined struggle against them. The Party thereby strengthened—rather than undermined, as “sovietologists” attempt to convince gullible readers—the foundations of Marxism-Leninism. Drawing new theoretical conclusions that issue from the requirements of life itself, the Party remained true to the testament of Marx, Engels and Lenin. It struggled against international opportunism, which rejects the dictatorship of the proletariat, substituting petty reforms for revolutionary transformation of society. The CPSU has staunchly defended Marxism-Leninism’s cardinal propositions on the political leadership of the working class, headed by the Communist Party, in all forms of transition to socialism and communism.

It is well known that at the 20th Congress of the CPSU the cult created around the person of Stalin was subjected to harsh criticism. The Party has launched a strong campaign to eliminate its consequences. The Congress recognized the need to ensure precise and unconditional observation of Leninist norms in Party life and obliged all Communists

to study with even greater persistence the theory of Marxism-Leninism, to combat distortion of that theory uncompromisingly, to link ideological work with the everyday practice of building communism. Attempts by imperialist propaganda to exploit the criticism of the cult of personality in the USSR for ideological subversion failed completely.

Nevertheless, anti-communists have not given up their efforts to find “weak spots” in the theory of Marxism-Leninism, they repeatedly assert that socialist ideology is “dogmatic” and “conservative”, that it is isolated from real life.

Some “sovietologists” prefer a more “differentiated” approach to the history of Soviet social thought in the last decade. Slandering it, they, at the same time, “magnanimously” point to some “bright” spots.

The Politics of Ideas in the USSR, one volume in “The Contemporary Soviet Union Series” edited by Robert Conquest, maintains that the “thaw” in the intellectual life of Soviet society that had lasted down to the end of 1961 was at the beginning of 1962 replaced by a “reaction”. As one might guess, the boundary separating these two periods is the 21st Congress of the CPSU.¹ Kurt Marko, a West German “sovietologist”, finds the demarcation between “light” and “dark” in the history of the USSR in the last decade in the October (1964) plenary session of the CC CPSU.²

Isaac Deutscher and the authors of the French yearbook *L'année dans monde* associate the alleged change-over to the so-called “conservatism” with the 23rd Party Congress.

All the above-mentioned attempts to divide the history of the USSR into two parts: “liberal” (or “semi-liberal”) and “conservative”, are not based on objective study of Soviet reality, but on a false, biased selection of material.

The CPSU has always determinedly defended Marxism-Leninism from encroachments by its enemies and has at

¹ *The Politics of Ideas in the USSR*, New York, 1967.

² K. Marko, *Evolution wider Willen*, Graz-Wien-Köln, 1968, S. 100.

the same time developed this eternally vital doctrine, enriching it with new conclusions and propositions.

The 21st Congress of the CPSU, summing up the activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet people since the October Revolution, concluded that socialism had triumphed in the Soviet Union completely and irreversibly. This conclusion was inseparably connected with Lenin's proposition that socialism could triumph at first in a few or even in a single country.

New proof of the Communist Party's creative approach to Marxist-Leninist teaching were the decisions and documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, which adopted the first program in the world for the construction of a communist society. The materials of the Congress gave scientific substantiation to the regularities of the transition from socialism to communism.

In the resolutions of the plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee, in the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, in the theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" (June 1967) and "On the Centenary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin" (December 1969), the Party elaborated in more specific terms and developed a number of the propositions of the Program.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU marked an important new step in the development of Marxist-Leninist theory. The Congress gave a profound and thorough analysis of present-day socialist society, of the ways for building the material and technological base for communism, of the socio-political development of the country, of the tasks involved in shaping the new man. The Congress reviewed at length the current problems in the development of the world socialist system, of the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of the world, and adopted a realistic program for the struggle for peace.

In furtherance of the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, much has been done to elaborate topical problems of

Marxist-Leninist theory. Party documents sum up the immense experience of building the new society and analyse the latest processes in international affairs. There are impressive achievements in philosophy, economics and history, and in the study of political and social problems. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress says: "At the present stage in the country's development, the need for further creative elaboration of theory, far from diminishing, has, in fact, been growing. Fresh opportunities for fruitful general theoretical, fundamental, and applied research arise in inter-disciplinary areas, notably in the natural and the social sciences."¹

The 25th Congress called on Soviet scientists to study all elements and aspects of the developed socialist society. The Party and the Soviet state require research relating to production and management, and recommendations that would assure the utmost growth of production efficiency. Closer studies are required of the objective laws and development tendencies in such fields as the productive forces, social and political system of the Soviet society, its highly varied culture, socialist way of life, the development of the state, the forms and methods of ideological work, public opinion, the environment, population trends, use of natural resources, and demographic policy.

These most important landmarks in the theoretical work of the CPSU give us every justification for refuting the conjectures of the "convergionists" and their supporters as to the "conservatism" and "dogmatism" that have allegedly prevailed in the USSR in recent years.

No matter how bourgeois ideologists strive to discredit Marxism-Leninism, it not only continues in existence, it is also developing. Emerging as a scientific expression of the vital interests of the proletariat, the ideas of Marxism-Len-

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 86.

inism have become the leading ideas of our age, the motive force of the universal social progress.

Marxist-Leninist teaching on the construction of a new society has found extensive and irrefutable confirmation in the experience of the Communist Party and the Soviet people. All-encompassing social progress, as events in the Soviet Union have shown, is possible only along the path of socialist development.

The science of building a socialist society, embodied in the socialism that exists in the USSR, is an outstanding contribution to the theory of scientific communism.

Anti-communists would like Soviet citizens to lose their point of reference in their enormous work, to forget the ultimate goal in the welter of everyday concerns, to abandon their class approach to the phenomena of social life. But this has not occurred, and never shall.

"... If we have successfully traversed a long and difficult road and withstood all trials with honour," L. I. Brezhnev has noted, "it is above all due to the fact that we have always used our most reliable weapon, the Marxist-Leninist teaching, undeviatingly adhered to it and developed it further...."

"Marxism-Leninism has become the ideological banner of the Soviet people. It is the greatest gain of our revolution and the key to the victory of communism."¹ Marxism-Leninism is the doctrine of innovators travelling uncharted paths.

Soviet citizens meet the future calmly and joyfully. They are the masters of their fate. Marxism-Leninism gives them their confidence in the future—in the hands of the Party it is a powerful tool for scientific prevision and leadership.

The historical experience of the CPSU and the development of the international communist and workers' movement have shown in practice the importance of the great doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Marxist-Leninist rev-

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 70.

olutionary theory is the only reliable and effective guide for Communists throughout the world in their struggle for the liberation of working people from imperialist slavery. Bourgeois ideologists cannot but know and understand this—and so they try all the harder to discredit Leninism, to "prove" its "narrow, national" specific character, allegedly applicable only to Russia.

The experience of the CPSU and the other Communist and Workers' Parties has fully borne out the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the processes of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course.

These laws are: guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist party, the establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the alliance of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry and other sections of the working people; the abolition of capitalist ownership and the establishment of public ownership of the basic means of production; gradual socialist reconstruction of agriculture; planned development of the national economy aimed at building socialism and communism, at raising the standard of living of the working people; the carrying out of the socialist revolution in the sphere of ideology and culture and the creation of a numerous intelligentsia devoted to the cause of socialism; the abolition of national oppression and the establishment of equality and fraternal friendship among peoples; defense of the achievements of socialism against attacks by external and internal enemies; solidarity of the working class of the country concerned with the working class of other countries.¹

In our day—an era of class battles in capitalist countries, an era when the ideas of Leninism are finding increasing

¹ *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1960, p. 14.

support in the world—bourgeois theoreticians make special efforts to demonstrate the “incompatibility” of the struggle for both national and international interests, and for the common goals of the working class. The internationalist basis of Marxist-Leninist doctrine is not to their taste.

“Sovietologists” peddle the phoney idea of a disintegration of the doctrine of world communism and the end of the unity of Marxist-Leninist teaching. In place of the latter, as they see it, there has developed a “pluralism” or a multiplicity of national forms of Marxism, this allegedly signifying the triumph of nationalism over internationalism.

Within the framework of the false thesis of the “disintegration” of Marxism-Leninism, of Marxist “pluralism”, there is a subsidiary thesis to the effect that Marxism, as an allegedly purely “Western” doctrine, is counterposed to Leninism, which is allegedly an ideological product of “Russian backwardness” or is of a “purely Russian” character.

In fact, Marxism and Leninism are inseparable parts of a whole, there are no “Russian” and “Western” varieties. Leninism is the further development of Marxism as applied to the conditions and requirements of the modern age.

“The international character of Leninism”, M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, has observed, “is a product of the following principal circumstances:

“First, for a number of historical reasons Russia was at the beginning of the 20th century the focal point of all the principal contradictions of the world imperialist system, and the October Revolution was the point of departure and the pivot of the modern international revolutionary process....

“Second, the international character of Leninism is a function of the multifaceted experience of the October Revolution itself, as of the experience of building socialism in the USSR that followed the October Revolution....

“Third, on the strength of the position of Russia on the boundary between the developed capitalist countries of the West and the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries of the East, the Russian workers’ movement inevitably linked

up with the West European revolutionary workers’ movement, on the one hand, and with the national liberation movement of the colonial peoples, on the other. . . . Leninism summed up the experience, forms and methods of the revolutionary movement and the national liberation struggle of all countries.

“Fourth, Leninism developed not in a vacuum, but on the solid foundation of Marxism. . . .”¹

Developing and enriching Marxism, Leninism became the theoretical basis for the present-day communist movement. This truth was confirmed with especial force at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow in June 1969. The Meeting was a major achievement of the communist, workers’ and liberation movement. It demonstrated the increased tendency of Communist and Workers’ Parties to unite for the sake of common interests, from which the interests of the individual parties are inseparable.

The Meeting was held on the threshold of the centenary of V. I. Lenin’s birth. In commemoration of this date, the Meeting unanimously adopted a most important ideological document, an address “Centenary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin”. Inspiring and profound were the words of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, on Lenin and his immortal teaching: “‘With Leninism in our minds and hearts we shall win!’ sang the Bulgarian partisans, the Bulgarian Communists and patriots in the years of the antifascist struggle.

“With Leninism in our minds and hearts, we participants in this Meeting are building socialism and fighting capitalism and imperialism, for peace and democracy, for the triumph of our great cause.

“Lenin lives, Lenin is with us! Otherwise the world communist and workers’ movement would not have scored such successes in the battle against the class enemy.

¹ M. A. Suslov, *Selected Works. Speeches and Articles*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 578-79 (in Russian).

"Lenin lives, Lenin is with us! Because we have grown and developed under the influence of Leninism, because the modern world communist movement has won all its victories under the banner of Leninism, because only under that banner can it win in future."¹

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist parties have carried out enormous theoretical work. As a result, the position of Leninism has become stronger on an international scale.

It is difficult to overestimate the international importance of the decisions of the 23rd, 24th and 25th Congresses of the CPSU, of the documents drawn up by the Central Committee of the Party on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution, the centenary of the birth of V. I. Lenin, the 50th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All sorts of "national variants" of Marxism, propagandized by the ideologists of imperialism together with opportunists and revisionists, are a distortion of the essence of Marxism-Leninism as the international doctrine of the working class.

History demonstrates that the interests of the working class in every country, the interests of the progressive development of all peoples, i.e., their truly national interests, not only do not contradict the international interests of the struggle of the working class, of all working people, but coincide with them.

Marxism-Leninism is a cohesive revolutionary doctrine, the ideological compass for the working class and working people of the entire world at all stages of their great struggle for freedom, a better life, for the creation of the most just society—communism. It is the point of departure for all genuine revolutionaries in their noble activity, illumined by a great goal. The attitude to the unity and integrity of

¹ *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, pp. 301-02.*

Marxism-Leninism is the touchstone of a genuinely revolutionary spirit in the present ideological struggle between the forces of socialism and capitalism.

* * *

The theoretical activity of the CPSU is subjected to malicious falsification by anti-communists.

The false dilemma, "dogmatism" or "convergence", that "sovietologists" have invented with respect to the postwar development of socialist ideology in the USSR indicates, among other things, the limited scope of bourgeois sociopolitical thought, its incomprehension of dialectics, which is the creative method of Marxism-Leninism. Bourgeois philosophers are unable to understand how Marxism-Leninism can develop while retaining its fundamental tenets. They cannot grasp this. History shows, however, that the socialist ideology in the USSR has developed constantly, but has retained *in toto* its revolutionary essence.

The presentation of Marxism-Leninism by some "sovietologists" in the guise of bourgeois pragmatism, with its postulate that "that which is useful is true" has no ground to stand on. Marxism-Leninism defines the tendencies in the development of Soviet society through knowledge of the objective laws operating within that society, it is a great organizing and transforming force in the hands of the CPSU. Typical of Marxist-Leninist theory is not recording the events that have occurred, not endless apologetics, but sober and critical explication of the road that has been travelled by the CPSU and the Soviet people.

The idea of "pluralism" in Marxism-Leninism, propounded extensively in "sovietology", is an attempt to make speculative capital out of manifestations of nationalism that have not yet been eliminated from the world communist movement. With the aid of this theory, the imperialist bourgeois attempts to fragment the Marxist-Leninist doctrine into a plethora of national "variants",

3. THE TRUE SENSE OF THE "THEORY OF DEIDEOLOGIZATION"

Life continually provides fresh evidence of the crisis and overturns the dogmas of anti-communism. "Sovietologists" attempt to find a way out of their intellectual cul-de-sac by maintaining that there is no need for ideology (they have in mind primarily socialist ideology) in an age of scientific and technological revolution. For this purpose they have moved their "theory of deideologization" to the firing line. This theory was advanced in 1960, by the American sociologists Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset. In 1964, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, in their treatise *Political Power: USA/USSR*, outlined the heart of this theory briefly and clearly. "Ideological fervor is characteristic of only the early phases of the industrialization process," they argued. "The age of ideology has already come to an end in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. It will soon come to an end in the Soviet Union."¹ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a well-known American historian, has argued in the same spirit that "the ideological age is waning."²

This point of view is absolutely unacceptable for a Marxist. Ideology is an inseparable part of class society, determined in the final analysis by the requirements of the development of its material life. As a part of the superstructure, ideology in turn affects the development of society. The interests of the different classes can be expressed only by means of ideology.

Humanity's entry into an age of scientific and technological revolution does not reduce, let alone abrogate, the role of ideology—ideology's role in fact increases. Social life becomes more complex, the volume of information increases precipitously, the level of education rises, the "struggle for minds" in the international arena picks up. As a result, the number

¹ Z. Brzezinski and S. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, 1964, p. 11.

² *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 3, 1967, p. 23.

of ideological institutions and the size of their staffs, particularly in the most important capitalist power, the United States, increases. Yet Brzezinski asserts: the United States has always been a pragmatic society free of ideological fetters. He is concerned lest the United States yield to internal and external ideologization.

However, statements of this sort are in clear contradiction with reality. It is, after all, evident to any unprejudiced observer that bourgeois ideology plays an enormous role in the United States. This is clear, in particular, in the fact that the American government is making increased use of ideological consultants and assistants. It was not happenstance, for example, that one of the most important ideologists of the capitalist world, Walt Rostow, was an official advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

A document entered into the *Congressional Record* under the title "Winning the Cold War: the US Ideological Offensive", was eloquent in its advocacy of making maximum use of the mass media to discredit communist ideas in the eyes of the peoples of the entire world.¹

The slogan of "deideologization" is meant to obscure American imperialism's ideological war. Open confrontation between bourgeois and communist ideologies has, as we know, never redounded to the advantage of the former. The anti-communists' tactics are now being revised. Plans are being worked out for covert "bridge building" into socialist countries, i.e., through the development of economic, cultural, tourist and other contacts to "ideologize" these countries in a bourgeois spirit.

A number of liberal bourgeois sociologists have seen through to the hidden class motives of the concept of "deideologization". For example, Stephen Rousseau and James Farganis wrote in *The New Sociology* that "the end of ideology . . . is nothing more than the ideology of the *status quo*."

¹ *Congressional Record*, Vol. 110, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 18, September 29, 1964, p. 23156.

It can be so described in the sense that if the good society has already been achieved, then, by definition, the need for structural criticism no longer exists. And American political thought ... is fast approaching the end of its ideological line".¹ Reading this, it is not difficult to understand the purpose of the myth of "deideologization": to maintain the reactionary exploitative order existing in the United States, to combat criticism of its underpinnings. The role of this "deideologized ideology" is just as reactionary in the international arena. "As for the underdeveloped countries," note Rousscau and Farganis, "the ideology of the *status quo* ... has consistently supported reactionary regimes in these underdeveloped areas and has resisted, or sought to modify in most cases, the pressures for fundamental change."²

The "theory of deideologization" is aimed squarely against the Soviet Union. Using the myth of deideologization, the falsifiers hope to find supplementary resources for their struggle against Marxism-Leninism. But the facts show that this myth has been of no real assistance to the anti-communists.

Some "deideologizers" make a direct appeal for following the Marxist example and creating a "new ideology" of their own as a guidepost on the road into the future. Brzezinski, for one, notes that there is a need for a new intellectual synthesis that can play a role in the coming age analogous to that of Marxism in the preceding age.³

Bourgeois theorists are, therefore, scarcely opposed to ideology in general. They do specifically oppose Marxism-Leninism, of whose power they are all too well aware.

Contemporary monopoly capitalism is increasingly revealing its hostility to the fundamental interests of the working people. In response to increasing oppression by big capital, there is a mounting protest by working people against

¹ *The New Sociology. Essays in Social Science and Social Theory in Honor of C. Wright Mills*, New York, 1964, p. 286.

² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

³ Z. Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era*, New York, 1970, p. 121.

the entire system of social relations in bourgeois states. In these conditions, bourgeois ideology is called upon continually to invent new means for distracting working people from class struggle, for masking the selfish interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

Advocating the theory of deideologization, bourgeois theorists intentionally fail to mention the propaganda empire that has taken shape in capitalist countries, the vast ideological indoctrination of the population that is carried on intensively in the countries of the "free world". One might well ask: why is all this being done if ideology as a social phenomenon has outlived itself?

Nor is it clear why in the West the research and propaganda apparatus pursuing the goal of smashing Marxist-Leninist doctrine is continually expanding. In the United States, for example, there is a ramified system of government departments and services that concern themselves with organizing, planning and carrying out ideological warfare against the Soviet Union.

If Marxism-Leninism were really dead, as bourgeois ideologists say, why is there a total mobilization of all the resources of anti-communism, both along state and private lines? It is enough to note that according to published figures the United States alone spends 500 million dollars per year on ideological warfare, which is approximately 100 times as much as Nazi Germany spent for the same purposes before the Second World War.

We can hardly expect that the "deideologizers" will give us answers to these questions. This is why some "sovietologists" criticize the myth of the "deideologization" of socialist ideology. Günther Wagenlehner, a West German publicist, has referred in "On the Question of the Future Development of Soviet Communist Ideology" to a widely shared opinion in the West that there is a process of "deideologization" in the Soviet Union, as a result of which Marxism-Leninism will inevitably collapse. Wagenlehner considers this opinion, based on an alleged gap between

the theory of scientific communism and the practice of Soviet life, incorrect.¹

Anti-communists need the thesis of "deideologization" not only to discredit socialist ideology, but also to conceal the progressive impoverishment of bourgeois ideology. In fact, the 20th century has seen no few "theories" in bourgeois philosophy and sociology, but none of them has withstood the test of time. Machism, pragmatism, neo-Kantianism, existentialism, Husserlism, neo-positivism, the latest theism and so on—in the last 50-60 years they have all suffered depreciation or collapse. Imperialist ruling circles demand of their ideological lackeys a more imposing counterweight to Marxism-Leninism.

The emergence of the theory of "deideologization" is one more demonstration of the unceasing ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism.

Such "theories" demonstrate the weakness of bourgeois ideology, its inability to answer the questions that trouble mankind. As the Program of the CPSU says, "the bourgeoisie is no longer in a position to put forward ideas that will induce the masses to follow it. More and more people in the capitalist countries are renouncing the bourgeois world outlook".² This is a crisis of a social system that has become a brake to humanity's social progress.

"Deideologization" reveals the aspirations of its proponents to assert that Marxism-Leninism has not been involved in the achievements of the Soviet socio-political system. In the countries of the so-called "free world", people who are inexperienced in politics are led to think that there is nothing to be found in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism when that doctrine is itself "dying".

However, it is not Marxism that is dying, but the reactionary ideology of imperialism, an ideology defending the

¹ G. Wagenlehner, "Zur Frage der künftigen Entwicklung der Sowjetkommunistischen Ideologie", *Osteuropa*, Stuttgart, 1968, no. 8/9.

² *The Road to Communism*, p. 497.

laws of the exploitation of man by man, an ideology bringing up members of society according to the principle that *homo homini lupus est*.

Marxism-Leninism expresses the fundamental interests of the working class and of all working people. These interests correspond in the final analysis to the direction of world socio-economic progress.

In our day, reality itself irrefutably confirms Lenin's words: "The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent because it is true."¹

* * *

The theory of "deideologization", widespread in "sovietology", is meant to conceal and overcome the actual irreconcilability of socialist and bourgeois ideology. Assertions to the effect that ideologies are outmoded and superfluous in the modern world are meant for the gullible. The imperialist bourgeoisie, with no intention at all of renouncing its own reactionary and entirely discredited ideology, hopes to obtain the ideological "disarmament" of the socialist system which possesses so powerful an implement for progress and the revolutionary transformation of society—Marxism-Leninism.

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 19, p. 23.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE CPSU AND ITS CRITICS

In recent years, anti-Soviet propaganda has put special accent on distorting the foreign policy of the CPSU. The growth of activity of anti-communist forces in this area is directly proportional to the achievements of the Soviet Union in the international arena.

These achievements have been connected, to an enormous extent, with the foreign policy program adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in April 1971 and subsequently known as the Soviet Peace Program. The Program advances tasks of universal historical import: to thwart the aggressive intrigues of imperialism, eliminate seats of military danger and implement the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

In dealing with these tasks, the CPSU has proceeded from the premise that the struggle for peace and the struggle for social progress are inseparable. Here we find the concrete expression of the class character of Soviet foreign policy. Maintaining a stable peace and strengthening international security are indispensable conditions for creating a most favorable situation for communist and socialist construction in the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, for the development of the anti-monopoly, anti-imperialist and national liberation struggle of the peoples of the capitalist and developing countries.

"Our foreign policy," stressed L. I. Brezhnev in his report "On the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics", "has always been and will continue to be a class policy, a socialist one in content and aim. And it is precisely its socialist character that makes it a peace policy.... From the first foreign-policy act of the Soviet power—the Decree on Peace—to the Peace Program of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, our Party and state have steadily adhered to the main guidelines of struggle for peace and for the freedom and security of the peoples."¹

The thirty-year period since the conclusion of the Great Patriotic War against fascism has been marked by a determined and consistent struggle by the CPSU and the Soviet government for the establishment of a stable peace on our planet. The achievements of Soviet foreign policy in the years since the 24th Congress of the CPSU are of special significance. Most important has been the reduction of the threat of a world nuclear missile war that faced mankind during the cold war, the emergence of more favorable prospects for maintaining universal peace. Under the impact of the policy of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, there has been a turn from cold war to détente in international relations.

The Peace Program, as all the previous peaceful undertakings by the CPSU and the Soviet government, has met with furious resistance from imperialist reaction. There has been an unceasing and heated ideological and political struggle around the principles of Soviet foreign policy.

The principal front in this struggle runs between the positions of Communists and the representatives of imperialist reaction. But it would be an oversimplification to reduce everything to the clash between these diametrically opposed forces. Examination of the different currents in bourgeois historiography and political science is of no little scholarly and political interest. One can clearly trace two different tendencies in bourgeois political science—one extremely reactionary, the other more moderate—reflecting the interests

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 80.

of the two principal groupings in the ruling circles of the capitalist world.

Lenin stressed the great importance, from the point of view of the foreign policy of a socialist state, of taking into account the contradictions among representatives of the capitalist class "who are inclined to settle the problem by war" and those "who are inclined towards pacifism, even the worst kind of pacifism, which from the communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism".¹ Lenin considered it permissible and desirable to conclude not only commercial, but also political agreements with the moderate wing of the bourgeois camp.²

The attitude to the questions of war and peace lies at the root of the differences between the above-mentioned groupings of the bourgeoisie (and the ideologists representing them), not to mention the struggle between Communists and the advocates of extreme reaction.

The acute contradiction between the advances of science and technology and their application to the purposes of destruction rather than creation made itself felt as early as the First World War. As a result, not only Russia but all other countries of the capitalist world connected through military obligations suffered enormous calamities. In a speech of June 4, 1918, Lenin indicated that war "might, . . . it inevitably would, undermine the very foundations of human society".³ Hence it became a priority task to preserve human society as such. After the First World War, which killed 10 million people and maimed 20 million, followed the even more destructive Second World War, which took 50 million lives and crippled 35 million others.

The danger that Lenin noted—that the very foundations of the existence of human society could be undercut—increased especially in the postwar period, when the scientific

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 264.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 42, p. 403.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 422.

and technological revolution and the attendant revolution in military technology led to the large-scale production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. Under these circumstances, the need to forestall a new world war has become a prime human and democratic task, on the handling of which depends the preservation of human society. Communists have led the struggle for peace, and have conducted this struggle resolutely and consistently. This is natural—Communists have no higher goal than to serve mankind and society.

Representatives of different classes and social groups have joined in the movement of peace forces. Appreciable strata of the bourgeoisie, too, have begun to advocate peace. This is, without question, a manifestation of realism on their part.

In this connection, the arguments of historians and political scientists reflecting the frame of mind of moderate bourgeois circles are of great interest. One would scarcely suppose that so convinced an anti-communist journal as *Problems of Communism*, published by the United States Information Agency, would be particularly sympathetic to these circles. But even it has been compelled to recognize their political weight as balanced against extreme right groupings. "Western evaluation of Soviet foreign policy," it has been noted in the journal, "has tended to oscillate between extremes. One of these extremes has been uncompromising rejection of any policy emanating from what was considered an ideologically-motivated power as voracious in subverting other societies as cancerous cells are in destroying healthy tissue. . . . At the other extreme, Western opinion has periodically swung over to a view of Soviet policies as simply those of another big power satisfied with its world position willing—if not eager—to fit into the concert of nations, and more concerned with its own security than with further expansion of its influence."¹

We should note in this regard that while there are no grounds for identifying the foreign policy activity of the

¹ *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1974, No. 6, p. 51.

Soviet state with the foreign policy of bourgeois states, we have here, on the part of Western advocates of a soft line, treatment of the USSR as an equal partner in international relations. This circumstance has played its role in the difficult and lengthy process of improving the international situation in the postwar years, in shaping an objective picture of the goals and nature of Soviet foreign policy.

The peaceful character of Soviet foreign policy stems from the essence of socialism, which expresses the interests of working people who require conditions of peace to build a life free of exploitation. There are no classes or strata in Soviet society with an interest in oppressing other classes or strata, hence there are no social causes for a policy of aggression and wars of conquest.

By its very existence, the socialism that has been built in the USSR has a revolutionizing effect on working people in capitalist countries. An ever increasing number of people are persuaded that socialism alone can put an end to the oppression of man by man, to social and national inequality, to unemployment, poverty, lack of confidence in the future, and so on. The character of our epoch—an epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism—is increasingly apparent. This is an objectively predictable law-governed historical process.

But reactionary imperialist circles neither understand nor wish to understand this. They have in the past cherished the hope—and they have not abandoned it now—of destroying socialism by force of arms. The most reactionary, chauvinist and aggressive cohorts of imperialism—German fascism—attempted this in their time. We know how this attempt ended.

In the early postwar period, imperialist reaction and its ideologists had no need to invent ways and forms for masking their aggressive aspirations with respect to the socialist system. These forms had largely been invented by their predecessors—the myth of a “communist conspiracy” and the “communist threat” allegedly stemming therefrom. This

myth lay at the heart of the cold war that imperialists unleashed against the USSR and other countries of the socialist community.

The voices of the present-day advocates of this myth echo those who launched the cold war. In April 1975, Governor George Wallace of Alabama, in an interview with David C. Broder published in the *International Herald Tribune*, “slipped into a conspiratorial theory of history which made it seem that American governments for the past two generations had been, wittingly or unwittingly, the agents of international Communism”. According to Wallace: “That’s what’s at the root of it—Communism, and we’re the ones who let the Communists take over Eastern Europe. I knew even when I was just a kid in the barracks that Communism was the real enemy. Hitler was bad, but if it hadn’t been Hitler, it would have been someone else, Schultz or someone, leading the Germans.” And he added: “Then when Hitler fought Russia, we were the ones who saved Russia. If it hadn’t been for our aid, the Germans and the Russians might have fought each other to death.”¹

This statement would be unremarkable but for the position of its author. The fact is, as Broder noted, that Wallace at one time occupied, according to public opinion polls, the leading position in the list of potential Democratic candidates for the presidency in 1976.

Curiously enough, in this, one might say, eccentric interview Wallace repeated almost literally what the then Senator Truman said during the war.

It is sometimes held in the American press that McCarthyism is over and done with. But as is clear from the interview above, the spirit of the unlamented Senator Joseph McCarthy, the inspirer of unbridled anti-communist hysteria in the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s, has not disappeared. More than likely, it is the example of Senator McCarthy, who in the course of the witchhunt accused many

¹ *International Herald Tribune*, April 7, 1975, p. 8.

respectable adherents of capitalism, enemies of communism, of belonging to the "Reds", that inspired Wallace to this type of statement.

But for the sake of justice we should note that most anti-communists in the West now try not to follow in the footsteps of McCarthy and Wallace and do not go so far as to see a "Red danger" where it has never been.

More balanced and less extreme ideologists among the reactionaries, while they may talk of a "communist conspiracy" and "threat", do so in a calmer manner. Typical of them is Leopold Labedz, a well-known British "sovietologist" and editor of the anti-communist quarterly *Survey*.

In an introduction to the January 1966 issue, Labedz wrote that for twenty, or almost twenty, years, the cold war seemed much as it had seemed when it dawned on a world expecting postwar cooperation among the Allies, a world which instead experienced "Soviet expansion", bellicose pressure and offensives under the slogan of peace. Seven years later, in a similar introduction, he insisted that this was still true.¹ According to Labedz, then, the postwar world longed for cooperation among the Allies, but instead the Soviet Union imposed the cold war upon it.

In the same issue, Richard Pipes, an American "sovietologist" and professor of history, seconded Labedz's assertion that it was the Soviet leadership that unleashed the cold war.² We shall dwell in some detail on the reasoning of this "sovietologist", since it is in some measure the "last word" in anti-Sovietism, deepening what was said earlier on this score by his colleagues. This is the more justified since, as Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, he, and some other "sovietologists", head up the anti-communist front.

"One way to describe what we will be talking about," writes Pipes, "is to borrow terms from the vocabulary of mil-

¹ *Survey*, No. 2, Spring 1973, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

itary science. The language of Soviet politics is permeated with militarisms: even the most pacific spheres of government activity become 'fronts' which have to be 'stormed', all-out 'offensives' are launched to conquer internal difficulties, and even peace itself becomes the object of a 'struggle'. The military language is appropriate, for . . . Soviet theory does not distinguish sharply between military and political forms of activity, regarding both as variant ways of waging conflict which it regards as the essence of history."¹

What we have here is a peculiar linguistic, or perhaps terminological, method of argument. Using such an unreliable method one can "prove" whatever one wants, for example, that Charles Darwin was a militarist because he often employed the "bellicose" expression "the struggle for existence" in his works.

Pipes does not confine himself in his treatise to terminological investigations. He attempts to explicate the sources of Soviet foreign policy, for this purpose resorting to crude slander: "...We may ascribe the significance of Leninism as an ideological force in the twentieth century to an innovative linking of politics with warfare—in other words, to the militarization of politics which Lenin was the first statesman to accomplish."²

And Pipes goes on: "Class war, of course, was and remains the common property of all socialist and anarchist movements of modern times. But to Lenin, more than to any other prominent radical of this period, it was a real, tangible thing: a daily, hourly struggle pitting the exploited against the exploiters and (after November 1917) what he defined as the 'camp of socialism' against that of 'capitalism' or 'imperialism'. What to Marx and Engels was a means, became for him an end. . . . All his thinking was militant."³

What is it that leads to the assertion of the "militancy"

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.

of Lenin's thinking, of his "militarization" of politics? Pipes cites Lenin's article "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", written on December 16, 1919: "An overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive point at the decisive moment—this 'law' of military success is also the law of political success."¹

Pipes also points to Lenin's high opinion of Karl von Clausewitz, a German military theorist and historian of the first half of the 19th century and author of *On War*, where Clausewitz wrote his well-known dictum "war is a continuation of policy by other means", which Lenin cited in his lecture "War and Revolution" (May 27, 1917).

Pipes further notes that Lenin took notes on Clausewitz's book and that these notes and comments were published in volume 12 of *Leninsky sbornik* (*Lenin Miscellany*).

Finally, Pipes cites an article by V. G. Sorin, a member of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Bureau of the Communist Party, "Marxism, Tactics and Lenin", published in *Pravda* on January 3, 1923. Sorin reported that Lenin recommended that Party members study the works of Clausewitz and take account of them in practical work.

That, in effect, is Pipes' entire historiographical argument, if we leave aside a fabrication revealing his extreme anti-Soviet bias, in the spirit of the worst period of the cold war: "Admiration for Clausewitz is something the Bolsheviks and the Nazis have in common."²

One is amazed by the immoderate "audacity" of the investigator who with these few facts attempts to work a revolution in the approach to the study of Leninism. Not in vain does he preface his article with the statement: "The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this remarkably ignored subject"³ (i.e., the allegedly "militant" character of

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 258.

² *Survey*, No. 2, Spring 1973, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Soviet politics in general, foreign policy in particular—*N. M.*).

Let us try to sort out the facts that Pipes has adduced. Yes, Lenin did have a high opinion of Clausewitz as a military theorist, Lenin did have a high regard for Clausewitz's many observations on war. But this does not at all mean, as Pipes supposes, that there is some basis for speaking of a militaristic inclination in Lenin.

Let us now take a look at Lenin's work "War and Revolution", which mentions Clausewitz.⁴ The spirit of Lenin's remarks is not the glorification of war, as Pipes seeks to prove covertly, but, on the contrary, the establishment of the historical necessity of eliminating war from the life of society: "Our aim is to achieve a socialist system of society, which, by eliminating the division of mankind into classes, by eliminating all exploitation of man by man and nation by nation, will inevitably eliminate the very possibility of war."² Pipes did not notice, as it were, this cardinal conclusion. He did not notice it because this conclusion refutes the false thesis on Lenin's militarization of politics.

In the light of Lenin's remarks, intentionally passed over by Pipes, we see the mendacity of his thesis that the class struggle was for Lenin an end in itself. Not class struggle for its own sake, but class struggle for the achievement of a socialist society that would eliminate all possibility of war of any kind—that was how Lenin framed the question. So much for the broad historical plane. If we take a more concrete situation, the situation at the time Lenin delivered his lecture, we find that Lenin provides a profound analysis. First and foremost, he condemns the first world war in history, a war into which the imperialist bourgeoisie had one way or another plunged almost all the peoples of the world. "The war is not a game, it is an appalling thing

⁴ Pipes cites the 3rd Russian edition, Vol. 30, p. 333, which quotes Clausewitz's dictum.

² V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, pp. 398-99.

taking toll of millions of lives, and it is not to be ended easily."¹

To the specific question of how to end the war, a question then vexing all working people in Russia, as well as the peoples of other countries, Lenin gave a marvellously precise answer.

"When power passes to the Soviets the capitalists will come out against us. Japan, France, Britain—the governments of all countries will be against us. The capitalists will be against, but the workers will be for us. That will be the end of the war which the capitalists started. There you have the answer to the question of how to end the war."² Lenin uttered these prophetic words more than five and one half months before the October Revolution. And they were confirmed in their entirety.

The Soviet state that emerged as a result of the revolution adopted, as its first official act, the Decree on Peace written by Lenin and calling on all warring peoples and their governments immediately to begin negotiations toward a just and democratic peace. But, as Lenin had predicted, the capitalists of all countries took up arms against the young Soviet Republic and unleashed armed intervention against her.

The revolution was forced to defend itself. In a difficult struggle against domestic and foreign enemies, the state of the workers and peasants held its own and emerged triumphant. It triumphed, too, because, as Lenin had predicted, the workers of all countries were for it.

And then came the end of the war.

For any objective investigator, there are enormous numbers of documents that reflect Lenin's titanic efforts in the first years of the Soviet state's existence to secure the country's exit from the war and to secure the establishment of peace on earth. Only extremely biased ideologists

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 420.

² Ibid., p. 421.

such as Pipes can ignore such facts as the uncompromising struggle by Lenin and his associates against "left communists" and Trotskyites who advocated a "revolutionary war" with Germany instead of peace. As we know, it was on Lenin's insistence that the Brest peace treaty was concluded with Germany. Another confirmation of the peaceful foreign policy that Lenin conducted was his struggle for a lengthy breathing space, for peaceful and business-like cooperation with capitalist countries. Pipes' anti-communist inclinations prevent him from seeing these facts.

Pipes interprets Lenin's article "The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", written on December 16, 1919, just as arbitrarily. Thus, Lenin argued that military and political advances can be obtained by identical means (by ensuring a decisive preponderance of force at the decisive moment). But can one conclude from this that Lenin identifies the conduct of military operations with political activity? Not in the least. He conditions the possibility of applying military methods in politics on a specific historical situation, in the given instance primarily on revolution, which is "a desperate struggle of classes that has reached the peak of ferocity".¹ Further, he demands the most precise definition of the objective for which methods similar to those used in war, in particular methods of force, are applied in politics. What was the objective in 1919? It is clear that what was at issue was the use of revolutionary violence against those who had unleashed civil war against the proletariat that had come to power.

Pipes ignores this most important circumstance. He is interested neither in sound logic nor in objective historical events and facts. He is concerned with something else—with slandering the policy of the CPSU, with making out that the leadership of the USSR is "devoid of a popular mandate or any other kind of legitimacy to justify its monop-

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 371.

oly of political power except the alleged exigencies of class war".¹

The working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party, have over the entire history of the Soviet power exercised leadership over the state only with the active support of the entire people, relying primarily on the method of persuasion. Only with the overwhelming majority of the population already persuaded was revolutionary coercion applied against a minority that opposed the will of the people. This was especially emphasized at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party (1919), which adopted a policy of alliance with the middle peasantry, which then made up the bulk of the country's population.

Naturally, during the Civil War and the foreign intervention the entire life of the country was based on the most stringent wartime discipline. This was the policy of "war communism".²

With the end of the Civil War, the Communist Party introduced the New Economic Policy, one of the important aspects of which was a switch from methods of wartime administration to methods of peacetime development, from methods of command to methods based exclusively on persuasion and explanation. Pipes prefers to pass over this turning point in the history of the Soviet state in silence, and with reason. Analysis of the situation in that segment of history undermines the false thesis of the permanent militarization of the CPSU's policy. The facts show irrefutably that it was Trotsky, not Lenin, who stood for permanent militarization, and it was against him that Lenin waged a determined fight. Trotsky favored maintaining the system of "war communism", he favored "tightening the screws", not wishing to reckon with the fact that the situation in the country had changed fundamentally. He

¹ *Survey*, No. 2, Spring 1973, p. 44.

² "War communism" was the economic policy of the Soviet state during the Civil War and foreign military intervention in the years 1919-1920.

advocated imposing methods of command on the working class, the application of coercion on a large scale against the peasantry. In the realm of foreign policy, Trotskyism preached the "export of revolution", i.e., the forcible implanting of revolution in other countries. Lenin and the Communist Party shattered the Trotskyites in uncompromising struggle, condemning their discredited platform and firmly and consistently following a policy of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems.

Pipes thus works a forgery, attributing to Lenin and the CPSU a Trotskyist point of view. Even before the October Socialist Revolution, Lenin had concluded that a period "of the coexistence side by side of socialist and capitalist states"¹ was historically inevitable. He emphasized that this coexistence must be based on peace and must be implemented in the spirit of a peaceful agreement and of genuine parity between "the two *property systems*".²

In its relations with capitalist states, the CPSU has always been guided firmly and unwaveringly by those propositions of Lenin. Its foreign policy activity is of a genuinely peaceful nature, which has become especially evident at present. Reactionary ideologists attempt to deny this feature to the policy of the CPSU. Instead, as does Pipes, they endow it with "militancy" and "aggressiveness". Countless facts from the postwar foreign policy activity of the CPSU, as well as the testimony of many of the most sober scholars and politicians representing moderate bourgeois circles, refute this invention. In the eyes of ever more people throughout the world, the CPSU is a true champion of a firm, just and democratic peace on our planet.

The 25th CPSU Congress showed once again that the Party's home and foreign policy is faithful to Lenin's ideas. Soviet foreign policy has always been centered on implementing Lenin's ideas—from the time of the Decree on

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 39.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. 33, p. 356.

Peace in 1917 to the Program for the Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples adopted by the 25th Congress in 1976.

Welded by identical aims and interests, ideals and policies, the socialist community exercises a strong influence on the course of world affairs and on millions of people across the world.

The recent years saw a turn from cold war to the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, achieved in sharp struggle and by strenuous effort.

The peaceful coexistence policy implies negotiations, agreements, a search for mutually acceptable solutions, sometimes involving compromises, and mutually beneficial cooperation with the capitalist countries. This was so in Lenin's time, and it is so today. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress says on this score: "Struggle to consolidate the principles of peaceful coexistence, to assure lasting peace, to reduce, and in a longer term to eliminate, the danger of another world war has been, and remains, the main element of our policy towards the capitalist states."¹

At the same time, Soviet foreign policy is a class policy in principle and aim. It is a class policy because it is based on the interests of socialism, the interests of socialist and communist construction. It is a class policy because, while following a consistent policy of peace, the Party is firm in its internationalist solidarity with the struggle of the peoples for freedom and social progress.

The 25th Congress analysed the present world situation and adopted a new constructive program of further struggle for peace and international cooperation and for the freedom and independence of the peoples. This program is a natural projection of the Peace Program of the 24th Congress, and

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, 25th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 20.

is based on its results. It sets the objective of consolidating peace, ending the arms race, and eliminating war and force from international relations, and testifies to the humanism and high-minded aims and actions of the fighters for communism, champions of the vital interests of the working people, of humanity as a whole.

CONCLUSION

The postwar history of the CPSU shows that only under the leadership of the Communist Party could the working class and the entire Soviet people surmount the enormous difficulties involved in rebuilding the country's war-ravaged economy.

True to Lenin's precepts, the Communist Party has in the postwar years, as earlier, unswervingly followed the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The great goal of the CPSU and the Soviet people—building a communist society—is simultaneously an internationalist cause. Through the inspired and selfless labor of Soviet people, led by the CPSU, the country has been transformed into an invincible bulwark of socialism, and its influence is growing throughout the world. The creation of a new social order, the constant growth of the economic, political, ideological and defense capacity of the Soviet Union, all this is one of the crucial conditions for the further change of the balance of forces in the international arena to the advantage of socialism and reinforces the preconditions for the social liberation of all working people on earth.

"The triumph of socialism," declared the head of the delegation of the Paraguayan Communist Party from the podium of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "is an undeniable fact, as is the decisive influence of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the fate of the world. . . .

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"The growing might of the socialist camp has changed the balance of power in the international arena to the advantage of the forces of peace, national independence and progress. The crucial role of the CPSU and the Soviet state in rallying the socialist countries, in further strengthening their achievements, is the highest expression of their internationalism, their unshakeable fidelity to Marxism-Leninism."

Addressing the millions of members of the Soviet Communist Party, Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, said at the 25th Congress of the CPSU:

"Since the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the peoples of the Soviet Union under the guidance of Lenin's Party have coped with unheard-of difficulties and performed tasks of truly gigantic proportions to move ahead steadily along their historical path. The power of the working class and all working people, the democratism of the Soviet system, and the creative powers of a people free from exploitation have produced the world's first socialist state, the mighty Soviet Union. Ever since 1917 the Soviet Union has been the decisive factor behind the favourable changes in international affairs. The Soviet people have always made the greatest sacrifices in the interests of world peace, the freedom of the peoples and social progress.

"The past of the Soviet Union is a great and historical lesson, its present is an example to be followed, and the future a brilliant perspective. . . . The historical experience of the Soviet Union merits the closest attention and will never lose its relevance."

The historical experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is an example for all the progressive forces of the world.

The results of the creative activity of the CPSU constantly influence millions of people in the capitalist world, prompting them to compare, to rate the two opposing socio-economic systems. Their judgement is becoming increasingly profound and all-encompassing.

The level of material prosperity is a very important index, but the scale of measurement is now much broader in scope. It includes society's political face, its morality and culture. Many of these indices have a substantial influence on the quality of life.

As the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the United States, Gus Hall, said at the 24th Congress of the CPSU:

"How can you weigh the growing sense of insecurity, alienation and frustration of not being involved, not being a factor, under capitalism with that of being totally involved and relevant, of being able to determine the course of life that flows from the inner nature of socialism."

Socialism is sure to come out the winner in the historical competition of the two socio-economic world systems. Capitalism is moving to its doom, for the concepts of progress and capitalism are mutually exclusive.

"Today, when the capitalist world is in the throes of a profound economic crisis and when unemployment, demoralisation, insecurity and chaos are tightening their grip on bourgeois states," said Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba Central Committee and the Cuban Prime Minister, at the 25th CPSU Congress, "a continuous process of material, social and spiritual progress is seen in the optimistic, victorious and confident Soviet society. This is incontrovertible proof that a better future is possible for all mankind."

Now that man has discovered anti-particles and antibodies, the "sovietologists'" pleas for a return to capitalism in the socialist countries have the ring of evil irony. The "history" invented by them about the activity of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet state is, in fact, nothing but an anti-history.

The aspiration to discredit Marxist-Leninist doctrine, to cause a split in the international communist movement, to sow doubt as to the appropriateness of Party leadership of civic and economic life—this is the principal substance of

anti-communist historiography. For these purposes "sovietologists" have thought up pseudo-scientific theories of the "single industrial society", "political and economic convergence" and so on. All these theories are based on a crude falsification of objective reality. It is with the aid of these theories that imperialist propaganda describes the postwar history of the CPSU. However, no matter how anti-communists distort the truth, the course of world history shows that the future belongs to Communism.

The passage of all countries to socialism, and then to communism, is an objective historical law. Just as logical is the leadership of this process by the most advanced and revolutionary contingents of the working people—Communist parties, the great strength of which is Marxist-Leninist doctrine.